Beyond Retribution: Unveiling Al Qaeda’s Strategic Power Logic for 9/11
Introduction
On September 11, 2001 (9/11), the United States (US) was rocked to its core by an unfathomable act of terror. Nineteen terrorists associated with Al Qaeda, an Islamist extremist group, hijacked four planes, crashing two into the World Trade Center, one into the Pentagon, and another in Pennsylvania. New York City’s iconic Twin Towers, symbols of American prosperity and power, burst into flames and collapsed, following horrific airliner attacks. The 9/11 attack killed nearly 3,000 people and injured more than 6,000 others, making it the deadliest terrorist attack ever on U.S. soil.
Given the horror and revulsion of the event, many American leaders and citizens declared Al Qaeda’s attack as sheer irrational hatred instead of strategic behavior. President George W. Bush claimed Al Qaeda “hates progress, and freedom, and choice,” while Attorney General John Ashcroft asserted that Al Qaeda’s followers are “fanatics who seek to extinguish freedom, enslave women, corrupt education and to kill Americans wherever and whenever they can.” Although such sentiments and perceptions resonated throughout the US, Al Qaeda’s terrorist attack was more deeply rooted in strategic logic than most Americans imagined. Al Qaeda conducted the 9/11 attacks not solely as a retribution against US involvement in the Middle East, but rather as a calculated effort to unite followers of Islam under the jihadist ideology of Salafi and to mobilize Muslim leaders to enact Sharia Law across the Arab World.
The purpose of this paper is to provide valuable insights into how power operates in the realm of international relations. The concept of power is often referenced in scholarly works, but authors frequently interpret the term differently. This essay helps conceptualize power by highlighting that the concept is more than merely an abundance of resources, economic strength, and military supremacy. This paper reveals that power revolves around an actor’s ability to convert their resources to desired outcomes.
The first section explores the foundational context surrounding the events of 9/11. It discusses how Al Qaeda formed, what the terrorist organization believes, and why it committed the attack against the United States. In the subsequent section, this paper evaluates the notion of power within the literature of international relations. In particular, it examines Joseph Nye’s strategic power framework, a pivotal tool that aids scholars in dissecting how actors attempt to translate their resources into desired outcomes. Next, the essay applies Nye’s framework to Al Qaeda’s actions against the United States and evaluates the effectiveness of the terrorist organization’s strategic logic. Finally, this paper offers an explanation for why Al Qaeda’s plan failed to achieve its aims. By analyzing Al Qaeda’s strategy through the lens of Nye’s power framework, readers will better understand that power revolves around an intricate interplay between resources, strategic logic, execution, and desired outcomes.
Background
The development of Al Qaeda can be traced back to the Soviet-Afghan War (1978-1989). During the war, an Afghan resistance group known as the Mujahideen successfully defended their state from Soviet invasion. The success of this effort cannot be separated from the US’s assistance to the Mujahideen. Following the Soviet withdrawal, the Mujahideen split into factions, one of which became Al Qaeda in 1988. The Taliban, an Islamic fundamentalist organization, provided a safe haven for Al Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden, in Afghanistan in the years leading up to 9/11. Moreover, Al Qaeda funded military camps and trained around 10,000 to 20,000 fighters between 1996 and 2001. The United States officially designated Al Qaeda as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 1999 after it bombed U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
Members of Al Qaeda, along with other extremist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, adhere to an ideology known as Salafi jihadism. West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) claims the ideology aims “to raise awareness among Muslims that their religion has been on the wane” because leaders and followers in the Arab World are idolizing Western powers and not adhering to Sharia Law. Salafi jihadism emphasizes the obligation of practicing Sharia Law as their prophet Mohammed intended in 570 CE. Sharia means “the correct path” in Arabic, and the law refers to the Quran’s religious and moral guidance. Among the sects of Islam, scholars suggest Salafism projects the most literal interpretation of the Quran. Shadi Hamid and Rashid Dar claim that “Salafis, often described as ultraconservatives, believe not just in the spirit, but in the letter of the law, which is what sets them apart from their mainstream counterparts.”
In an attempt to characterize the demise of Shariah Law in the Arab World, Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda referenced Islamic stories and doctrine. In particular, Al Qaeda created a parallel between the prophet Muhammad’s battle in Mecca and their modern fight against individuals and leaders incorrectly practicing Islam. Bin Laden likened the United States to the Hubal of the age, referring to a stone idol that Muslims praised and invoked to push Mohammed out of Mecca. As scholar Michael Scott Doran claims, bin Laden used imagery to suggest that “the leaders of the Arab and Islamic worlds today are hypocrites, idol worshippers cowering behind America.” In his 1996 fatwa, entitled “Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans,” bin Laden accused Saudi Arabia of such hypocrisy. He claimed, “the regime has desecrated its legitimacy through many of its own actions, the most important being: 1) Its suspension of the rulings of the Islamic law and 2) Its inability to protect the land and its allowing the enemies of God to occupy it for years in the form of the American Crusaders.”
Just as Mohammed destroyed followers of Kabul in Mecca, bin Laden declared that Muslims must remove Islamic leaders who were partnering with the US or those Muslims not practicing Sharia law, like the leaders in Saudi Arabia. Al Qaeda initially collaborated with Egyptian Islamic Jihad in the late 1980s to remove lax Muslim leaders from power in the Arab World, which resulted in the death of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. However, beyond states like Sudan and Afghanistan, Al Qaeda was unable to mobilize their movement throughout the Arab World. As noted in his Declaration of War, bin Laden claimed the “Zionist-Crusader alliance moves quickly to contain and abort any “corrective movement” appearing in Islamic countries.” The “Zionist-Crusader alliance” refers to the partnership between Israel (the Zionist entity) and Western powers (the Crusaders) to control Muslim lands and ideology, especially in the Middle East. Bin Laden responded to Al Qaeda’s failures and a growing alliance between Israel and Western powers, by proclaiming “different means and methods” must be utilized to institute Salafi Islamic doctrine.
After Al Qaeda’s ineffectiveness in mobilizing its aims, Bin Laden developed a parallel between the United States and the Mongol invasion of Islamic lands in the 1300s to justify and promote a new strategy for furthering Salafi jihadism. In particular, Al Qaeda referenced Ibn Taymyr, an Islamic legal philosopher, during the Mongol invasion. Taymyr produced a renowned fatwah calling upon Muslims to unite despite their differences to repel the threat of the Mongols. J.M. Porter claims bin Laden regularly quoted Tamiya, who argued that “when Muslims face a serious threat, they must ignore minor differences and collaborate to get the enemy out of the [Islam].” Rather than attacking other Islamic sects, bin Laden began to unite Muslims by engaging in violent rhetoric toward the United States. He embraced the classic idea of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”
In a 1998 Fatwa, bin Laden united Muslims under a common struggle, stating that for over seven years, the United States had been “occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples.” In his Letter to America, he further cited the morality of his stance against the United States to encourage participation in Al Qaeda’s movement: “We do not fight for mere killing but to stop the killing of our people. It is a sin to kill a person without proper, justifiable cause, but terminating his killer is a right.” Leveraging a common struggle against the United States, bin Laden claimed it is an “individual duty for every Muslim” to “kill the Americans and their allies — civilians and military.”
Although Al Qaeda and bin Laden incited Islamic unification in their rhetoric against the United States, their main objective remained to promote Salafi jihadism. Doran argues that “war [against the United States] was not a goal in of itself but rather an instrument designed to help its brand of extremist Islam survive and flourish among believers.” While the group did hold hatred against the United States, as many Americans thought, it ultimately longed to create the conditions for the founding of an Islamic Caliphate with Sharia Law. An Islamic Caliphate is an “Islamic form of government in which political and religious leadership is united, and the head of state (the caliph) is a successor to the Prophet Muhammad.” As bin Laden frequently emphasized before the 9/11 attacks, Al Qaeda aspired to overthrow regimes and leaders incorrectly practicing Islam, specifically in Saudi Arabia, and to return Islam to its original teachings as outlined by the prophet Muhammad.
Power Conversion: Nye’s Framework
Power is a highly contested concept in the realm of International Relations because it encompasses varying definitions and interpretations. For instance, some scholars define the term as “the ability to make or resist change,” whereas others claim it is “the ability to get what we want.” Within the array of interpretations, Joseph Nye provides a power framework that offers scholars a foundational resource for examining the complexities of power dynamics in international relations. Beyond distinguishing between types of power, Nye’s framework also provides a power conversion model that assists scholars in analyzing how actors attempt to convert their resources to desired outcomes. Nye’s framework helps explicitly delineate why Al Qaeda committed the attacks against the United States on 9/11.
The scholar defines power as “the ability to affect others to get the outcomes one prefers.” He argues there are three faces of power. In the first face of power, known as “hard power,” Nye suggests actors focus on “the ability to get others to act in ways that are contrary to their initial preferences and strategies.” He contends that Actor A uses coercion through threats or rewards to change Actor B’s behavior. Coercion, in this face, serves as a tool to “deter” an actor from committing an action or to “compel” them to act in a specific manner. As for the second face of power, Nye contends it exists when Actor A “controls the agenda of actions in a way that limits B’s choices of strategy.” In other words, Actor A ensures that the “less powerful are never invited to the table, or if they get there, the rules of the game have already been set.” Finally, in the third face power, which is often declared as “soft power,” Nye claims Actor A “helps create and shape B’s basic beliefs, perceptions, and preferences.” Rather than coercing an actor like hard power, soft power affects others through co-optivar means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes.
Along with distinguishing between types of power, Nye develops a power conversion model to analyze how an actor attempts to achieve its desired outcomes.
The model consists of an actor’s resources, power conversion logic, power conversion execution, and desired outcomes. Nye claims that an actor’s “power is conveyed through resources, whether tangible or intangible.” Hard power resources can include factors such as military force and economic strength, whereas soft power resources comprise intangibles such as ideas, values, culture, and legitimacy. Powerful actors often possess large populations, territory, natural resources, economic strength, military force, and social stability. However, as Nye cites, actors are not always successful in employing their resources to reach their desired outcomes. For instance, despite the United States being far more powerful than the Vietcong in the 1970s, it was unable to achieve its goals in Vietnam. Nye argues that “power conversion—getting from resources to behavioral outcomes—is a crucial intervening variable.”
Power conversion strategies relate to how an actor intends to use its resources to obtain its objectives. This involves analyzing the actor’s usage of hard power tactics, soft power strategies, or a combination of the two. For example, an actor may employ a blend of military force, economic incentives, and diplomatic pressure to coerce or persuade other actors to comply
with its preferences. Nye contends that “converting resources into realized power” requires “well-designed strategies and skillful leadership,” which he describes as “smart power.” Nevertheless, plans are only as effective as the execution of such a strategy. Nye states that “strategies are often inadequate and leaders frequently misjudged.” For this reason, the scholar independently analyzes the execution of an actor’s strategy to determine why the actor may have failed or succeeded in achieving his desired outcomes.
Nye’s power conversion model provides an excellent framework to understand why Al Qaeda committed attacks against the United States on 9/11. By examining the terrorist organization’s resources, power conversion logic, execution strategies, and desired outcomes, this paper provides insights into the motivations and objectives behind Al Qaeda’s actions. Although Americans often contend Al Qaeda is an irrational actor who “hates progress, and freedom, and choice,” as President Bush stated, a deeper analysis through Nye’s framework reveals a rational and more strategic logic than many Americans realize.
Al Qaeda’s Power Conversion
As mentioned previously, the concept of power is about influencing others to achieve desired outcomes. In the early 2000s, Al Qaeda held the following desired outcome: establish an Islamic Caliphate under the rule of Sharia Law in the Middle East. To achieve this objective, Al Qaeda focused on mobilizing Muslims to practice Salafi Jihadism in the region. Although individuals often believe Al Qaeda’s goal was to commit retribution against the United States, the terrorist organization utilized the United States as a “means” to unite Muslim sects. Hence, as mentioned before, Al Qaeda ultimately was attempting to affect the behavior of Muslims in Arab Lands to establish an Islamic caliphate and abolish regimes not practicing Sharia Law.
Al Qaeda employed a combination of the first and third faces of power to achieve its objective: hard power and soft power. Al Qaeda implemented Nye’s idea of hard power by utilizing coercion in the form of corpulence. The act of compelling is, as Nye describes, forcing an actor to take a specific action or change its behavior. Al Qaeda leveraged its ability to ignite fear in the U.S. population to force American leaders to respond with an invasion of Islamic countries. In addition to its initial attack on September 11th, Al Qaeda continued to employ the first face of power by resisting the United States invasion and occupation of Afghanistan with guerrilla warfare and asymmetric tactics, including ambushes and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Al Qaeda utilized hard power to inflict pain on the United States and to raise the costs of military intervention in the Middle East. This form of power was employed to assist Al Qaeda in mobilizing the Muslim population.
As for Al Qaeda’s usage of soft power, the terrorist group attempted to win the hearts and minds of members of Islam in the Arab world. Daniel Byman argues that Al Qaeda desired to “create affiliates and forge alliances with existing groups” in order to expand its influence in the Middle East. Al Qaeda attempted to attract Muslims to its movement by demonstrating the terrorist group’s legitimacy and highlighting the United States’ brutality. By engaging in such an ambitious and elaborate attack on 9/11, Al Qaeda and bin Laden attempted to display their competency and commitment to implementing Sharia Law in the Middle East. The terrorist group also invoked soft power by strategically targeting symbolic American buildings, such as the World Trade Centers and the Pentagon. Al Qaeda believed that destroying symbols of American power would display American weakness and rally Muslims to fight against a major power, just as members of Islam did during the Mongol invasion in the 1300s. Furthermore, Al Qaeda attempted to employ soft power by displaying U.S. immorality in its invasion of Arab lands and the killing of civilians. Through these channels of soft power, the terrorist organization highlighted the benefits of joining its movement and the costs of inaction to co-opt members of Islam in the Middle East.
Beyond the faces of power, more specifically Al Qaeda’s strategic power logic can be broken down into two phases:
As mentioned before, the first step in Al Qaeda’s plan was to provoke the United States to invade Afghanistan. Americans at the time of the attack may have suggested Al Qaeda’s strategy was irrational, but 9/11 expert Lawrence Wright suggests the terrorist organization believed it could “replicate the experience of the Soviet Union, which invaded Afghanistan and engaged in a very bloody and failed effort there, and then shortly after that it dissolved.” Upon an invasion of the United States, Al Qaeda sought to exploit the atrocities caused by American destruction. Michael Doran exemplifies this idea: the “script was obvious: America, cast as the villain, was supposed to use its military might like a cartoon character trying to kill a fly with a shotgun.”
While highlighting the costs of American intervention in the Middle East, the terrorist organization desired to expand the following of Salafi jihadism. Gabriel Weiman states that the 9/11 attacks gave Al Qaeda a platform to spread its message in Arab Lands. In agreement, Daniel Byman contends that Al Qaeda thrives by issuing a “swarm of propaganda to convince Muslims that jihad is their obligation and to convince jihadists to adopt Al Qaeda’s goals over their local ones.” Then, in Phase 2, Al Qaeda sought to mobilize its followers to support an Islamic Caliphate while opposing U.S. intervention in the Middle East. Weiman states that the 9/11 attacks gave Al Qaeda a platform to combine “multimedia propaganda and advanced communication technologies to create a very sophisticated form of psychological warfare.” Not only was the psychological warfare intended to impact Americans, but it was even more so meant to mobilize Muslims to take up arms against the United States.
Finally, with an expanded following, Al Qaeda sought to expel Western influence in the region and set the conditions for the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate under the rule of Sharia Law. Just as Afghanistan repelled a Soviet invasion in the 1980s, Al Qaeda believed Afghans could do this once again with the terrorist organization leading the movement. While opposing American intervention in the region, Al Qaeda aimed to consolidate its power and spread its extremist ideology to ultimately destabilize governments seen as partners of Western powers such as Saudi Arabia. In their strategic logic, Al Qaeda attempted to leverage conflict with the United States, exploit Muslim grievances, and spread their extremist ideology across Arab Lands.
To execute this plan, Al Qaeda employed a combination of hard power and soft power resources. In terms of the resources invoking hard power, Al Qaeda utilized its military power to provoke a U.S. response and resist its invasion. In particular, Al Qaeda hijacked four planes, crashing two into the World Trade Center, one into the Pentagon, and another in Pennsylvania. Additionally, as the invasion commenced, Al Qaeda actively engaged the United States, leveraging its members initially and garnering additional support from insurgents who joined their movement throughout the conflict. As for soft power resources, Al Qaeda leveraged the Salafi jihad ideology along with its perceived legitimacy and commitment to establishing an Islamic caliphate. Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda often invoked religious texts to justify their actions and attract members of Islam to their movement. Additionally, the organization appealed to its past success as a resource to enhance its public perception among Muslims in the Arab World.
Outcome
In what today is known as the Global War on Trade (GWOT), the United States toppled the Taliban regime and decimated Al Qaeda in the state. In 2003, the United States pushed its invasion into Iraq and eventually displaced Saddam Hussein’s regime, as well. American forces remained in Afghanistan, conducting state-building efforts until its withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2020. As a consequence of the war in the Middle East, over 900,000 people lost their lives directly, with an additional 3.6 million fatalities indirectly attributed to the conflict.
Scholar David Baldwin suggests that “before criticizing foreign policy failures, one should ponder the meaning of success and failure.” In this context, Al Qaeda’s ultimate objective was to establish an Islamic Caliphate under Sharia Law. Therefore, their plan should be deemed successful if Al Qaeda completed this goal. Conversely, a failure would entail a scenario such as a decline in the practice of Sharia Law or a further divide in the Muslim population. However, it is difficult to fairly evaluate Al Qaeda’s attacks with such a distinct valuation. Hence, a success-to-failure continuum is necessary, like the one depicted in the figure below.
Evaluating Al Qaeda’s plan in hindsight, the terrorist organization did not succeed in achieving its desired outcomes. Al Qaeda’s aspiration to establish an Islamic Caliphate under Sharia Law remains unfulfilled in 2024. However, Al Qaeda’s execution should not be labeled as a complete failure because its actions did expand Salafi Jihadism and mobilize a large population of Muslims. Additionally, the United States was unable to successfully implement regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan and eventually withdrew from the countries as Al Qaeda predicted.
Evaluating Al Qaeda’s plan in hindsight, the terrorist organization did not succeed in achieving its desired outcomes. Al Qaeda’s aspiration to establish an Islamic Caliphate under Sharia Law remains unfulfilled in 2024. However, Al Qaeda’s execution should not be labeled as a complete failure because its actions did expand Salafi Jihadism and mobilize a large population of Muslims. Additionally, the United States was unable to successfully implement regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan and eventually withdrew from the countries as Al Qaeda predicted.
Because this stark divide prevails, it is clear that Al Qaeda was unable to unite the Islamic World under Sharia Law with its Salafi Ideology. Some scholars even argue that the divide between sects of Islam has increased and become more contentious since Al Qaeda committed the attacks on 9/11. Muslims are increasingly opposing their counterpart sect and referring to violence against one another in some cases in the Arab World today. Mohammed Aly Sergie suggests that “Sunni-Shia tensions contribute to multiple flash points in Muslim countries that are viewed as growing threats to international peace and security.” In particular, Saudi Arabia (Sunni Majority) and Iran (Shia Majority) have deployed considerable resources in the Syrian Civil War, which scholars have called a “Sunni-Shia conflict.”
Along with its inability to unite sects of Islam, Al Qaeda failed to minimize Western influence and implement Sharia Law throughout the region. The Council on Foreign Relations suggests that U.S. foreign policy has grown to incorporate countering terrorism and nuclear proliferation in the region since 9/11. It also argues that the U.S. has expanded its reach by establishing “military bases in more than half a dozen countries, an offshore naval presence in the Gulf, and military assistance and arms sales to its partners, notably Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.” As for Sharia Law in the region, Kali Robinson argues it is not often interpreted literally or practiced fundamentally as Al Qaeda intends in the Middle East. She suggests that “European-style law also influences legal systems in Muslim countries, even in Iran and Saudi Arabia, which claim to only follow Islamic law.”
Although Al Qaeda failed in these regards, Al Qaeda seized upon the U.S. invasions as opportunities to expand its following and recruit new members. In 2007, Daniel Byman wrote that Al Qaeda, a branch of the original Al Qaeda in Iraq, found itself with “the best recruiting tool it could wish for.” He mentions that “with over 100,000 U.S. troops occupying the country for a long period of time, Iraq has become the focus of the media throughout the world and especially the Middle East.” A 2006 National Intelligence Estimate found that the conflict created a “cause celebre’ for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of U.S. involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement.” Furthermore, in a study conducted in 2006, Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank found that “the Iraq War generated a stunning sevenfold increase in the yearly rate of fatal jihadist attacks.”
Along with expanding its following, Al Qaeda played a crucial role in compelling the United States to withdraw from Afghanistan and Iraq in defeat. After nearly 20 years of fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq, the cost of the Global War on terror stands at $8 trillion and over 7,000 service members deaths for the United States, according to a report from the Costs of War project at Brown University. Scholar William Galston writes that the “United States is weaker, more divided, and less respected than it was two decades ago, and we have surrendered the unchallenged preeminence we then enjoyed.”
However, Al Qaeda’s inability to unite the Islamic World, implement Sharia Law, and expel Western influence in the region far outweighs the gains of its Salafi expansion. Because the Muslim world remained divided and the United States conducted state-building operations for nearly 20 years, Al Qaeda failed to set the conditions for establishing an Islamic Caliphate under Sharia Law in the Middle East.
The Challenge of Projecting Power: Al Qaeda’s Flaws
Joseph Nye highlights that actors often face challenges in converting their resources to desired outcomes. He argues that “strategies are often inadequate and leaders frequently misjudged.” In this case, Al Qaeda failed in three key regards:
- Al Qaeda underestimated the United States’ commitment to a prolonged intervention in the Middle East. The terrorist organization believed that it could repel American forces as Afghans did to the Soviets in 1989. The Soviet Union remained in Afghanistan for nine years compared to the nineteen years the U.S. intervened in the state. The U.S. was also backed by a coalition that included the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, among others. This multinational support distinguished the American intervention from that of the Soviet Union.
- Al Qaeda overestimated its own strength and ability to resist U.S. military power. Despite having an estimated 70,000 members in over 60 countries by 2001, as indicated by a study conducted by Johns Hopkins University, this figure pales in comparison to the Afghan resistance during the Soviet-Afghan War, which numbered around 200,000 insurgents. While Al Qaeda anticipated garnering support from fellow Muslims to bolster its ranks, it miscalculated the extent of its influence. Consequently, the United States swiftly invaded Afghanistan and established an interim government by early December 2001, a mere three months after the 9/11 attacks.
- Al Qaeda failed to project a consistent message to Muslims in the region. Although the terrorist organization succeeded in expanding its following as American forces entered Iraq, its efforts were complicated by the diverse factions within the movement. The insurgency in Iraq encompassed a spectrum of groups with varying motivations and ideologies. As highlighted by Daniel Byman in 2007, Al Qaeda was “at the forefront of efforts to foment a sectarian war between Iraq’s Shi’a and Sunni populations.” He noted that the “jihadists have attacked Shiite shrines, pilgrims, political leaders, and other civilian targets.” Al Qaeda deviated from its initial message of Islamic unity, opting instead for violence and division. This departure from their stated goals further obscured their message and undermined their credibility among potential supporters.
Conclusion
The concept of power focuses on an actor’s ability to achieve its desired outcomes. As noted by Nye, power is more than merely resources such as military force and economic strength. He argues that “power conversion—getting from resources to behavioral outcomes—is a crucial intervening variable.” Hence, it is critical that actors develop compelling power conversion logic to maximize their resources in pursuit of their objectives. Nye contends that power conversion strategies can employ hard power and soft power. Hard power utilizes coercion through threats or rewards to change an actor’s behavior, whereas soft power engages with co-optive means like framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attractions to obtain preferred outcomes.
Although Al Qaeda has frequently been portrayed as an irrational actor, particularly in the aftermath of the 9/11 attack, the terrorist organization operated with clear strategic intent. Contrary to popular belief that the terrorist organization sought only revenge for U.S. involvement in the Middle East, Al Qaeda engaged in a movement to unite Muslims under an Islamic Caliphate with Sharia Law. To achieve this objective, the terrorist organization employed both hard power and soft power strategies to mobilize its movement. In terms of hard power, Al Qaeda coerced the United States by compelling it to respond to the terrorist organization’s attack on U.S. soil in 2001. As for soft power, the terrorist group attempted to win the hearts and minds of members of Islam in the Arab world by highlighting the costs of American intervention and the benefits of supporting its movement.
Evaluating Al Qaeda’s strategic power logic and execution in hindsight, it is clear that it failed to establish an Islamic Caliphate under the rule of Sharia Law in the Middle East. Al Qaeda’s plan effectively expanded its following as a result of the United States invading Afghanistan and Iraq, but it failed to unite the Islamic Sects of Sunni and Sharia Islam. Al Qaeda’s strategic logic failed in large part because it underestimated the United States’ commitment to a prolonged intervention and overestimated its own resilience against U.S. military might. Moreover, the organization’s execution faltered due to its inability to maintain a coherent and compelling message to Muslims across the region.
We must therefore never assume an actor is irrational, as many US leaders did after the 9/11 attacks. We must remember the importance of understanding adversaries’ strategic motivations and intentions, even in the face of incomprehensible actions. Moreover, we must value doing our best to think like the enemy. One practical approach to doing so is utilizing Nye’s strategic power logic. By evaluating an actor’s resources and potential courses of action to achieve its desired objectives, we can better anticipate and respond to security threats, ultimately contributing to more effective national security strategies and safeguarding the interests of the United States and its allies.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect the views of the U.S. Army or Department of Defense.
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