The Horn Of Africa States: Rebuilding Governance And Trust In The Region – OpEd
The Horn of Africa States region is marked by continuing violence, poverty, and political stagnation and manipulation by a few, often explained as failures of democracy or as the product of irreconcilable social divisions. Both explanations are insufficient. It is a region where social trust has been systematically destroyed by political systems that rewarded manipulation over competence, and once that trust eroded, every attempt at institution-building became an exercise in building roofs without foundations.
The region, indeed, presents a paradox that exposes the weakness of cultural explanations. In places like Somalia, people share the same language, religion, history, and social norms, yet behave politically as though they are alien to each other and/or enemies. This mistrust is not ancient or natural. It has been made and produced. It is the rational outcome of decades in which power was exercised selectively, institutions were weaponized, and competence was subordinated to loyalty (most often to ethnicity and/or clan). When the state in the region repeatedly demonstrates that rules do not apply equally, people learn a harsh lesson that survival does not depend on institutions, but on identity.
Democracy, introduced into this environment, does not correct the problem but only amplifies it. Leaders do not win by governing well, but by convincing their group that they alone can protect the group from others. It is how, over time, manipulation outcompeted competence and politics became existential rather than being administrative and this still continues, unabated. This is not a moral failure of the populations of the region, but an environment where competent leaderships are neutralized and manipulators thrive, by aligning themselves with the mistrust and exploiting it. It is how institutions have been hollowed out and the state became a prize to be captured instead of making it a tool working for the collective good.
External actors reinforce this dynamic. Foreign governments and international institutions prioritize their interests and, at best, short-term stability, border control, or counterterrorism cooperation over genuine capacity-building for the region. They have rewarded leaders who conform to their narratives and especially those who threaten chaos, if challenged. This teaches both rulers and citizens that legitimacy is staged, not earned, and that deception is not a vice but a survival skill. The cumulative effect is devastating, as social trust erodes not only between communities, but also between citizens and authorities.
Many of the politicians of the region appear to be of the belief that social trust can emerge from speeches or constitutional declarations. Social trust emerges from experience. People trust when they repeatedly observe that rules are applied predictably, that competence is protected, and that power restrains itself. In the Horn of Africa States region, people did not stop trusting the systems because they forgot how. They stopped trusting because trust was and is being punished!
It is sequencing…. Rebuilding social trust requires a radical reordering of priorities. The primary political value must become competence over identity, not symbolically, but operationally. People must see that administrators, judges, police officers, and officials are selected, retained, and protected based on performance in the place of clan, ethnicity, or loyalty. This must be experienced at the local and everyday level, where disputes are resolved, services delivered, and rules enforced. Small, boring, consistent successes do more to rebuild trust than any national dialogue could ever do. When manipulation is penalized and institutional neutrality is consistently protected, mistrust gradually loses its rationale. People do not become virtuous overnight, but are pragmatic, adapting their behavior to altered incentives. Predictable enforcement then gives rise to procedural trust, as repeated experience demonstrates that rules are applied uniformly, irrespective of identity or power.
The tragedy of the Horn of Africa States region is not that its people cannot trust or govern themselves, but that they have lived long under systems, which rewarded manipulation over skill. This can be changed through prioritizing of competence, punishment of manipulation, and application of rules. It is how trust can return, not as sentiment, but as a habit, and institutions gain real and lasting foundations.
First, state-building must precede mass politics. This does not mean abandoning participation. It is sequencing it. Functional bureaucracies, credible courts, professional security forces, and reliable revenue systems must be established before electoral competition is allowed to determine executive power (A Technocrat Council). Without these, elections only legitimize factional capture. Countries that successfully escaped poverty and instability, whether in East Asia or parts of Europe, did so by first building capable states, often under constrained political competition, before gradually expanding participation.
Second, politics must be made boring. Power should be dispersed across institutions rather than concentrated in personalities. Term limits, independent fiscal authorities, and technocratic agencies insulated from daily political pressure are not luxuries; they are survival mechanisms. When holding office becomes less lucrative and less existential, the incentive to manipulate identities and narratives diminishes.
Third, external actors must be channeled to change their assistance. Aid, security cooperation, and diplomatic recognition should be tied not to rhetorical commitments or electoral rituals, but to measurable improvements in institutional performance such as tax collection, service delivery, judicial independence, and civil service professionalism. This requires patience and a willingness to tolerate slower, less dramatic forms of progress.
Finally, political legitimacy must be redefined. In deeply divided societies, legitimacy cannot rest solely on popular enthusiasm. It must rest on predictability, fairness, and restraint. A government that quietly delivers basic services, enforces rules impartially, and limits its own power may inspire less passion than a fiery demagogue, but it creates the conditions under which genuine democracy can eventually function.
The tragedy of the Horn of Africa States region is not that its people are unfit for self-rule, but that they have been trapped in systems that reward the worst political traits while punishing the best. Only when competence is allowed to outcompete manipulation will the region begin to move forward rather than in circles.