Democrats Don’t Need a New Centrist Pressure Group

As is the case after every disappointing election cycle, there’s a lot of finger-pointing among Democrats looking to ascribe blame for the 2024 outcome, particularly at the presidential level. There are also some attempts underway to steer Democrats toward a comeback. Most often, they involve time-worn Democratic factional advice, ranging from the hearty perennial progressive recipe of a sharpened economic “populist” message designed to freeze or reverse the decades-long working-class drift towards the GOP, to the equally well-known centrist prescription aimed at seizing a majority of persuadable swing voters, including some Republicans.

How, exactly, Democrats are supposed to incorporate and carry out such advice is usually left a little unclear. Presumably 2028 presidential candidates will test various strategies in the primaries, which is how ideological battles in the major political parties tend to get resolved.

But at least one group of centrist Democrats are planning to organize a more gradual and less top-down party makeover, or at least a force to push back against the strategies they deem futile or counter-productive. The New York Times reported:

Seth London, an adviser to some of the Democratic Party’s biggest donors, wrote a private memo addressed to “Discouraged Democrats” arguing that the party should “begin with a complete rejection of race- and group-based identity politics.”

The sweeping four-page memo, obtained by The New York Times and earlier reported by Politico, was both widely forwarded and a source of controversy in Democratic circles.

“Democrats have increasingly focused on the priorities of core party activists over the common voters we claim to represent,” wrote Mr. London, who has spent the last three weeks working with other Democratic strategists to build what he envisions as a “a party within the party” of media companies, donors and advocacy groups that support charismatic, moderate officeholders.

When you look at the “party within the party” London proposes to build, there is a very specific model he has in mind, and it’s focused more on elected officials than the Times take on it might suggests. The model is the Democratic Leadership Council, and the structure is a “leadership committee of federal and state elected officials” determined to act as a party faction in opposing identity-politics litmus tests and advancing “common sense” policies that are attractive both to swing voters and to the entrepreneurs who are essential partners in carrying them out.

The Democratic Leadership Council (DLC), where I worked as policy director for over a decade in the late 1990s and early aughts, functioned from 1985 until 2011 as the kind of centrist pressure group London seems to envision recreating. Its initial goal (other than serving as a sort of clubhouse for Democratic politicians unhappy with the national party) was to create the conditions for a Democratic return to the White House at a time when pundits spoke of a Republican “Electoral College Lock.” But once that goal was accomplished under DLC co-founder and all-around star Bill Clinton, the group focused more on state leadership development, and on burnishing its think tank, the Progressive Policy Institute (which still exists), as an idea lab for Democrats, particularly on issues which more orthodox progressive Democrats tended to ignore (including crime, education reform, and national security). The DLC had a large if diffuse influence on all sorts of Democrats, but the group faded after a period when it was mainly known for divisive lefty-bashing, and for pro-market views on the global economy that didn’t look so good after the Great Recession and the subsequent voter backlash against globalization.

So is something like a “new DLC” a good idea right now? It’s a question worth asking, but on balance I’d say no. We are in a very different political moment than the founders of the DLC confronted. In 1985, Democrats were reeling from a presidential election in which its nominee had lost 49 states and was beaten by over 18 percentage points in the national popular vote. It was the second straight landslide loss to Ronald Reagan, viewed by Democrats at the time as a conservative extremist. But at the very same time, Democrats did relatively well down-ballot. They picked up two U.S. Senate seats despite the Reagan landslide, and won a House majority of 35 seats. They controlled 34 of 49 partisan governorships after this terrible election, and also controlled 66 of 98 state legislative chambers. The problem, DLC founders agreed, was that a failed national party had become detached from a still-successful state and local party, and the first step toward recovery was to rebuild the national party on the shoulders of its more successful politicians, who were far more in touch with voters than the party-committee identity-group, and ideological litmus-test commissars who wielded power nationally.

While there were isolated situations (particularly in a few Senate races) where down-ballot Democrats did significantly better than Kamala Harris in 2024, but there just wasn’t the sort of wholesale return to ticket-splitting that suggests the only problem is in Washington. In all the elections of the Trump Era, the top of the Democratic ticket was stronger than it was in the 1980s while the bottom was weaker. There is no obvious cadre of better-connected or more successful elected officials who can lead the donkey back to victory.

The prescriptions the DLC offered Democrats back in the day are also a bit obsolete. In the most prominent DLC-published diagnosis of the party’s problems, Bill Galston and Elaine Kamarck’s The Politics of Evasion, the culprit identified was the refusal of Democratic elites to come up with credible policies on the economy and national security, leaving these urgent concerns to be dominated by the GOP. While you can argue that today’s Democrats have identified with the wrong economic policies and made some missteps in the White House regarding global threats to national security, there’s really no “evasion” going on. And for all the ancient talk of progressives only being interested in the party “base” while centrists care about “swing voters,” it’s pretty clear all Democrats hunger and thirst for all votes, but have different definitions of “swing” and “base” voters and different understandings of what makes them tick.

But the single biggest reason the time isn’t ripe for a “new DLC” goes to the heart of what Seth London seems to envision, as progressive critic David Dayen argues at The American Prospect:

While much of the vision is laid out in vague platitudes—“a future-focused narrative,” “rooted in hard work” and “the pursuit of the American Dream”—where he is most clear, London aligns his movement with the “abundance agenda,” pushed by a series of groups favoring supply-side liberalism through removing regulatory barriers to a host of common needs, while rejecting the concept of “socializing” the provision of health care and housing and education. (London has consulted for Arnold Ventures, a key funder of the abundance agenda, led by former Enron trader and hedge fund manager John Arnold.) The memo commits to “social insurance for those who need it,” an unconcealed reference to means testing.

I strongly object to the frequently-heard lefty smear of the DLC as a brothel of “corporate whores,” but there’s no question its corporate funding-base created a lot of perception problems for the group and for Democrats who aligned with it (even though the DLC went out of its way to defy donors on issues ranging from cap-and-trade to health care to tax cuts to “corporate welfare”). And there’s also no question their (our!) irrational exuberance about the New Economy and financial deregulation discredited key parts of what was otherwise a sensible policy portfolio. Similar problems, it must be admitted, afflicted other center-left “reform” efforts like Britain’s New Labour movement under Tony Blair, which was heavily influenced by Clinton’s New Democrats (the final and best brand for DLC Democrats, which alas, is not reusable).

To be very blunt about it, Democrats will not regain the White House or Congress under the conspicuous leadership of folks from Wall Street or Silicon Valley, however well-meaning they may be. You don’t have to be attracted to what passes for progressive economic “populism” these days (and generally speaking, I’m not) to recognize this is a moment in the history of the Party of the People when a focus on those very people should be paramount. Indeed, one of the DLC’s early slogans was that Democrats should represent “the values and economic aspirations of the middle class;” that’s not a bad starting point for revival.

Beyond the specific strategy chosen for that revival, it’s important to recognize that Democrats overall are in much better shape than they were in 1985. It’s as close to a scientific certainty as you can get that Republicans will lose their slippery hold on the U.S. House in 2026 and with it the governing trifecta that makes them so terrifying at present. Trump is more likely than any president in living memory to overreach and make mistakes that erode his base of support and (quite possibly) damage the living standards that were such a huge part of the problem facing Joe Biden and Kamala Harris this year. While it’s always healthy to discuss what went wrong in an electoral defeat and debate policies and political strategies, a descent into formal factional combat that London seems to contemplate is both unnecessary and counter-productive. For now, the best way to oppose Trump is to maintain a united opposition party prepared to exploit the mistakes that are sure to come.