Comeback Of Tehran-Friendly Iraqi PM Al-Maliki Alarms US

By Björn Stritzel

(EurActiv) -- Nouri al-Maliki, the former Iraqi prime minister long seen as aligned with Tehran, is edging toward a political comeback, raising alarm in Washington just as the US heads into talks with Arab states and Iran this week in Istanbul.

A return to power could expand Iran’s reach in the country and weaken Iraqi state institutions that the US and its allies tried to build after the 2003 invasion, critics warn.

Current Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani won the largest share of votes in November’s parliamentary election. But Shia parties have nominated al-Maliki, who served as Iraq’s head of government from 2006 to 2014, as their candidate for the premiership.

US President Donald Trump has warned that a renewed al-Maliki government would prompt the US to withdraw its support for Iraq.

On Sunday, it was reported that the US special envoy to Iraq, Mark Savaya, had been removed from his post. One presumed reason, according to Reuters, is his failure to block al-Maliki’s nomination.

Al-Maliki’s legacy

Al-Maliki’s reputation is deeply tarnished, Faisal al-Mutar, an Iraqi human-rights activist, told Euractiv. During his first term, al-Maliki “entered office with an extremely aggressive sectarian tone”.

“He represented a version of politics rooted in the Dawa Party’s worldview,” al-Mutar said, referring to al-Maliki’s Islamist Shia party.

“It suggested that Shia Muslims, particularly his own faction, were uniquely entitled to rule Iraq,” he added. The activist, who previously worked with US  forces against al Qaeda in Iraq, now leads the non-profit organisation Ideas Beyond Borders.

According to him, that sense of ownership over the state was deeply alienating, not only to large segments of the population, but even to many Shia Iraqis as well: Al-Maliki’s policies accelerated polarisation, helped drive the country into a cycle of sectarian warfare, and empowered extremist groups across communities.

“In many ways,” al-Mutar said, “that era marked the beginning of the deeper failure of Iraq’s post-2003 political system.”

Michael Pregent, a former US military intelligence officer in Iraq, shared that view.

“He is a sectarian leader,” Pregent told Euractiv: Al-Maliki politicised the Iraqi security forces and bears substantial responsibility for the crisis of 2013-14, when Sunni communities – marginalised and harassed – became fertile ground for recruitment by the Islamic State (IS) terror group.

That outcome reversed hard-won US gains. Earlier counterinsurgency efforts had pushed jihadist groups in western Iraq to the margins, but al-Maliki dismantled the successful ‘Sons of Iraq’ initiative, Pregent added, referring to the coalition the US had formed with Sunni tribes in the country’s Anbar province, which helped stabilise the country.

What followed was the rise of IS, which overran large parts of the country in 2014, including Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city.

‘One of his guys’ 

Even if al-Maliki himself does not return as prime minister, Pregent said he expected one of his henchmen to fill the role: “If it’s not going to be al-Maliki, then it will be one of his guys.”

Iran-backed Shiite militias, including the powerful Badr Corps led by al-Maliki’s ally Hadi al-Amiri, would ensure that Tehran retains decisive influence over its neighbour.

“If Iraqi political forces choose to bring back al-Maliki, it would signal a highly antagonistic posture toward Washington,” al-Mutar also said.

“It risks Iraq losing a major ally and a critical bridge to the global economy, a prospect many within the Iraqi state are deeply concerned about.”

A restoration of al-Maliki’s rule would re-institutionalise sectarian governance and further empower militia networks that have expanded over the past decade, he said.

“In that scenario, the EU should not treat his return as business as usual,” al-Mutar argued.

Instead, Brussels “should actively oppose the reinstallation of figures tied to Iranian-sponsored sectarian rule and make clear that development aid, political normalisation, and economic engagement cannot continue under such leadership.”

Sanctions would be an effective lever, Pregent agreed. “Iraq is critical to Iran in part because it provides access to US dollars.”

Should al-Maliki – or one of his proxies – take power, sweeping sanctions should follow, including cutting off all interaction with militias run by Iran’s elite armed forces, the IRCG, and targeting their financial lifelines, he said.

Joint US-EU sanctions would deal a severe blow to Iraq’s economy, Pregent said, adding that Europe should also engage Shia youth protest movements.

In 2019, predominantly young Shia demonstrators rose up against the sectarian rule of Iran-backed militias. The protests were violently suppressed by the IRGC and its Iraqi proxies, leaving hundreds of protestors dead.

That movement – explicitly rejecting Iraq’s sectarian fragmentation – remains one of the few sources of hope for a better future for the country, Pregent added.