By Atul Kumar

On 12 July 2024, the Rural Development and Migration Prevention Commission of India’s Uttarakhand State reported that 11 villages along the India-Tibet border in the Chamoli, Pithoragarh, and Uttarkashi districts had been abandoned. The Commission’s survey of 137 villages in the previous year revealed that three villages in Chamoli, six in Pithoragarh, and two in Uttarkashi were deserted. This finding underscores the significance of the Indian government’s Vibrant Villages Programme (VVP), launched in July 2023, aimed at preventing such occurrences. The VVP seeks to provide essential services, including social goods, livelihood opportunities, healthcare, infrastructure, and communication facilities to encourage the repopulation of these border villages.

This initiative is particularly crucial in light of China's establishment ofXiaokangvillages near the Indian border. Thesettlementof entirely new villages close to the border, often within contested territory, surpasses the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) previous forward patrolling and road-building activities. This action violatesmultiple treatiesthat China has signed with its neighbours, disregards decades of border negotiations, and mirrors the tactics China used in the South China Sea to seize smaller islands and construct new ones.

Importance of Xiaokang

Xiaokang(小康) is an ancient Chinese social concept firstmentioned in the "Shi Jing"(Book of Poems) nearly 2,000 years ago. It signifies China's national aspiration to develop into a society characterised by "modest happiness and comfort" for the common people. Over the years, the term evolved, and China's paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, describedXiaokangas a stage of economic development marked by a per capita income of US$ 800. China achieved this target in 1997, and by 2024, its per capita income hasrisento approximately US$ 13,136.

In 2017, Chinese PresidentXi Jinping invokedtheXiaokangconcept to address poverty and measure the quality of life in villages, ensuring that no one would be left behind in the pursuit of development. He emphasised the importance of health, infrastructure, and cultural and environmental progress, alongside income equality, to signify the attainment of a modestly prosperous village. This policy shift led to increased efforts to develop border villages, aiming to enhance the living standards of border populations and improve border management and security.

Therefore, as part of theXiaokangvillage construction programme in 2017, China began developing 628 villages, primarily near its borders, with some even in disputed territories.Gyalaphug, deep within Bhutan's Beyul region, is an example. In May 2023,news reportsfurther highlighted China's construction ofXiaokangvillages near Uttarakhand State’s Barahoti region, just 11 kilometres from the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Middle Sector. These villages have been established to support strategic road networks and sustain China’s military outposts in rugged, mountainous areas. Chinese authorities encourage their residents in these villages to see themselves as "soldiers without uniforms," turning each village into a fortress and each household into a watch post, primarily to guard China's borders.

Situation Inside Xiaokangs

The actual population of these villages is often higher than reported in official figures. This includes mostly temporary residents, primarily Chinese and occasionally Tibetan, such as construction workers, technical advisors, and security agents, who reside there for a year or more. A special unit of the border police is also stationed in or around the village, with theprimary task of interceptingTibetans attempting to flee to India or Nepal. Village residents arerequiredto form a joint defence team with the border security police to patrol the neighbouring mountains. Consequently, PLA border patrols, which previously occurred once every three months or seasonally,now arriveapproximately every fifteen days due to the presence and development of these villages.

Additionally, a village-based cadre work team resides here, with its members rotated every year or more. This teamguides the village committeeand the local Communist Party branch, providing political education to villagers and assisting with practical needs such as greenhouse building and management, and mushroom growing techniques. These various regulatory agencies ensure that the residents of these villages remain under strict surveillance and control.

TheXiaokangvillages represent a sophisticated strategy for extending de facto and de jure control over borders. The PLA enhances its security infrastructure and support system, following its often-professed philosophy of civil-military collaboration in logistical supply. Furthermore, these villages have become popular tourist destinations, contributing to the region's financial development and strengthening Chinese control over the frontier.

Additionally, the establishment of village political units, along with the introduction of postal networks, broadband connections, and permanent administrative apparatus, helps China bolster its legal claims to these areas in the international arena. Since bilateral territorial negotiations typically avoid disturbing settled populations in disputed territories, theseXiaokangvillages have become a quasi-legal instrument for the Chinese state. India and Bhutan, in particular, have been adversely affected by these incremental Chinese advances.

The Indian context: Vibrant Villages Programme

India must devise countermeasures to address China's salami-slicing (Can Shi蚕食) tactics in territorial acquisition. One countermeasure is todefine and announce red lines, then defend them witha serious commitmentto deter the adversary. Another is to cultivate a reputation for unpredictability or occasional overreaction; irregular aggressive responses can shape adversary behaviour and maintain deterrence. The third countermeasure is the "swallowing as a whale" (Jing Tun 鲸吞) strategy, where small territorial nibbles by the adversary are countered with significant territorial gains, negating their efforts and creating space for negotiation.

The most robust response to these Chinese villages is an equally effective, focused, and determined border development strategy that India's Vibrant Villages Programme (VVP) intends to achieve. This development initiative aims to repopulate frontier regions, expand state presence, and attract tourists, thereby bolstering India's territorial claims.

The Indian government must maintain its commitment to the VVP, ensuring it does not succumb to bureaucratic inefficiencies. Often, ineffective monitoring and lack of accountability lead to fund diversion and consequent slow or lack of progress in development schemes in far-flung regions. Even in 2024, some villages along the India-Tibet border still require days of travel on foot or by pony to reach. Therefore, the VVP’s effective implementation will help these Indian villages connect to the national mainstream, participate in India’s growing economy and, in return, enhance security for the state. Repopulated villages along the border can become the most important sustainment factor for Indian troops deployed along harsh mountainous terrain.

Finally, there are crucial differences between Indian border villages and ChineseXiaokangvillages. In India, border populations abandon their villages due to a lack of facilities and livelihood opportunities, therefore, providing basic amenities would likely encourage them to return and reinhabit their homes. In contrast,Xiaokangvillages are forcibly established, with the local border population compelled to remain and support the Chinese state and its agencies. This distinction can be a significant advantage for India. Proper planning, adequate support, and effective monitoring are crucial to leverage this advantage.

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• About the author: Atul Kumar is a Fellow in the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
• Source: This article was published at the Observer Research Foundation