An Assessment Of Israel’s War As Peace Efforts Grind To A Halt – OpEd
A year has passed but the war in the Middle East has not slumped. Israel’s many fronts war seems only to be expanding with the direct intervention of Iran. As peace efforts have been sidelined, Israel’s war strategy has been caught adrift, especially with a besieged front in Gaza.
At the outset, Israel has mostly withdrawn from the Gaza strip although it has kept a sizable presence in strategic areas such as the Philadelphi corridor among other high grounds, this is fundamentally to prevent any regrouping of Hamas fighters. The Rafah crossing is equally vital for the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) since large quantities of infrastructure and material supplies have been funneled through that infamous crossing.
Yoav Gallant has publicly acknowledged that Hamas’ military capabilities have been downgraded severely. One of Israel’s core rallying points for the October 7 retaliation was the complete disintegration of Hamas’ military wing coupled with its political arm insomuch that it could never establish an authoritative presence in Gaza. This is confirmed by the continuous bombings in Beit Lahiya a municipality in northern Gaza and the Jabaliya refugee camp despite exterminating Yahya Sinwar, the mastermind of the ignominious October 7 massacre.
In Lebanon, the IDF’s strategy has been to target Hezbollah affiliated sites in and around Beirut while the ground forces are carrying out clearing operations. A relatively small number of Israeli troops are fighting along the border. Whether the IDF will make the grade in pushing Hezbollah beyond the Litani River is still early to predict however in 2006, they were unable to achieve that goal. Meanwhile, attacks from the West Bank are growing in number and lethality whilst the internal security agencies within Israel have contained the threats.
Within Israel, there were internal dissensions at play considering what Israel’s Defence Minister had to say about the trajectory of the war. Yoav Gallant wrote a letter to top military officials and cabinet ministers including Benjamin Netanyahu about the direction the war is heading; the Defence Minister has opined that the ongoing war seems aimless. According to former CIA Director David Petraeus, the strategy of “clear and leave” employed by the IDF is not a viable option. This strategy has certainly worked for Israel in the short-term especially, after the death of key leaders and commanders. But ideally, the approach should have been “clear, hold, and build” but it is too late for that since the quantum of depredations and destitution in Gaza has crossed epic proportions.
In the backdrop of these myriad developments, negotiations are rife in the back channels of war between the US, Lebanon, and Israel as reports of a draft agreement under discussions is slated for 60 days. The onus of this agreement has been entrusted to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) who are required to gradually deploy 10,000 troops as both Hezbollah and the IDF cease attacks, while the US alongside the UN, Europe, and regional states would ensure a “Monitoring and Enforcement Mechanism” to supervise ceasefire violations including sanctions packages. The ultimate objective is to steer this agreement towards enforcing the UN Resolution 1701. However, this truce effort has been rejected as Benjamin Netanyahu has stated that “agreements, documents, proposals are not the main point”, thus crushing any prospects for brokering a ceasefire settlement.
Another ceasefire proposal mediated by Egypt, Qatar and the US was aborted. They had designed a cessation-of-hostilities agreement backed by the US advocating for a ceasefire in Gaza. It has several stages. First, a prisoner swap is to be implemented under which the following criteria has to be applied i.e., the IDF has to gradually withdraw and Israel should allow humanitarian aid into Gaza. Second, Hamas should release all remaining hostages and Israel should follow suit by releasing a number of Palestinians alongside the withdrawal of all soldiers from Gaza. Third, the end of the blockade and the exchange of dead bodies has to be undertaken. A fourth option beseeches that Hamas should not rearm.
Lately, a senior Hamas official Khalil al Hayya has outright rejected a proposal for their safe passage from Gaza so that the hostage deal could be resolved. The reticence shown by Hamas indicates two possible scenarios: on the one hand, Hamas will continue their fight against Israel while on the other, they will prima facie look for avenues to form a government in Gaza. Indeed, Hamas is seeking to build a national unity government in coalition with the Palestinian Authority (PA) clinging on to the idea of a vacuum in the post-war reconstruction of Gaza.
As peace efforts in the Middle East grind to a halt, the options for de-escalation appear distant. First, the destruction of Gaza will have ramifications in the long-term as anger against the Israelis is mounting; many disgruntled youths would in all likelihood join Hamas and other militant clusters against Israel. Second, there is no alternative vision to reconstruct Gaza on humanitarian grounds which could perhaps solicit the support of the Arabs if the Israeli government resorts to such a course. Nevertheless, to expect such a directional change in the war from either side is preposterous.
Third, Tel Aviv would certainly hold on to vital corridors such as the Philadelphi corridor and the Rafah crossing if future attacks are to be prevented. Fourth, the Biden administration, belatedly, had tightened the noose on Benjamin Netanyahu just before US elections on pertinent issues. Washington pressed for a 30 days timeline under which Israel had to help improve the living conditions in Gaza— allowing aid into Gaza including 90 percent of humanitarian movements between northern and southern Gaza and to provide access to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) which was recently barred by the Israeli Knesset.
Finally, the return of Donald Trump to the White House could perhaps a) tighten the noose on Iran and its proxies although that does not preclude the latter would cease to threaten Israel; b) Trump’s foreign policy could facilitate the probable annexation of the West Bank by Israel at the expense of the Palestinians and c) Netanyahu’s discretion in total war against Hamas and Hezbollah may be curtailed by a strong US President. However, until Trump assumes office, Israel’s objectives in Gaza, its ground operations in Lebanon would persevere in full swing.