The recent incidents at Scarborough Shoal and Sabina Shoal have shattered the “false sense of peace” we enjoyed following the withdrawal of the BRP Teresa Magbanua at Sabina Shoal a few months ago. As usual, these acts of Chinese coercive tactics have triggered a media frenzy to dissect the whys and wherefores of the incident, the summoning of the Chinese ambassador for discussions, and the standard announcement of a diplomatic protest that is being rolled out for the umpteenth time. 

Unfortunately, our efforts to de-escalate tension in the West Philippine Sea (WPS) will not alter China’s behavior and policy. Xi Jinping’s geopolitical ambition in East Asia is constant and under a long-term trajectory: the effective sea control of the East and South China Seas and placing the surrounding Northeast and Southeast Asian states under its orbit of influence; including the Philippines.

On the days and weeks that we do not suffer from the antics of the Chinese coast guard or militia; it does not mean that our diplomatic parlay for de-escalation was a success. These quiet periods are mere “tactical pauses” in certain areas of our exclusive economic zone; the Southern Theater Command actively sustains its “operational tempo” in other parts of the South China Sea that fall within their so-called “ten-dash line.”

When will we realize the current “business model” used in the WPS is not working? We cannot defend our sovereignty and protect our sovereign rights sans a holistic maritime strategy. Shifting responsibilities and creating new offices within the bureaucracy do not necessarily translate to a winning solution. Insisting on a “white-on-white paradigm” in the WPS reeks of an inability to adapt to changes in the operating environment. Beijing is now jointly its naval, maritime, and para-military capabilities.

When do we realize that the threat posed by China in the WPS is not a “maritime law enforcement” issue? What we need is a “denial strategy” that could disrupt China’s current strategy.

Beijing is using its maritime forces to control key areas within our exclusive economic zone and compel us to incrementally give up legal entitlements in the WPS to de-escalate tension; thus preventing the legitimate and peaceful exercise of our sovereign rights, such as exploration for energy sources, fishing, and scientific surveys.

Navy’s struggles

The concept of a denial strategy is not a novel approach. The Philippine Navy’s capability posture is built on a “sea denial strategy.” However, it struggles in the execution due to competing security mandates, the slow tempo of its modernization, and the current fixation by the government against employing it in the WPS for fear of escalation. More recently, the Ateneo Policy Center published a paper on the ”Filipino Theory of Victory,” which offered a multi-dimensional approach to counter Chinese strategy against the country. The study looked at a denial strategy at different dimensions of national power. Given the demands of the times, the compelling question is how a denial strategy be translated into actionable policies. Some proposals come into mind, these are not new, but providing a strategic context makes it more logical.

First, let us resume the exploration of the Reed Bank. This is easier said than done because we need to set up a protective layer of ships to secure the contracted survey vessel; as China will definitely surge vessels to prevent this from succeeding. It is a high-risk but high-payoff approach, but we should be reminded that at stake is our energy security, as the gas from Malampaya is expected to run out by 2027. 

Second, we need a better way of protecting our fisherfolks. They need a 24/7 overwatch from our coast guard and fisheries bureau. The sporadic patrols and the resupply missions may be good for purposes of optics, but it does not in any way give sustained comfort to our fisherfolks who are subjected to harassment by the Chinese daily. As a side note, let us cast aside any plans that conceptualize our fisherfolks as frontline forces; going out to sea to ensure our food security is taxing enough. It is not their responsibility to guard our waters; this is the national government’s mandate.

Third, re-declare Scarborough Shoal as an aerial gunnery range for our air forces. Before, the shoal was previously used as a target during aerial exercises, particularly when US forces were still stationed in Clark and Subic. Restoring the shoal to a previous status does not mean its actual use for lobbing bombs and missiles. That would create furor among our own environmentalists and key stakeholders. The point is through a monkey wrench against China’s illegitimate claims and poses a quandary over their current blockade around the shoal.

Floating bases

Fourth, acquire a few large oil tankers or bulk carriers, which can be repurposed as “floating bases” and deployed at Scarborough, Second Thomas, and Sabina Shoals. They should be large enough to be impervious to ramming, water cannons, lasers, or other forms of bullying employed by the Chinese at sea. Such vessels can sustain our troops in BRP Sierre Madre, resupply our fisherfolks continuously, project special operations teams, or conduct aerial surveillance using onboard drones.

Fifth, let us start having 24/7 naval patrols along the outer edge of our exclusive economic zone. This is to counter the sovereignty patrols of Chinese coast guard vessels just outside our territorial waters along the Luzon Sea and off mainland Palawan. Such patrols can be performed using “surface action groups” instead of the usual single-ship deployment, to mitigate against Chinese swarming tactics. 

Sixth, to leverage the Archipelagic Sealanes Law to strengthen military presence along the Luzon, Mindoro, Balabac, and Sibutu Straits. These chokepoints are vital to Chinese trade, and we should be able to strategically impose costs against its economy if it pushes too far with its encroachment in the WPS. 

These are but a few possible approaches. Our government has the capacity and the proper information to come up with better solutions. The point is de-escalation measures that are unsupported by any strategy will place the country’s interests at a disadvantage over time. Further, such measures should support our national interest, not because the Americans or other external parties asked us to do so. In the end, we need to learn to play the long game, if we are to survive as an archipelagic state. – Rappler.com

Retired Rear Admiral Rommel Jude Ong was formerly vice commander of the Philippine Navy.