The U.S. Military’s Anti-Houthi Campaign Still Isn’t Working

The problem, however, is that it’s not working.

Washington’s approach to the Houthis is the epitome of strategic malpractice. It won’t work, costs too much, jeopardizes the lives of American servicemembers stationed in the region to protect primarily foreign vessels, and risks further destabilizing Yemen as well as the broader region. Moreover, though the Houthis maintain their own unique incentives, Washington’s refusal to acknowledge Israel’s war in Gaza as the original catalyst of the Houthis’ attacks prevents any hopes of stopping these attacks in the Red Sea. Washington should immediately end its military activity against the Houthis, press European and Asian states to take a more proactive role in protecting their own shipping vessels, and stop subsidizing Israel’s war in Gaza in the hopes of deescalating rising tensions across the Middle East.

There are three main problems with Washington’s current Houthi strategy.

First, it is devoid of concrete and achievable political objectives while burdening American taxpayers with inordinate costs. Since November 2023, the Houthis have conducted roughly 200 drone and missile attacks targeting commercial and military vessels in the Red Sea, sinking two vessels and killing at least three sailors. In turn, the United States reached for its usual Middle East playbook — military force — spearheading Operation Prosperity Guardian in December 2023, and Operation Poseidon Archer in January 2024.

According to U.S. officials, these efforts are meant to “restore deterrence.” The United States has already shot down over 150 Houthi drones and missiles. Compared to the Houthis’ missiles and drones — each costing around $2,000— the U.S. Navy’s missiles used to shoot down these projectiles cost American taxpayers millions of dollars. So far, Washington has spent over $1 billion on munitions to strike the Houthis and intercept incoming missiles and drones.

Yet, these efforts have failed to deter the Houthis, nor are they likely to. Put simply, they see the benefits of conducting these attacks — namely, the political benefit of brandishing their defense of the Palestinian cause — as far outweighing the costs being imposed by the United States. In fact, the majority of the attacks perpetrated by the Houthis happenedafter the United States and its partners began their retaliatory campaign, showing plainly that U.S. efforts have failed to deter further violence.

The U.S. is also unlikely to considerably degrade the Houthi’s capabilities to the point that they can no longer attack vessels transiting the Red Sea. After nearly 10 years of fighting against Saudi-led forces — supported by the United States — they have proven adept at the “shoot and scoot” method of combat and their weapons are cheap, highly mobile, and dispersed across Yemen.

What’s ironic is that U.S. officials recognize the disconnect between this military campaign and its ostensible political aims.

Rear Admiral George Wikoff, the U.S. Naval commander in charge of Operation Prosperity Guardian, noted in February that the group “has not been deterred.” In August, Wikoff explained a solution to this conflict “is not going to come at the end of a weapons system.” But President Biden best summed up this disconnect when asked about U.S. airstrikes against the Houthis: “Are they stopping the Houthis? No. Are they going to continue? Yes.”

Though the Houthis’ attacks have disrupted global shipping and freedom of navigation through the Red Sea, America’s tit-for-tat military engagement has not resolved this issue. Commercial shipping traffic through the Red Sea has decreased considerably as a result of the Houthis’ attacks. There has been a significant effort to re-route these vessels — the majority of which are bound for Europe — which has led to increased shipping costs and some delays, namely for European vessels and consumers.