Governing Biotechnology’s Dual-Use Security Dilemma – Analysis

By Lakshmy Ramakrishnan

Securitisation of biotechnology creates a dual-use security dilemma with significant policy implications. While biotechnology is increasingly treated as a strategic asset, framing its dual-use capabilities in security terms can trigger exceptional policy measures that constrain international collaboration, deter beneficial research, and heighten biosecurity risks.

The perception of biotechnology as a strategic asset intensifies the dual-use dilemma, as states pursue competitive techno-nationalist strategies. Amid shifting geopolitics, weakening multilateral frameworks, and the rapid convergence of biotechnology with artificial intelligence, policymakers must recognise this dilemma and manage innovation through balanced, cooperative mechanisms that safeguard security while harnessing the benefits of scientific openness.

Biotechnology and Techno-Nationalism 

Biotechnology has advanced significantly over the past few decades, impacting numerous sectors. Applications of recombinant DNA technology and CRISPR-Cas in disease management, the development of gene-edited crops for food and nutritional security, and the production of mRNA vaccines to address the COVID-19 pandemic illustrate notable achievements. Moreover, the convergence of biotechnology with artificial intelligence (AI) is underway—exemplified by the first fully AI-discovered drug candidate, rentosertib, discovered by Insilico Medicine in 2025.

Recognising biotechnology’s potential to address global challenges, an emerging policy discourse characterises it as a strategic asset. Governments, including the United States (US), China, Japan, Australia, South Korea, and India, have formulated strategies that position biotechnology and the broader bioeconomy at the centre of economic growth and technological competitiveness, shaping industry policy. In this context, the US National Security Strategy (2025) identifies biotechnology as part of its core national interest, while the European Union (EU)’s proposed Biotech Act emphasises biomanufacturing. This turn towards techno-nationalism in biotechnology, coupled with shifting geopolitics, is reshaping its identity from a developmental tool to one of strategic and security concern. Consequently, as biotechnology becomes integrated into national strategies, its framing through a security lens lays the foundation for securitisation and the implementation of exceptional policy measures. 

The Dual-Use Security Dilemma in Biotechnology

The development and deployment of emerging technologies have historically been approached with caution due to their dual-use nature—the potential to produce both harmful and beneficial applications. This dual-use characteristic generates a security dilemma with broad policy implications. In a traditional ‘security dilemma’, measures by one state to enhance its security—such as increasing military strength or economic power—create uncertainty about its intentions and capabilities, triggering insecurity in other states. Such dynamics can escalate tensions and spiral into competitive cycles, as exemplified by historical arms races.

In the case of biotechnology, this dilemma is deepened by low distinguishability—the ease with which a state can differentiate between military or harmful and civilian applications of a technology—through its technical characteristics as well as through political economy structures. For instance, the infrastructure, materials, tools, and knowledge used to develop a vaccine or conduct genomic surveillance of a disease outbreak can be redirected for harmful purposes, making it arduous to distinguish between activities intended for public health security and those intended to create harm by bad actors. The same applies from a political economy perspective; deeply integrated civil and military sectors, or interwoven state–business relations, are more likely to have dual-use technologies diverted for defence purposes. From an external standpoint, low distinguishability can make threat assessment and verification processes cumbersome, reinforcing uncertainty and sowing mistrust among states, thereby deepening the dual-use security dilemma.

Securitising Biotechnology: From Protection to Insecurity

Amid this ambiguity, shifting biotechnology from a developmental to a strategic tool, and framing it as a security concern or securitising it, can generate insecurity and prompt exceptional policy measures. A notable example is the tensions between the US and China over Huawei’s 5G technology, where the company was treated as an existential threat and exceptional measures, including sanctions and semiconductor export restrictions, were imposed by the US. Similarly, through legislation, regulatory measures, and public discourse, biotechnology risks may be constructed in ways that limit international scientific collaboration, including data-sharing. Consequently, precautionary measures such as export controls and restrictions on foreign investment or funding may be implemented. While protective in intent, long-term securitisation can amplify threat perceptions, institutionalise exceptional measures, and fragment global research ecosystems and joint responses to transnational biological threats.

USA-China Interplay in Biotechnology

This is evident in the interplay between the US and China over biotechnology. The US views China’s dominance in the sector as a national security threat. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) released its Critical Technology Tracker, highlighting that China and the US are locked in intense competition to lead the field. A recent report by the National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology (NSCEB) noted that China’s expanding biotechnology sector could surpass the US, necessitating increased domestic investment and innovation.

As a countermeasure, the Biosecure Act was signed into law in December 2025 by US President Donald Trump. Initially introduced in 2024 to limit US agencies from procuring technology or contracting with certain Chinese biotechnology companies deemed threats to national security, the revised legislation now establishes an Office of Management and Budget to compile a list of companies, such as those associated with the Chinese military, that pose a risk to the US. Further, earlier this month, the US introduced the Biosecurity Modernization and Innovation Act to broaden the national biosecurity framework, taking cognisance of rapid advancements in the field and the risk of losing leadership to foreign adversaries. Collectively, these measures illustrate how securitisation can shape legislation, industry policy, and research collaboration while reinforcing mutual insecurity.

Biotech at the Defence–Civil Interface 

Biotechnology’s military applications further complicate the dual-use security dilemma. Defensive applications include protecting against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats, enhancing human combatant performance, advancing military medicine, and optimising troop deployment pathways. These measures are intended to strengthen military capabilities. China’s incorporation of biotechnology into its military-civil fusion strategy underscores its use of the technology for defence, while NATO identified biotechnology and human enhancement (BHE) technologies as a strategic imperative in 2019, culminating in the organisation’s first international strategy on BHE in 2024. Similarly, Russia’s investments in BHE aim to counter Western advancements and maintain military superiority.

While biodefence programmes are integral to national security, the overlap of their technical characteristics with offensive capabilities complicates threat assessments—and ambiguity can create uncertainty over intent—reinforcing the dual-use security dilemma. Low levels of distinguishability are particularly evident where civil and military dimensions converge—most notably in the case of China and its military. Consequently, biotechnology capabilities may be perceived as offensive by strategic competitors or adversaries. For instance, China’s genomic surveillance programme came under scrutiny over concernsregarding the alleged misuse of genetic data and human rights abuses; since then, China has strengthenedthe regulation of human genetic resource data.

Compounding this fusion is the possibility of misuse by malicious non-state actors, particularly given the growing accessibility of biotechnology tools. The democratisation of knowledge and resources through do-it-yourself (DIY) bio communities and large-language models (LLMs), alongside the increasing accessibility and affordability of these technologies, can be exploited by malicious actors. As states reduce collaboration, funding, or access to tools and knowledge, securitisation may push experimentation into less regulated spaces, thereby reducing oversight and transparency and exacerbating biosecurity risks.

Collectively, this demonstrates that exceptional policy measures through securitisation can produce unintended consequences, such as the fragmentation of global research ecosystems, restrictions on data-sharing during health emergencies, and the diversion of funds away from beneficial advances, including the development of novel vaccine platforms. By fueling mistrust among nations, accelerating techno-nationalist competition, and pushing research into less regulated spaces, the securitisation of biotechnology can deepen the dual-use security dilemma. Managing the dual-use security dilemma in biotechnology requires safeguarding against legitimate threats while preserving science diplomacy. This necessitates awareness of the unintended consequences of securitisation, where uncertainty over capabilities and intent can hamper beneficial scientific cooperation and even prompt malicious actors to develop their own biological weapons.

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) remains the bulwark against the deliberate misuse of biological sciences. Strengthening confidence-building measures and verification mechanisms under the BWC would be beneficial. Norm-building efforts that emphasise responsible science, rather than exceptional policy responses, are needed to reduce threat perceptions. Science cooperation in biotechnology can be incorporated into multilateral and minilateral arrangements to foster trust, goodwill, and a collective commitment to addressing global challenges. Finally, as AI accelerates biological research, norms and frameworks are needed to govern the responsible development of AI-biotechnology tools without hampering innovation.

Conclusion 

The shift of biotechnology from a developmental tool to a strategic asset reflects a broader geopolitical turn in which scientific capabilities are increasingly viewed through the lens of strategic competition. This, however, frames biotechnology as a security concern, deepening the dual-use security dilemma. Measures intended to enhance security can erode trust, fragment research ecosystems, and restrict data-sharing, thereby worsening biosecurity risks. Governance can be strengthened through verification mechanisms under the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), embedding science cooperation within multilateral frameworks, and developing shared norms for innovations such as AI-biotechnology tools. These steps will help policymakers prevent cycles of insecurity and mistrust while harnessing biotechnology as a powerful tool for global health, nutrition, and resilience.

• About the author: Lakshmy Ramakrishnan is an Associate Fellow with the Centre for New Economic Diplomacy at the Observer Research Foundation.
• Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.