Vietnamese Communist Chief Nguyen Phu Trong Leaves Behind A Weak, Fractious Party – Analysis

By Zachary Abuza

On July 19, Vietnamese state media reported that Nguyen Phu Trong, the long-serving general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, had died after an illness.

The report of Trong’s passing at 80 came a day after the party brass had announced he hadrelinquished his powersto President To Lam due to his failing health. In a rushed announcement, he wasawarded the Gold Star, the country’s highest honor suggesting that the party did not want to have to do this posthumously.

Born on April 14, 1944, in Hanoi, Trong was a lifelong communist ideologue. He was educated at Hanoi National University, the Hồ Chí Minh National Academy of Politics and Public Administration, and the Russian Academy of Social Sciences.

He spent several decades working for the party’s ideological journal,Tạp chí Cộng Sản(Communist Review), where he was editor-in-chief from 1991-1996.

He joined the Communist Party of Vietnam’s (CPV) Central Committee in 1994, and was first elected to the Politburo at the 9th Party Congress in 1996.

From 2000-2006, he served as the chairman of the Hanoi Party Committee. From 2001-2006, he concurrently headed the Central Committee’s Theoretical Council, making him the top communist ideologue.

He held his first and only non-Party assignment from 2006-2011, as the chairman of the National Assembly.

He was elected general secretary at the 11th Party Congress in January 2011 and was re-elected at the 12th Congress in January 2016 with an age waiver, after ousting Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, who had vied to be the party chief.

Trong despised Dung, whose economic liberalization set the stage for today’s growth, but also led to surging inequality and corruption.

Trong became president when incumbent Tran Dai Quang passed away in September 2018. He ceded that role at the 13th Congress in January 2021.

Party control and anti-corruption

He showed little interest in foreign affairs, although he met President Barack Obama in the Oval Office in 2018, traveled to Beijing in October 2022, and hostedPresident Joe Bidenin September 2023,Xi Jinpingin December 2023 and Vladimir Putin in June 2024.

Having served five terms on the Politburo, Trong had significant staying power in a system that has tried to implement a regular transition for leaders. But there were limits to his power in a system of collective leadership.

Trong failed to get his protege Tran Quoc Vuong, who oversaw his anti-corruption campaign, elected as his successor at the 13th Congress.

Trong, who was reported to have suffered a stroke in late 2020, stayed on as a compromise figure. It was a clear violation of the two-term norm that was established after the disastrous quarter-century-long reign of Le Duan, whose death in July 1986 set off theDoi Moireform era.

At the time, it was widely expected that Trung would be a caretaker until an agreement on his successor could be reached, but he showed no inclination in stepping down, despite his advanced age and failing health. By late 2023, he was believed to be residing at the 108 Military Hospital, a special facility for top leaders.

There were two big themes to Trung’s long tenure: re-asserting party control and anti-corruption.

Trong was concerned that the Communist Party was being sidelined as the economy grew and became more complex, and the loci of decision making shifted to technocrats, such as Vu Duc Dam, a cosmopolitan former deputy prime minister.

While Trong understood the importance of economic growth, he never believed in performance-based legitimacy. Like China’s Xi Jinping, he believed that economic growth could never come at the expense of party control.

Under him, the Politburo, which traditionally tended to be a careful balance of competing institutional interests, sectoral and regional representation, became dangerously out of balance, demonstrating the regime’s insecurity.

At the Central Committee’s 9th Plenum in May2024, four new members of the Politburo represented the party, not the state apparatus.

Crushing civil society

Today, five of the 16 members came out of the Vietnamese Ministry of Public Security, with three coming out of the army. That half the Politburo represents the security sector, with a palpable dearth of economic expertise, is evidence of the party’s priorities for the nation of 100 million people.

Under Trong, the government stepped-up efforts to quash Vietnam’s nascentcivil society, focusing, in turn, onreligious organizations,lawyers,environmentalists, LGBTQ activists, independent journalists and social media influencers.

The Politburo issued Directive 24 in July 2023, which was a clarion call against “peaceful evolution” and the threat posed by “colored revolutions”, which the document warned, could be fomented by international donors, foreign investors, and students studying overseas.

Politburo language became increasingly Chinese in tone, as were the tactics employed to defend the party’s monopoly of power.

Like Xi and his predecessors in Beijing, Trong viewed corruption as the party’s greatest vulnerability.

He launched the “Blazing Furnace” anti-corruption campaign, moving the anti-corruption commission from state to party control, in 2013 with himself as chairman.

Trong took down a slew of rivals within the 12th Politburo, including Dinh La Thang and Hoang Trung Hai, the party chiefs of Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi, respectively.

But the “Blazing Furnace” campaign spiraled out of control as it allowed then minister of public security, To Lam, to weaponize anti-corruption investigations to eliminate political rivals on the Politburo.

Between December 2022 and June 2024, seven of the 18 members of the 13th Politburo were forced to resign – a period of unprecedented political turmoil.

Trong proved impotent as Lam, now serving as acting general secretary and president, removed his proteges – including President Vo Van Thuong and his assumed heir apparent National Assembly Chairman Vuong Dinh Hue – in the security chief’s maneuvers to grab the top job.

Lam’s ambitions created resentment

Trong could only watch helplessly as Lam installed his Ministry of Security deputies, Luong Tam Quang and Nguyen Duy Ngoc, as his successor as the Minister of Public Security and the head of the Central Committee Office, respectively.

And as Trong’s health weakened, he routinely missed key meetings, with Lam – now president – standing in for him.

Ironically, the party apparatus emerged not just weaker and less collegial as a result of the anti-corruption campaign, but also became delegitimized in the eyes of the public as it exposed the sweeping extent of corruption among the senior leadership. Trong never took any responsibility for the damage he caused, and even seemed oblivious to it.

To be fair, Trong lived quite modestly and his children never involved themselves in business or profited from his position, a seeming birthright for the children of other top Hanoi leaders.

Under Communist Party rules, Luong Cuong, the head of the Secretariat, is supposed to stand in, but the Central Committee and Politburo announced that Lam will serve concurrently as president and acting general secretary.

That suggests that the Central Committee has determined that Lam will be elected to a full term at the 14th Congress in early 2026, though, at 67 now, would require an age waiver.

Planning for the congress is already underway. Having installed allies in key positions and having purged most rivals, Lam is in a very strong position.

However, we have to consider the possibility that the Central Committee, which is much more powerful and independent than in China, could decide to elect a vastly new Politburo and a different general secretary.

Not everyone on the Central Committee has been happy with the political instability caused by Lam’s ambitious ascent, and party history offers the precedent of Le Kha Phieu,a hardline leader who was removed from office four years into his five-year term in 2001 amid public infighting that tripped up the economy.

Zachary Abuza is a professor at the National War College in Washington and an adjunct at Georgetown University. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of the U.S. Department of Defense, the National War College, Georgetown University or Radio Free Asia.