US-Israel relations are more complicated than protestors realize

Donald Trump and Kamala Harris have repeatedly and emphatically stated their staunch support for Israel, although Harris tempers her support with calls for a cease-fire and recognition of Palestinian rights. 

Keenly aware that the close presidential race limits the ability of the White House to pressure him, Netanyahu continues to defy Biden’s call for a ceasefire. 

This situation has led pro-Palestinian protestors to view U.S.-Israel relations as a simple transaction in which the U.S. administration provides weapons, money and diplomatic support in return for Jewish American votes. 

History reveals a far more complex relationship. Contrary to popular belief, the U.S. has not always backed Israel, and it has usually been able to influence Israeli policy. 

The relationship began even before Israel became a state. 

After World War II, many of the more than 250,000 holocaust survivors languished in displaced persons camps, unable to return to their former homes and unsure where they could go to start a new life. Many wished to immigrate to what was then the British Mandate of Palestine.  

However, following the Arab Revolt (1936-1939), Britain had promised to end Jewish immigration. Concerned over the plight of Jewish refugees, President Harry Truman called for the creation of an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, which recommended admitting 100,000 refugees into Palestine in 1946. 

The United Kingdom needed American aid, so it complied and restrained its forces trying to suppress a Zionist insurgency in Palestine. 

When Israel declared independence on May 14, 1948, Truman immediately recognized it.  

As historian David McCullough observed, doing so was “good politics.” Facing a tough reelection battle, Truman hoped recognition would win Jewish-American votes in the key states of Illinois, Pennsylvania and New York. 

U.S. recognition gave Israel much-needed legitimacy, but Truman did not supply it with weapons to defend itself in the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948. Recognition also did not guarantee future support. 

During the 1956 Suez Crisis, Washington opposed Israel’s actions. President Eisenhower forced Britain to leave the Suez Canal zone and pressured Israel to withdraw from Gaza and the Sinai. 

U.S. policy towards Israel changed again during the Johnson administration from 1963-1969. Washington provided some weapons and money, but it did not give the Israeli military everything it wanted. 

A Johnson administration memo from April 1967 revealed U.S. concern over fueling a Middle East arms race and objections to Israel’s nuclear weapons program as reasons to withhold aid. 

To preserve a balance of power, the U.S. also supplied weapons to Jordan. 

Then, in June 1967, Israel defeated Egypt, Jordan and Syria in the Six-Day War, capturing the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan. Instead of demanding Israel relinquish the occupied areas immediately, Johnson proposed a “land-for-peace” plan, making withdrawal contingent upon peace treaties with Arab states.

The U.S. also voted for United Nations Resolution 242, which called upon Israel to return land captured during the Six-Day War.  

The U.S.-Israel relationship changed again during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. When coordinated attacks by Syria and Egypt caught Israel completely by surprise, President Richard Nixon airlifted arms and ammunition that enabled the Israeli military to drive back the attackers. The Arab members of OPEC retaliated against the U.S. with an oil embargo. 

The election of Jimmy Carter in 1976 led to further policy changes. Carter brokered the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel. In return for a peace treaty, Egypt got the Sinai back, and both countries received a significant increase in U.S. military and other aid. 

Neither Presidents Ronald Reagan nor George H.W. Bush pressured Israel to implement Resolution 242 and return the West Bank and the Golan. But in 1988, Jordan relinquished its claim over both the West Bank and Gaza. 

Then, in 1993, Bill Clinton facilitated the signing of the Oslo Accords, culminating in the historic handshake between Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin and Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat.  

The PLO renounced terrorism and recognized Israel’s right to exist in return for the creation of a Palestinian Authority to govern parts of the West Bank and Gaza. The agreement was not popular on the Israeli right, and it cost Rabin his life when an ultra-Zionist assassinated him in November 1995.

Netanyahu became prime minister for the first time in 1996. Although his Likud Party opposed the two-state solution envisioned in the Oslo Accords, he tried to advance the peace process, only to fall from power in 1999. 

After the 9/11 attacks, the administration of George W. Bush was in no mood to promote Palestinian aspirations against Israeli opposition, especially since the U.S. had designated Hamas, which gained control of Gaza in 2007, a terrorist organization.

The election of Barack Obama in 2008 and Netanyahu’s return to power in 2009 altered the U.S.-Israel relationship yet again. While Obama continued military support for Israel, he also entered into the Iran nuclear deal, which Netanyahu vehemently opposed. After he took office in 2017, Trump withdrew from the Iran deal, moved the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan. 

Then came Oct. 7. President Biden initially gave Israel unconditional support, but as the months passed and the death toll in Gaza mounted, he pressured Netanyahu to exercise restraint. The U.S. probably got Israel to limit its response to attacks by Iran and Hezbollah, thus preventing a regional war. 

As this brief historical overview illustrates, U.S.-Israel relations have always been shaped by the complex interaction of domestic politics and foreign policy interests in each country.

The idea that American Jews are a single-issue monolithic block of voters that can be delivered to the highest bidder is at best a simplistic notion and at worst an antisemitic trope. They will vote based on a broad range of issues, just as they have in the past. 

This year’s election offers a stark choice. One candidate will write Israel a blank check; the other will balance aid with efforts to secure a lasting peace that guarantees the rights of Israelis and Palestinians.

Pro-Palestinian demonstrators should keep that in mind when they demand an arms embargo against Israel that could affect the outcome.

Tom Mockaitis is a professor of history at DePaul University and the author of “Violent Extremists: Understanding the Domestic and International Terrorist Threat ."