Vietnam confronts China with island building in South China Sea
WASHINGTON — Vietnam has ramped up its building of islands in the disputed South China Sea to bolster its position in relation to China, say experts, but does not pose any threat to the other main claimant in the area, the Philippines.
Since November last year, Vietnam has accelerated the expansion of its outposts in the Spratly Islands, according to a report published earlier this month by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, or AMTI, at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.
According to the report, Vietnam constructed 280 hectares (1 square mile) of land across 10 features it controls in the archipelago in the first half of 2024, compared with a total of 301 hectares (1.2 square miles) in the first 11 months of 2023 and the whole of 2022 combined.
Beijing still controls the three largest outposts in the Spratly chain but, thanks to the recent dredging and landfill work, Hanoi now controls the next four largest. Manila’s largest island in the archipelago — Thitu — ranks ninth in size.
Vietnam and the Philippines have been locked in a decadeslong territorial dispute with China over the South China Sea and its islands despite a ruling in 2016 by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague that dismissed China’s claim to most of the sea. That claim infringes on the exclusive economic zones of several coastal states.
“Boosting presence”
Vietnam’s acceleration of island building took place after Hanoi upgraded ties with Washington to the highest level in September 2023 and agreed to building a “community of shared future” with Beijing in early December.
“It’s a good timing for Vietnam to step up dredging,” Hoang Viet, a lecturer at University of Law in Ho Chi Minh City who closely monitors the situation in the South China Sea, told VOA over the phone.
Hanoi has learned a lesson from Manila’s recent stand-off with Beijing over the Second Thomas Shoal in which Chinese coast guard vessels attempted to block the Philippines’ resupply missions to its troops on a grounded vessel. Viet said the lack of an expanded outpost there puts Manila at a disadvantage.
It will be more complicated for Beijing to harass a claimant that has a strengthened garrison on a disputed feature, he said, so it’s imperative that Hanoi speed up dredging in the South China Sea if it wants to safeguard its presence in the area.
He said legal action is not enough for Hanoi or Manila to push their claims if they are not accompanied by an actual military presence, noting that the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s 2016 ruling has not helped the Philippines much against Chinese aggression.
“It’s Chinese aggression that has prompted Vietnam to carry on its own reclamation. Vietnam had seen no need to do that prior to Chinese reclamation and militarization in the South China Sea,” he said.
Harrison Pretat, deputy director of AMTI, told VOA in an email that the new reclamation will give Vietnam several more large ports in the Spratly Islands.
“This may allow Vietnam to begin operating more coast guard or militia vessels in disputed areas for long periods, without having to make the long return journey to Vietnam’s coast,” he said.
“It is also possible that Vietnam could build a second airstrip in the Spratly Islands, enhancing its ability to move personnel and supplies quickly and potentially conduct maritime air patrols,” he said.
Viet also cited Vietnam’s need to build strongholds in the waters to help with search and rescue operations for its fishermen caught in rough weather, as well as to prevent them from engaging in illegal fishing in its neighbors’ waters.
“Not provocative to Manila”
Viet said Vietnam’s dredging is “unlikely to stoke tension” in the South China Sea given that “it is purely for development or defense purposes, not to threaten or attack other claimants.”
“Beijing has little reason to protest because they reclaimed twice as much land, while Washington and Manila understand Vietnam’s motive,” he said.
Hanoi and Manila have overlapping claims to features in the Spratly chain, but incidents between the two countries have been rare, while bilateral ties were strengthened during President Ferdinand Marcos’ state visit to Hanoi earlier this year. The two countries agreed to increase coast guard cooperation.
Two days after AMTI released its report, Commodore Jay Tarriela, spokesperson of the Philippine Coast Guard for the West Philippine Sea, told local press that “Vietnam focuses on minding their own affairs and reclaiming maritime features they occupied before the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties.”
AMTI’s Pretat argued that although Manila is not excited to see Vietnam expanding its outposts, it “doesn’t see it as a threat to its own maritime activities.”
“Vietnam has shown no effort to forcefully administrate its claims the way China has,” noted Pretat. “The Philippines is much more concerned with China’s behavior at sea and its efforts to restrict the activities of Philippine fishers, coast guard and military.”
He stressed that Manila sees Hanoi as a potential partner. “Vietnam has been one of the only claimants besides the Philippines to maintain a relatively strong stance against China’s claims and activities in the South China Sea,” he said.
Viet said statements by Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Pham Thu Hang regarding incidents in the Second Thomas Shoal last Friday “carried implicit support for the Philippines.”
She also said that Vietnam “stays ready to discuss with the Philippines to seek and achieve a solution that is mutually beneficial for both countries” regarding overlapping claims to the undersea continental shelf, AP reported.
However, Viet said that despite similar stances on South China Sea issues, as well as shared concern of China’s assertiveness, Hanoi’s measured and less noisy approach to Beijing makes it hard for them to work with Manila to counter Beijing.
“Without the support of ASEAN or other claimants like Indonesia or Malaysia, I think Vietnam’s appetite for direct and public opposition to China’s activities currently can’t match the Philippines,” said Pretat.
Since November last year, Vietnam has accelerated the expansion of its outposts in the Spratly Islands, according to a report published earlier this month by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, or AMTI, at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.
According to the report, Vietnam constructed 280 hectares (1 square mile) of land across 10 features it controls in the archipelago in the first half of 2024, compared with a total of 301 hectares (1.2 square miles) in the first 11 months of 2023 and the whole of 2022 combined.
Beijing still controls the three largest outposts in the Spratly chain but, thanks to the recent dredging and landfill work, Hanoi now controls the next four largest. Manila’s largest island in the archipelago — Thitu — ranks ninth in size.
Vietnam and the Philippines have been locked in a decadeslong territorial dispute with China over the South China Sea and its islands despite a ruling in 2016 by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague that dismissed China’s claim to most of the sea. That claim infringes on the exclusive economic zones of several coastal states.
“Boosting presence”
Vietnam’s acceleration of island building took place after Hanoi upgraded ties with Washington to the highest level in September 2023 and agreed to building a “community of shared future” with Beijing in early December.
“It’s a good timing for Vietnam to step up dredging,” Hoang Viet, a lecturer at University of Law in Ho Chi Minh City who closely monitors the situation in the South China Sea, told VOA over the phone.
Hanoi has learned a lesson from Manila’s recent stand-off with Beijing over the Second Thomas Shoal in which Chinese coast guard vessels attempted to block the Philippines’ resupply missions to its troops on a grounded vessel. Viet said the lack of an expanded outpost there puts Manila at a disadvantage.
It will be more complicated for Beijing to harass a claimant that has a strengthened garrison on a disputed feature, he said, so it’s imperative that Hanoi speed up dredging in the South China Sea if it wants to safeguard its presence in the area.
He said legal action is not enough for Hanoi or Manila to push their claims if they are not accompanied by an actual military presence, noting that the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s 2016 ruling has not helped the Philippines much against Chinese aggression.
“It’s Chinese aggression that has prompted Vietnam to carry on its own reclamation. Vietnam had seen no need to do that prior to Chinese reclamation and militarization in the South China Sea,” he said.
Harrison Pretat, deputy director of AMTI, told VOA in an email that the new reclamation will give Vietnam several more large ports in the Spratly Islands.
“This may allow Vietnam to begin operating more coast guard or militia vessels in disputed areas for long periods, without having to make the long return journey to Vietnam’s coast,” he said.
“It is also possible that Vietnam could build a second airstrip in the Spratly Islands, enhancing its ability to move personnel and supplies quickly and potentially conduct maritime air patrols,” he said.
Viet also cited Vietnam’s need to build strongholds in the waters to help with search and rescue operations for its fishermen caught in rough weather, as well as to prevent them from engaging in illegal fishing in its neighbors’ waters.
“Not provocative to Manila”
Viet said Vietnam’s dredging is “unlikely to stoke tension” in the South China Sea given that “it is purely for development or defense purposes, not to threaten or attack other claimants.”
“Beijing has little reason to protest because they reclaimed twice as much land, while Washington and Manila understand Vietnam’s motive,” he said.
Hanoi and Manila have overlapping claims to features in the Spratly chain, but incidents between the two countries have been rare, while bilateral ties were strengthened during President Ferdinand Marcos’ state visit to Hanoi earlier this year. The two countries agreed to increase coast guard cooperation.
Two days after AMTI released its report, Commodore Jay Tarriela, spokesperson of the Philippine Coast Guard for the West Philippine Sea, told local press that “Vietnam focuses on minding their own affairs and reclaiming maritime features they occupied before the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties.”
AMTI’s Pretat argued that although Manila is not excited to see Vietnam expanding its outposts, it “doesn’t see it as a threat to its own maritime activities.”
“Vietnam has shown no effort to forcefully administrate its claims the way China has,” noted Pretat. “The Philippines is much more concerned with China’s behavior at sea and its efforts to restrict the activities of Philippine fishers, coast guard and military.”
He stressed that Manila sees Hanoi as a potential partner. “Vietnam has been one of the only claimants besides the Philippines to maintain a relatively strong stance against China’s claims and activities in the South China Sea,” he said.
Viet said statements by Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Pham Thu Hang regarding incidents in the Second Thomas Shoal last Friday “carried implicit support for the Philippines.”
She also said that Vietnam “stays ready to discuss with the Philippines to seek and achieve a solution that is mutually beneficial for both countries” regarding overlapping claims to the undersea continental shelf, AP reported.
However, Viet said that despite similar stances on South China Sea issues, as well as shared concern of China’s assertiveness, Hanoi’s measured and less noisy approach to Beijing makes it hard for them to work with Manila to counter Beijing.
“Without the support of ASEAN or other claimants like Indonesia or Malaysia, I think Vietnam’s appetite for direct and public opposition to China’s activities currently can’t match the Philippines,” said Pretat.