Learning a lesson from the nation’s Cold War warriors
Recently, the House of Representatives approved a bill for the Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), with the bill allocating a total of $895 billion in discretionary funds. Congress announced this staggering amount amid the Congressional Budget Office’s report that the U.S. is expected to reach a $1.9 trillion budget deficit by the end of 2024. It’s clear that something needs to change with federal spending, and making changes to defense spending is an obvious way at achieving this goal. In this NDAA, the House of Armed Services Committee One of the programs mentioned in this defense budget proposal is the creation of a third continental missile interceptor site. Not only should policymakers look to drop this proposed third continental missile interceptor site on America’s east coast, but they should cut a majority of America’s continental missile interceptor system—the Ground-based Midcourse Defense System (GMD), the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System, and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD).
Theoretically, continental missile defense systems should defend the U.S. from ballistic missile attacks. However, they fail on this account. These defense systems tend make a security competition between two countries more unstable. In this case, a defensive weapon actually increases offensive capabilities. A country’s ability to retaliate is the best form of deterrence, especially when it comes to nuclear weapons. Continental missile interceptors reduce this ability to retaliate. Robert Jervis explained this conundrum, stating that a country “would be able to alter the status quo” if it were to protect its military capabilities and population from a retaliatory attack. In other words, the side with continental missile defense capabilities does not fear retaliation if it were to strike first. During the Cold War, for instance, the Soviets feared that the development of the Reagan Administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative would give America a first-strike advantage.
To overcome a rival’s first-strike advantage, the other side builds more missiles in an attempt to overwhelm the adversary’s missile defenses. U.S. policymakers during the Cold War understood the risks of continental missile defenses, leading them to sign the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as a way to maintain a nuclear balance with the Soviet Union and avoid an arms race. In a 1998 interview, Robert McNamara, John F. Kennedy’s and Lyndon Johnson’s secretary of defense and one of the architects behind the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, said the following on why continental missile defense systems are destabilizing:
“Just think now, if you’re trying to ensure you have a second-strike capability and you decide you need, let’s say, a thousand Minutemen for that and then they put in a defence. If you had a second-strike capability before they put in the defence, after they put in the defence you’ve got to increase your offence, otherwise you’ve lost your deterrent.”
The logic goes that a country believes its adversary to have any sort of first-strike advantage with its missile defense capabilities, it might become compelled to strike first to use these missiles before they lose them—a use-it-or-lose-it scenario. This advantage of taking the offensive increases the chances of preemptive war, creating a very unstable security competition.
Given the minimal effectiveness these missile systems provide for deterring America’s adversaries, the policymakers should look to cut significant portions of its ballistic missile defense program. They can take two main actions to accomplish this task.
First, policymakers should completely cut two main missile systems that form America’s continental missile defense program: GMD and Aegis. Cutting these two systems would save $2.34 billion for 2025 and $10.88 billion over the next five years. These savings account for procurement, operation and maintenance, research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) costs from each of these continental missile defense programs. However, it should be noted that these cuts do not include Aegis Ashore, the land-based equivalent of Aegis used throughout NATO, nor do they include missile defense radars and satellites.
Second, policymakers should halt the acquisition of more THAAD missiles. The Missile Defense Agency requested the procurement of 12 THAAD missile interceptors for 2025. As of October 2023, the Missile Defense Agency distributed 799 THAAD missile interceptors to the Army and America’s allies. Given this current amount, the U.S. can afford to cut the acquisition of new interceptors for 2025 and beyond. Savings from THAAD procurement and RDT&E would amount to $0.62 billion for 2025 and $5.13 billion over the next five years. However, policymakers should look to maintain the current THAAD systems currently deployed. These missile defenses complement the Patriot missile system’s capabilities and can be used for tactical purposes on the battlefield rather than for strategic purposes.
Finally, policymakers should cut the Next Generation Interceptors (NGI)—new “never-fail” missile interceptors for the GMD. While the Missile Defense Agency is looking to have these missile interceptors operational by the fourth quarter of 2027, the Government Accountability Office called this timeline “already optimistic when compared to development timeframes of similar weapon systems.” In other words, expenses for NGIs are likely to extend beyond 2027. Like the GMD, policymakers should scrap plans to develop these new missile interceptors. Doing so would save $1.63 billion for 2025 and $7.53 billion over the next five years.
If Congress were to make these cuts, the U.S. would save a total of $4.6 billion for 2025 and $23.48 billion over the next five years. It should be noted that these savings do not include the proposed third continental missile interceptor site. Currently, there is no price-tag for this missile defense site, though Mark Milley noted in 2023 that such a program would “take billions” to complete.
While the savings from cutting the GMD is a drop in the bucket compared to the 2025 proposed defense budget, some savings are better than none at all. The ineffectiveness of continental missile defense systems makes cutting the GMD even more compelling.
American policymakers during the Cold War understood the problems with continental missile defense systems. With the return of great-power competition, the U.S. must look to be more prudent with its defense spending. Today’s policymakers could learn a thing or two from America’s Cold Warriors on this front.
Benjamin D. Giltner is a defense and foreign policy analyst. He earned a Masters of International Affairs from George H.W. Bush of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. His research interests include military strategy, great-power competition, and deterrence.
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