China’s Redlines Aren’t Where You Think They Are | USNI Proceedings

In China’s Redlines Aren’t Where You Think They Are, Lt. Col. Brian Kerg argues that U.S. planners consistently misread the sources of escalation risk in the Taiwan Strait. Drawing on the First, Second, and Third Taiwan Strait Crises, he shows that Chinese escalation has been driven by perceived threats to political narratives and objectives rather than by the mere presence or use of U.S. military power.

The article challenges assumptions that restraint preserves stability and instead identifies substantial maneuver space for U.S. naval and amphibious forces to deter aggression without crossing Beijing’s true redlines. Kerg concludes that stability depends on avoiding political challenges to the status quo while making any attack on Taiwan carry an unmistakable risk of war with the United States.

The First Taiwan Strait Crisis

The 1954–55 First Taiwan Strait Crisis was an armed conflict between the nationalist Republic of China (ROC)—Taiwan—and the communist People’s Republic of China (PRC). The object of the fight was several ROC-held islands near the Chinese mainland… Notably, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chairman Mao Zedong explicitly directed that the PRC not become ensnared in a fight with U.S. forces…Finally, it is clear the PRC’s objective was something Mao and the CCP wanted, but only if they could avoid war with the United States, while the United States was clearly willing to risk war with the PRC to protect the status quo.

The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis

Conflict emerged again in 1958, this time with significantly higher stakes. The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis saw bloody naval and amphibious operations, a significant commitment of U.S. forces to Taiwan, and the threat of Soviet intervention…Once again, the PRC’s desire to prevent war with the United States decisively influenced the conflict’s development…Exceptions occurred only in response to perceived political—not military—escalation.

The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis

By the time of the third crisis (1995–96), the ROC had ceased to be an existential threat to the PRC. It was therefore a perceived attack on the political status quo rather than military actions that triggered the crisis…The core cause of PRC escalation was fundamentally political. Missile tests and military exercises were a clear response to Lee’s speech affirming Taiwanese sovereignty.

Winning the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis

Today, cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan are reaching a new boil… fears of antagonizing China often hamstring recommendations for a more assertive U.S. military posture regarding Taiwan’s defense. Paralysis by analysis is reinforced by a commitment to strategic ambiguity… China’s redlines are political, not military… There is significant maneuver space for the United States to make military—particularly naval—investment in and around Taiwan without risking escalation.

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