The Invisible Frontline: The Nature of China’s Unrestricted Warfare and Why the US Needs a Strategic Wake-Up Call

“Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away to return once more”

― Sun Tzu

Introduction

Imagine you’re playing a game of chess with the assumption that the rules are traditional. Your opponent, however, gets to change the rules at any time, distract you with clever misdirection, and manipulate the audience’s perception of the match. This game is no longer equal; one player has a major advantage. This is the essence of China’s approach to warfare in its Unrestricted Warfare (UW) strategy. Rather than relying solely on traditional military strength and playing by the “rules,” China employs the full spectrum of national power, including cyberattacks, economic coercion, disinformation campaigns, and spies, to achieve strategic goals. The United States (US) is scouring the rule book for effective responses but is coming up short. These tactics fall outside the typical rules of warfare and are increasingly relevant in today’s interconnected world, effectively creating a new normal. With a traditional mindset on warfare, the US needs to adapt to these changes to keep up with integral changes to the character of war and effectively protect itself from external influence. China’s use of UW is having profound repercussions on core US infrastructure. These effects occur without recognition and proper urgency, putting US national security and hegemony at risk. It’s critical that senior-level policymakers and strategists adequately recognize the impact of China’s UW on the US. This article provides evidence of UW’s occurrence within vital US systems and details possible solutions to mitigate its effects. The primary aim is to increase awareness of China’s ongoing action against the US to stimulate strategic discussion within higher levels of the government.

Brief History of China and Setting the Stage for UW

Tensions between the US and China are well-documented and are anticipated to be a central focus in strategic discourse for the foreseeable future. These tensions are not recent but have deep roots, originating from a complex history that goes back several centuries. Interactions began when disagreements arose between Great Britain and China on the importation of opium into China in 1839. This led to the Opium Wars, which China lost, and the signing of the Treaty of Tianjin in 1858. This treaty opened Chinese ports and gave access to foreign powers, including the US. Many deemed this signed agreement unequal, granting foreigners privileged access to China while forcing the country to make concessions. This fueled Chinese animosity toward Western powers and imperialism. The exploitation and embarrassment experienced after the Opium Wars led the Emperor of the Qing Dynasty, Xianfeng, to realize that a national reassessment was required. This reassessment focused on border fortification, strengthening internal systems, and maintaining the national capacity to influence surrounding entities. Despite these aspirations, internal conflict hindered forward progress. A century of wars within China led to integral changes in leadership and ideology. These include the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, the rise and fall of the nationalistic Republic of China, and the revolutionary takeover of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) led by Mao Zedong in 1949. Following the revolution, Mao Zedong stated, “China will never again be an insulted nation. We have stood up…No Imperialist will ever be allowed again to invade our territory”. Mao’s goal was to build China’s economy and solidify national communism. Industrial growth more than doubled under Mao’s leadership, but his ideology created rifts in the population. These rifts came from his Cultural Revolution in the 1970s, which aimed to reinforce communist party ideology through radical policy. These policies led to significant social friction, the persecution of intellectuals, and cultural destruction. This revolution further divided China’s ideology from global powers, affecting its standing in the international community. Following Mao’s complex legacy, China underwent leadership changes with Mao Zedong’s passing and Deng Xiaoping’s rise. Deng brought a level of change and openness to the country while also introducing critical doctrinal ideas. One included the “toa guang tang hui,” meaning “keep a low profile.” This idea prompted China to lay low, “hiding one’s capabilities and biding one’s time.” Deng’s emphasis on patience, practical work, and cautious observation was foundational in guiding China through its initial phase of economic reform and integration into the global economy. His approach was characterized by strategic patience to create a stable environment for China’s growth. This idea benefited the country, and over the last four decades, China’s economic strength has accelerated at surprising rates, allowing it to move towards more assertive goals. China’s bolstered economy and the transition from Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatic advice to China’s current strategic ambitions reflect a significant change in the country’s approach to global interactions. China’s current strategy centers on its economy. This strategy involves leveraging its economic power through trade, investments, and technological advancements while engaging in indirect activities to achieve strategic objectives and replace the US hegemon. It also includes efforts to influence international institutions and norms while expanding its arm of influence globally. A primary target of China’s action is the United States. The friction between China and the United States, rooted in ideological differences and competing national visions, has become more pronounced as China’s ambitions grow. The economic symbiosis that once characterized their relationship is now complicated by rivalry and competition for global influence. China’s pivot to UW tactics is vital to understand as it targets the US and navigates the international environment. As both nations continue to maneuver within their relationship, the interplay between China’s rising ambitions and the US’s response will likely shape the future of global geopolitics.

Unrestricted Warfare

A critical component of China’s shift in strategy is the document, Unrestricted Warfare, authored by People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui.

Effectively broadening the scope of traditional warfare, the UW premise introduced a diverse array of indirect methods of warfare that fall outside the bounds of conventional armed conflict. These methods include lawfare, economic manipulation, disinformation campaigns, and cyber theft and coercion via sabotage, social media platforms, and news outlets.

The introduction of UW at the turn of the century demonstrates a remarkably forward-thinking approach. At that time, the internet was an emerging technology seen as clunky, slow, and rudimentary. Its full potential remained largely speculative. The strategic foresight embodied in UW, which anticipated the profound impact of technological advancements, highlights China’s long-term strategic vision. By recognizing these possibilities, China displayed an approach that used budding technologies in its long-term goals.

Modalities of warfare that were once considered peripheral have become central instruments of manipulation and subversion. Due to their subtle and indirect nature, the repercussions of these UW strategies are frequently underestimated. They are challenging to quantify and often exhibit low levels of observability, resulting in unrecognized areas of influence across multiple domains.

The first step in addressing this issue is uncovering instances of UW tactics used in the US. It is then crucial to determine their severity on core infrastructure and components of national security. Once these are detailed, senior officials should discuss whether a response is warranted or whether the effects of these indirect attacks are inconsequential. The following section showcases examples of UW’s occurrence in critical systems that comprise US infrastructure and national security. These represent a small portion of all documented cases but demonstrate that China actively influences the US without a strategic response. The systems examined for this article include the US economic, political, military, and academic systems.

How UW is Affecting the US?

Economy

Chinese influence on the US economy occurs mainly through economic espionage. China’s Thousand Talents Program (TTP), a program that China uses to “recruit overseas expertise to build up China’s science and technology knowledge and innovation base,” is consistently present in several cases of recorded espionage actions implemented by China.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) started a new “Chinese initiative” in 2018 to combat the transfer of information back to China by TTP participants. This initiative found several instances of espionage involving Chinese and US professors, employees, and scientists.

• Gou Zeng, an Ohio State immunologist, was arrested en route to China. He failed to disclose his TTP participation and foreign affiliations after receiving a $4.1 million grant. The FBI found that he was transferring scientific information from his research at Ohio State back to Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou, China.
• A Harvard scientist, US-born Charles Lieber, was also found to be a TTP participant who failed to disclose financial incentives received from China. These included a $50,000 per month salary, $150,000 annual living expenses, and a $1.5 million grant to create a research lab at Wuhan University in China.
• Hongjin Tan stole $1 billion worth of secrets from his employer, a US-based petroleum company. Another scientist, Shan Shi, also applied to the TTP and stated that he would digest and absorb technology from the US. He ended up stealing synthetic foam trade secrets used in US submarines with a plan to give them to state-owned Chinese companies so they could put the American company out of business (Wray 2020).
• Hao Zhang was convicted of stealing an American wireless device manufacturing process that took 20 years to develop and sent it to China so state-owned businesses could patent the process and return to America to use it as their own.

Though the TTP is an integral part of the Chinese strategy to manipulate US economics, it also has other state-run programs that accomplish this. China uses its Overseas Chinese Scholars program, which has roughly 2.21 million participants worldwide. This program aims to send Chinese nationals to study abroad at foreign universities and companies to gather knowledge. China incentivizes them to return to China to use this knowledge or send it back to China for national broadening in the science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) fields.

• These transfers were found to be primarily theft. This technological theft cost the US roughly $300 billion in revenue leading to the loss of 2 million jobs (Levine 2020, 10). China also takes advantage of foreign companies that want to do business in the country. With roughly 350 million people living in first-world conditions, it creates an attractive advantage for foreign businesses. These companies are required to enter agreements with Chinese firms that mandate the sharing of technology and expertise. These agreements extend into long-term arrangements that mandate foreign manufacturers to educate Chinese companies on how to produce similar products and the associated infrastructure to do so. These agreements are part of the technology transfer found in China’s strategy.
• China’s use of UW tactics to steal economically advantageous technology and proprietary practices has profound repercussions in the US. An FBI report determined that China is the world’s leading intellectual property thief and found that the cost to the US economy of counterfeit goods, stolen trade secrets, and pirated software ranged between $225 billion and $600 billion.

Politics

China’s indirect tactics for manipulating US politics include funding, incentives, technological manipulation, and foreign agents. These findings come from FBI reports and independent investigations on Chinese action in US politics.

• Fang Fang, a Chinese intelligence agent, was arrested in California for her involvement with state and federal politicians. She participated in campaign fundraising and networking activities and was involved in romantic and sexual relationships with two Midwestern mayors. She also involved herself in the re-election campaign for the US Representative of California, Eric Swalwell, and was actively engaged in his office.
• Linda Su and her husband, Chris Hu, were recently arrested in 2024. Linda Su worked as the deputy chief of staff for New York Governor Kathy Hochul and the deputy diversity officer for Governor Andrew Cuomo. Linda was arrested for acting as an agent of the Chinese government and was charged with advancing Beijing’s agenda in various ways. She blocked Taiwanese officials from accessing the governor’s office and “shaped New York governmental messaging to align with the priorities of the Chinese government.” Additionally, she was charged with violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act, which mandates that individuals working on behalf of foreign entities register with the Department of Justice (DOJ). She entered the US illegally, helped people commit visa fraud, and laundered money. As an agent for the CCP, she and her husband received hefty financial incentives from the Chinese government, totaling several million dollars.

China also prioritizes cyber capabilities and financial incentives to influence US politics.

• The 2024 Annual Threat Assessment Report found that China used cyber capabilities to influence politics within the US. This was demonstrated by the PRC’s use of TikTok accounts that targeted both political party candidates during the US midterm election in 2022.
• Intelligence agencies found evidence that Chinese hackers interfered in the 2016 and 2018 elections and mentioned that there were signs that China-allied hackers engaged in “spear-phishing” attacks on US politicians before the 2020 vote.
• A well-known pro-CCP network known as “Spamouflage” is altering its influence tactics to manipulate politics via social media. Spamouflage created radical right-wing social media accounts that exploit domestic divisions by targeting controversial issues circulating in politics. Changes to Spamouflage tactics since 2017 have increased engagement from real US users, which generated between 16,000 and 20,000 views.
• Financial favors and incentives were also used as manipulation tools in US politics. US-based groups closely tied with the United Front Work Department, a CCP-operated organization, donated to leading New York politicians. Investigations found that these donations span decades and include influential politicians such as a former New York senator and presidential candidate Hillary Clinton.

Military

The main form of subversion in the military system is theft through foreign agents or cyber hacking. Targets of this theft include personnel information and technology. The evidence of cyber hacking is far too abundant for this article. Hacking puts all innovative military technology and practices at risk.

• In 2007, 2009, and 2011, investigations found that China successfully hacked the Pentagon’s servers. They gained access to massive amounts of data, including the blueprints of US stealth fighters and supporting technology.
• In 2014, Su-Bin, a Canadian aerospace company owner with US contracts, assisted two PLA hackers in stealing roughly 630,000 files from Boeing concerning details on the C-17 cargo plane and the F-22 and F-35 stealth fighters.

The Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI) found that Su-Bin informed the hackers of specific individuals and technologies to focus on and helped draft reports that were sent back to the PLA’s General Staff Headquarters.

• Reports found that China purchased technology from the Department of Defense (DOD) when it attempted to eliminate excess. PRC companies used American names to avoid suspicion and bid on American technology and military equipment to acquire it. An example of this was the purchase of a tool profiler used to build components of the F-14 jet for $25,000 when it was initially priced at $3 million.
• One of the largest hacks related to the military was the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) hack, which resulted in the theft of background information, fingerprints, addresses, social security numbers, and other personal records of 21.5 million federal employees.

Academics

China’s goal to reinvigorate its science, technology, and innovation base creates a prime opportunity for UW tactics. These tactics are especially effective in academics because of the US tradition of academic openness. China uses state-run programs, discreet funding, and student spies to gain access to research in US academics.

• A Department of Education investigation found that multiple American universities failed to report financial ties to foreign entities such as the PRC. This report determined that “these financial incentives may have been used to influence or control teaching and research at several universities, with additional risks of property theft, espionage, and propaganda operations.” At the initiation of this investigation, academic institutions rushed to report anonymous donations, which totaled $1.14 billion when unveiled. These funding sources were deemed hostile to the US by targeting investments to “project soft power, steal sensitive and proprietary research, and spread propaganda.” Academic institutions that accepted these anonymous donations included the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Georgetown, Cornell, Yale, and Harvard. China also uses personnel in US academic institutions to support its use of financial incentives. Reports indicate an increased use of student spies to collect information and return it to the CCP.
• Glenn Duffie Shriver was recruited by three PRC intelligence officers posing as students. He agreed to take money in exchange for sharing classified national defense information. This was ultimately caught by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) interviewers but demonstrates China’s use of student spies.
• A University of Tennessee professor, John Roth, who worked under contract for the United States Air Force on drone technology, gave Chinese national students access to his data and equipment. He was arrested while attempting to travel to China with a laptop containing sensitive information.

China’s use of Confucian Institutes also includes economic espionage. These institutes are government-funded Chinese cultural, language, and education programs that place centers abroad in numerous countries.

• In a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report to Congress, studies on Confucian Institutes found that board members of the institutes directly or indirectly pressured professors, administrators, and guests at US universities to avoid statements or public events that the PRC deemed politically sensitive.
• The CCP paid the teachers in Confucian Institutes to avoid sensitive topics such as human rights violations and negative impressions of China. Universities housing Confucian Institutes were identified as subservient to the Chinese government through its financial backing. Columbia University canceled talks “it feared it would upset Chinese officials,” and North Carolina State University canceled a visit by the Dalai Lama, Tibet’s religious leader because the university administration said that China is a key trading partner with North Carolina.

China uses financial incentives, student spies, and Confucian Institutes as tools of academic espionage within US academia. Evidence of Chinese involvement in the US is abundant. Whether you agree or disagree that this is a significant concern for the US is beside the point. The fact is that China is mounting influence and manipulation campaigns in several US systems.

Why Does it Matter?

Do these instances of Chinese subversion and manipulation matter? The US is already dealing with many domestic issues that politicians and the public are collectively calling to be addressed.

While these issues are crucial, it’s also important to acknowledge that China views these internal tensions as opportunities to push its agenda indirectly. The sinister nature of UW is that its effects are often intangible, creating the out-of-sight, out-of-mind effect. There are three main reasons why the US needs to pay attention to China’s use of UW.

1. It’s a Threat to National Security

This may seem like a dramatic statement, but let’s examine the necessary components of national security in general. It includes military defense to respond to threats worldwide, intelligence and surveillance agencies to identify and eliminate internal and external threats, law enforcement to maintain order, cybersecurity to protect critical infrastructure, and international alliances to minimize conflicts that could upset global order. From the documented instances of coercion mentioned previously, it’s factually evident that military technology is being stolen, hacks are occurring in government agencies, cybersecurity is sidestepped by Chinese cyber capabilities to steal economic information, and social media is used to cause strife in US politics, leading to increased disorder in the country. While Chinese action may not bring the country to its knees, a slow erosion is occurring that absolutely plays a role in how effective US national security is and where it will be in the future.

2. It Puts US Hegemony at Risk

The US still holds the edge in critical areas of national power. It’s still the world’s most robust economy, has the most potent conventional military power, and has pervasive influence in economic and cultural realms. These essential components dictate the US’s international standing. While this is true for now, many speculate on the failing nature of US hegemony and the degradation of these areas. China’s UW strategy puts US hegemony at risk, and I’ll explain why. China has a Military-Civilian Fusion (MCF) strategy. This strategy aims to fuse the private sector, including any innovation therein, with the military to create increased power projection through an “intelligent military.” The goal is to create a technologically advanced force through any means available, both direct and indirect. The US has historically had the most technologically advanced military in the world. It’s consistently known for its mobility, lethality, and strength, and the technology embedded in the services is crucial to this reputation. As detailed previously, China consistently steals military and private sector technology. If the F-22, F-35, B-2, or B-21 stealth technology and associated capabilities are unveiled, the US loses the advantage in using them. This same principle can be applied to conventional weapons, ICBM and submarine technology, nuclear development, cyber security procedures, and other aspects of military or national strength. This doesn’t only apply to military technology, either. If China can steal proprietary business information, patent it in China, and return it to the US for use, those private, innovative companies could go out of business. This economic manipulation hurts the US economy, as China uses stolen secrets to grow its global trading network. These are just examples, but China is using the US as a springboard to further its global reach economically and ideologically through theft. Retrieving innovative practices and assets from other countries can save them enormous amounts of time and money while impeding adversary progress. China’s focus on fusing advanced technology into various aspects of its national power poses a problem for the US and ultimately threatens US hegemony in multiple areas.

3. It can Deter Future Aggression

War with China is one of the last things that would benefit the US. However, strategic conversations on the ongoing US-China friction point toward possible cooperation rather than inevitable war. While this may or may not be true, it’s crucial to work toward avoiding any war scenario with China. The US can accomplish this by focusing on China’s indirect actions first. This situation reminds me of the phrase, “Give someone an inch, and they take a mile.” If the country allows indirect attacks to continue unhindered, they may increase in severity, even leading to overt conflict when the US finally decides to respond. China is also a nuclear-capable country, which invites elevated tension to the conversation regarding the use of weapons of mass destruction. This flashpoint must be avoided, which means focusing on the indirect, sometimes intangible areas of influence first. Identifying and deterring these effects early on, especially in the United States, can quell future aggression and it’s strategically beneficial to nip this problem in the bud. While it may be a monumental task to identify and counter areas of influence, the effects wrought on the US warrant attention, resources, and time. This takes us to the possible solutions that both military and academic professionals offer.

Possible US Solutions

The problem with identifying mitigation strategies is that UW tactics are inherently obscure. They’re challenging to observe, making them even harder to engage. Although countering the effects of UW isn’t prominently featured in US policy and military doctrine, existing research and literature do propose solutions. Unfortunately, these have not been fully considered, and most have yet to be implemented in significant ways. Out of sight, out of mind, right? The “lost decade” from roughly 2010 to 2020 is a large contributor to the lack of US counterstrategy. This period exemplifies US assumptions on Chinese predictions, ultimately leading to a strategic lag, leaving the nation considerably behind in its understanding and response to Chinese policies and strategies. This delay has hindered the development and deployment of comprehensive countermeasures against the indirect nature of UW. It’s critical that the US government acknowledge this lapse. When examining possible solutions to catch up strategically, I suggest three focus areas.

Focus on Defense

The first is a focus on national defense. This idea comes from author and US Air Force General Robert Spalding, one of the leading military professionals focused on UW. General Spalding offers several solutions to impede the effects of indirect strategies. One of his proposals focuses on changing from strategic offense to defense . In the 1980s, Ronald Reagan created the Active Measures Working Group (AMWG). The AMWG was a committee that operated for eleven years during the height of the Cold War. It consisted of members from the Department of State (DOS), DOD, CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), FBI, DOJ, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and the US Information Agency (Abrams 2016). This group was tasked with identifying and exposing Soviet disinformation and reported that it successfully established and executed US policy in response to Soviet action. It accomplished this by exposing covert operations and raising political costs by sharing this information with foreign and domestic audiences. It also worked to build alliances that made the Soviet Union “pay a price for disinformation that reverberated all the way to the top of the Soviet political apparatus.” This highly respected committee was solely tasked with the Soviet Union. A counter-UW interagency organization could accomplish these same objectives with similar results if specifically tasked to China. This organization would fit the need to focus on national defense. While some US intelligence agencies are tasked with identifying Chinese action, their resources and manning are spread thin with other investigative priorities. UW covers the spectrum of power, calling for a composite response force comprised of military and non-military specialists. This counter-UW organization would cover the spectrum of systems by incorporating professionals specializing in the economic, agriculture, business, academic, military, and technology domains. Their main task would be to identify and expose. A vital component of the AMWG was sharing evidence with international allies. This open flow of information is essential to ensure allies can also produce calls to action for China.

Focus on the Economy

For decades, China has been reluctant to participate fully in the international economic community, which has prompted speculation from peer nations. While China is a member of prominent organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank, it remains hesitant to fully adopt the responsibilities and roles typically associated with developed countries. There’s evidence that China does this to avoid the associated obligations that come with developed economy status, specifically in the WTO. By sidestepping these commitments, China can operate under less stringent standards while still progressing along its economic goals . Calls for greater transparency have become increasingly common, yet China often struggles to respond clearly to these inquiries. As international demands grow and China pursues further economic expansion, it has been forced to become more involved in organizations that necessitate increased visibility and accountability. If pressured to be fully involved, Chinese actions can be more effectively scrutinized when integrated into these global economic organizations. Having a voice at the table may entice China to take on more responsibility, leading to a higher visibility among developed countries that could decrease their use of UW around the globe. Another way economic manipulation can be used to influence China is to exclude them from economically beneficial treaties and pacts in response to exposed UW tactics. An example is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which aimed to create economic positives for all signatories while excluding China. A mainstay of this partnership was to decrease trade dependency on China while bringing allies closer to the US. Though this partnership never came to fruition, it represents an avenue that can check China’s influence through exclusion.

Focus on Protecting US Innovation

China focuses on the theft of innovation to bolster its economy and MCF policy. While this is not exclusive to the US, the US is a primary contributor to advanced technology research and design, making the country a prime target for China’s UW tactics. It is imperative to protect US innovation. When China steals innovative processes or technology, US companies lose money and are forced to contract, leading to less financial flow in the research and development sector. This financial restriction slows innovation. When companies contract work, they also downsize, losing engineers and scientists vital to creating and testing critical, advanced technology and innovative processes. The twofold effect of this downsizing includes a decreased desire from younger generations to pursue STEM-related occupations and a loss of technological advantage over adversaries. If US companies aren’t protected from cyber theft, the US will lose its position as one of the world’s most technologically advanced countries. Forms of protection that US companies would benefit from are protectionist policies implemented by state and federal politicians.

A robust system of protection through policy for US businesses could slow the amount of proprietary information retrieved by China. These policies shield the economy by protecting the companies that spend time and money on innovation. Innovation doesn’t reside in privatized companies or investments alone, however. The Chinese government also targets academic institutions, taking advantage of American tendencies toward cooperation in research. This is a tricky situation, though. While protecting proprietary information is critical, it’s important to maintain the historically inclusive and collaborative atmosphere in US universities. Policies or academic restrictions may be necessary to protect this environment, such as in the business and innovation sector. Despite these suggestions, discussions on UW must occur at higher levels of politics and defense institutions to increase familiarity. One of the latest discussions on UW in official political environments occurred in March of 2024 in a House Oversight Committee when a Grand Old Party (GOP) representative brought the increasing threat of China to the committee’s attention. The representative mentioned that he noticed UW was a term that senior homeland security officials “seemed puzzled by,” indicating unfamiliarity with an ongoing threat to US national security that requires immediate attention.

Conclusion

The warfare landscape is shifting, leaving traditional strategies insufficient to face indirect threats like China’s UW. Evidence shows that cyber operations, economic theft, disinformation campaigns, and other indirect tactics undermine traditional US strength, leaving the country without an effective counterstrategy. The US must recognize that the rules of engagement have changed. The country must adapt to this new reality to protect its national security and maintain its influence globally. This can be accomplished by focusing on defense, using economic power to its advantage, and protecting innovation in business and academia. Despite the suggestions unveiled in this article, the true purpose behind publications of this nature is to increase visibility and discussion. The existence of UW tactics and their effects need to be acknowledged through evidentiary support that creates discourse among senior officials at all levels. Awareness must then translate into action. This action is crucial to protecting the effectiveness of US national security, maintaining global hegemony in critical areas, and minimizing the risk of open aggression between the two superpowers as they navigate their fluid relationship.

The post The Invisible Frontline: The Nature of China’s Unrestricted Warfare and Why the US Needs a Strategic Wake-Up Call appeared first on Small Wars Journal by Arizona State University.