Sino-Indian Boundary Row: Caution In The Face Of Optimism – Analysis
By Kartik Bommakanti
The recent optimism about an improvement in Sino-Indian relations should not be overstated. Reports indicate that India and China have“narrowed”their differences, which in diplomatic language means “progress”. In his latest statement, External Affairs Minister (EAM) S. Jaishankar said75 percent of “disengagement” problemsare resolved. What this progress constitutes needs to be scrutinised.
If the record of previous negotiations and “disengagements” is any indicator of things to come, outcomes for India will remain sub-optimal. Indeed, in May this year, EAM S. Jaishankar made clear that there were pending issues such as“patrolling rights” or “patrolling abilities”and that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) must restore the status ante. What this fundamentally means is that the PRC must completely back down and withdraw all its forces to their pre-April 2020 deployments or garrisons, restore patrolling rights for both sides and honour the 1993 and 1996 agreements.
Let us consider the 1993 agreement which explicitly sets out terms on which border management on both sides will be executed.The agreement permits both sides to conduct troop patrols rightup to their perception of the LAC and if they cross each other’s perception line, both sides should resolve the matter there and withdraw their forces. Where a disagreement emerges about the boundary alignment, both sides are obliged to jointly work out a resolution. Neither side can use or threaten the use of force under the 1993 agreement.
The subsequent 1996 boundary agreement between India and Chinahas 12 articles that address each specific issue.The more salient ones require that each side’s capability not be used against the other. In the event military exercises are conducted close to the LAC with a brigade-size force on one side, the latter has to notify the other. Air intrusions across the LAC are also prohibited. No weapon can be fired or explosives used within two kilometres of the LAC. Large forces cannot be deployed close to the LAC and only light patrols are permitted, which was violated when China deployed a large number of troops with heavy equipment occupying tracts of territory on India’s side of the LAC in April-May 2020.
Restoration of the status quo: Comprehensive win for Modi government?
Indeed, if China were to restore the status ante along the LAC by honouring the 1993 and 1996 agreements, it would mean a comprehensive win for India against the PRC, despite the bloody altercation of Galwan in June 2020 that claimed the lives of 20 Indian soldiers and four Chinese soldiers.
A restoration of the pre-April 2020 status quo would deliver a massive diplomatic and domestic win for the Modi government. Fundamentally, it would mean that India’s counter-coercion pressure against the PRC’s coercion in Eastern Ladakh along thefive friction pointsthat involved the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’ occupation of territory in the Depsang Bulge, Gogra-Hot springs, Galwan, both South and North banks of Pangong Tso and Demchok worked very effectively. The outcome would be comparable to India’s victory against Pakistan at Kargil without the combat casualties and third-party intervention.
However, what would the comprehensive restoration of the status ante mean for the PRC and its leader Chairman Xi Jinping? A climbdown of this magnitude will have repercussions. It would mean a complete loss of face for Xi and his small cohort of loyal lieutenants, potentially threatening the domestic political position of the Xi-led regime. At the very least, it is difficult to imagine his position not being weakened, leaving him considerably weakened. At a maximum, it may mean Xi’s ouster as Chairman of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and leader.
Whether such an extreme outcome is in the offing, only time will tell, because Xi Jinping may well survive this lossgiven his tight grip on the Chinese stateoccasioned by the extensive purges he has executed during his more than decade-long rule. Yet this scenario or outcome, which would be extremely magnanimous and ideal for New Delhi as it would deliver a massive victory for Prime Minister Modi, is still hypothetical. There is another possibility.
What does disengagement mean?
The possibility of “disengagement” which is now doing the rounds might involve exactly what India and China negotiated in July 2020, August 2021, and February 2021. In early July 2020, a 1.5-kilometer buffer zone on both sides followed a mutual force pullout from Galwan. This was the first of the “disengagements”. Gogra Post-PP-17 was mutually vacated by the PLA and IA in earlyAugust 2021 creating a five km buffer zone.
A subsequent agreement involved Chinese forces pulling back from both the South and North banks of the Pangong Tso and India’s reciprocal withdrawal from Kailash Range heights which Indian forces seized in late August 2020 and helped perch them on dominating heights. With regard to Pangong Tso,prior to April 2020, the Indian Army (IA) used to patrol right from Finger 1 at the westernmost edge of the Pangong Tso to Finger 8 located at the easternmost edge of the lake. India claims that the LAC runs right up to the Finger 8 which is where its patrolling threshold ends. Before April 2020, Indian troops from their Dhan Singh Thapa post situated close to Finger 3 would patrol right up to Finger 8. China believes the LAC ends at finger 4 against India’s claims that it ends at Finger 8.
The February 2021 agreement ended up creating an 8-kilometre buffer zonebetween Finger 4 and Finger 8that prevented patrols from both sides with New Delhi also surrendering its occupation of the strategically important Kailash Range heights. Following the latter disengagement, another was completed atHotsprings or PP-15in September 2022 following the 16thround of military corps commanders meeting. All these disengagements, due to mutually negotiated buffer zones, wound up giving India no physical access to points up to which it could patrol pre-April 2020.
Now if the government proceeds to negotiate “disengagement” from the remaining two friction points at the Depsang Bulge and Demchok, it risks creating the same buffer zones as it did with the other friction points. This fundamentally means there will be no restoration of patrolling rights for Indian forces, let alone the complete withdrawal of Chinese to their pre-April 2020 positions and Beijing’s commitment that it will honour the 1993 and 1996 agreements. As the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA)made clear in its latest statement: “Both sides must [do not yet agree] fully abide by relevant agreements, protocols and understandings reached in the past by the two governments.” In a nutshell, India and China will end up negotiating the same disengagements they did earlier leaving India at best in former IA Chief General V.P. Malik's words: “non-physical surveillance”.
A solution of this kind will only serve as a palliative because China still has a considerable number of forces deployed both in-depth as does India, but Beijing can mobilise its forces rapidly in the event it wants to seize the territory it has vacated as part of the disengagement. This is exemplified by several infrastructural and logistical measures that the PLA has undertaken that give quick access to the LAC in Eastern Ladakh.
Since the Doklam crisis of 2017 and from April-May 2020 onwards, the Chinese upgraded and developed a new rail, road and communication network along the entire contested boundary with India.Adjacent to eastern Ladakh on their side, the Chinese have built up road infrastructure. They have constructed a new G216 highway that gives them easier access to all areas in dispute in eastern Ladakh. TheG216 will serve as a parallelor alternative to the current highway—GJ19 where Beijing sees a key vulnerability.
Supplementing these two highways is another called the GJ695, which is under construction and roughly 10-15 kilometres from the LAC enabling Chinese forces to rapidly mobilise in a future conflict, but also help them quickly seize territory on the LAC or beyond should they wish to do so, pre-empting resistance from the IA. As if this were not enough,satellite imagery released in July 2024reveals that the Chinese have now built a bridge that connects the North and South banks of the Pangong Tso. Apart from depriving India of patrolling rights and compelling disengagement that has led to the establishment of buffer zones, the shrinkage in mobilisation time through a massive infrastructure build-up has been among the real gains for the Chinese since April 2020. Regardless of the air of optimism surrounding current negotiations between New Delhi and Beijing, India would be well-advised not to celebrate prematurely, because the definition of disengagement is a band-aid, not a restoration of the status quo ante.
- About the author: Kartik Bommakantiis a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation
- Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation