The diplomatic conflict with Ecuador that favored Mexico

Ecuador has become isolated at the regional level

Originally published on Global Voices

On the night of April 4, 2024, Ecuadorian forces raided the Mexican embassy in Quito, violating the Vienna International Treaty Convention which regulates rights and obligations between international states. There, they overpowered the person in charge of the embassy and arrested former Ecuadorian Vice President Jorge Glas, wanted by Ecuadorian authorities for corruption in the case of the Brazilian company Odebrecht. He was also one of the key figures in former President Rafael Correa's infamous administration.

His capture had a clear political significance for Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa. Noboa hoped this would showcase his firm hand on security policy and strike a blow to the morale of the leftist bases, Correismo, currently the leading force in the Ecuadorian congress.

For Noboa, it was well worth entering a small diplomatic dispute with Mexico; there really wasn't much to lose. In his first Adress to the Nation, Noboa didn’t mention the diplomatic dispute with Mexico. For center-right Daniel Noboa, commerce weighed more heavily. And the trade relations between Ecuador and Mexico were almost non-existent. On July 9, Daniel Noboa expressed that “Mexico is one of his worst partners” referring to the unequal trade exchange between the two countries.

In December 2023, Glas arrived at the Mexican embassy, and from that moment there was a deadlock in Ecuador's relationship with Mexico. Mexico would not release Glas, considering him a political victim, and Ecuador alleged his corruption. The man has been locked up for three months in a maximum-security prison in the Ecuadorian city of Guayaquil. On July 8, the Ecuadorian justice denied Glas’ freedom on the basis of “habeas corpus”; authorities did not find alleged physical and psychological mistreatment during his stay in prison.

Mexico, leading the progressives

At this moment, Latin America is divided into two ideological poles: A front with leaders such as Mexican López Obrador and now his successor Claudia Sheinbaum, Lula da Silva in Brazil, Gustavo Petro of Colombia, and Gabriel Boric of Chile. They share common ideas of social progressivism and seek to strengthen ties among Latin American countries.

On the other hand, in response to the electoral outcomes in Ecuador and Argentina, a liberal right-wing front has emerged that is not necessarily united but aims to be disruptive and unilateral in its policies, prioritizing heavy-handed national security policies and foreign investment. Here we find figures like Javier Milei of Argentina, Salvadoran Nayib Bukele, and Daniel Noboa, who promote the idea of Latin American skepticism, returning to a policy of strengthening ties with the United States and Western countries, as the pursuit of investment outweighs regional development projects.

In Mexico, however, patriotic discourse had been present throughout the administration of López Obrador (commonly known as AMLO). AMLO gained enormous notoriety in the region by fostering rapprochement with Argentina's Alberto Fernández, protecting the family of Peru's former leftist president Pedro Castillo, providing asylum for former Bolivian President Evo Morales in 2019, and visiting with his Chilean and Colombian counterparts, Gabriel Boric and Gustavo Petro, respectively. Through these choices, AMLO has bolstered the position of the Latin American left, poorly portrayed by the governments of Venezuela and Nicaragua.

Mexico felt empowered to become the voice of Latin America, proposing at its meeting with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) the creation of an organization to replace the Organization of American States (OAS). In AMLO's view, the OAS had failed with the political crisis in Bolivia in 2019. Mexico strengthened ties with the region, hoping for a return on investment.

Such reward came when President Petro jumped to defend Mexico in the Embassy debacle, and Nicaragua and Venezuela cut ties with Ecuador. Brazil, Uruguay, Cuba, and most of Central America (except for El Salvador), came to Mexico's defense, leaving Ecuador completely isolated on the regional stage.

When the United Kingdom, the European Union, Norway, China, and even Russia defended Mexico's position, it was then that the United States of America and Canada timidly sided with Mexico. AMLO's position in the region was strengthened and bolstered internally, while in Ecuador, Noboa lost a political pact with Correa’s party — an essential ally to pass its legislative agenda.

However, the flagrant violation of the Vienna Convention represented a dilemma even for right-wing politicians, as any political refugee could be forcibly removed from diplomatic missions. The event was so disruptive that Peru's President Dina Boluarte, whom AMLO had called a “usurper,” and even Argentina's Javier Milei, who had exchanged insults with AMLO, closed ranks on the Mexican flank.

In Ecuador, this led to Noboa losing support in the Ecuadorian assembly and drew him international animosity, but on the positive side, he achieved a resounding victory in the April 29 referendum, where nine out of eleven of his proposals were adopted by the population. In the end, his security agenda secured him victory.

Written by Roberto Díaz Translated by Roberto Díaz · View original post [es]