On the Front Lines: CIA in Afghanistan
On the Front Lines: CIA in Afghanistan
In 2001, US intelligence officers picked up this al-Qa’ida training manual outside Kandahar, Afghanistan. The officers found the manual while searching the ruins of a suspected chemical processing site. US ordnance that damaged the site caused the handbook’s burn marks. The manual includes instructions for firing Stinger missiles.
In the aftermath of the tragic terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush ordered Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet to launch operations against the al-Qa‘ida terrorist organization and its Taliban supporters in Afghanistan. This order called for the CIA to collect real-time, actionable intelligence to help shape the battlefield and to use all means to target al-Qa‘ida. Within 15 days of the attacks on US soil, the first team of CIA officers was on the ground and operating in Afghanistan—some 8,000 miles from home.
This rapid deployment was possible because the CIA had developed and nurtured relationships with the Afghan Northern Alliance for several years prior to 9/11. Because of this thorough, low-key, and persistent effort, CIA officers knew the language, the history, and the culture of the region and were in position to move quickly against the terrorists. In addition to being “first on the ground” in October 2001, the CIA team was able to quickly amass an enormous body of information and a large stable of assets to launch rapid and robust efforts against the Taliban.
As the weeks unfolded, a core group of more than 100 CIA officers— primarily operations and paramilitary officers as well as officers from the Directorate of Support, all highly experienced leaders known for their independence, skill, initiative, and bravery—worked with some 300 US Special Forces personnel and partnered with local tribal and military forces. Team members took risks and worked with key groups in the area, doing whatever was necessary to accomplish the mission.
All-source intelligence enhanced the operations. The networks of sources that the CIA had developed in Afghanistan over the previous two decades provided critical information on the enemy’s capabilities, plans, intentions, and motivations. The overall success of military operations in those first few months is well-documented. Aided by superior firepower and backed every step of the way by a dedicated team of intelligence professionals, the United States and allied forces made significant strides in those early months. Outside Afghanistan, CIA teams with officers representing all Agency directorates supported officers in the field.
The combined efforts of the US Intelligence Community, the US military, Afghan allies, and coalition partners led to swift success. By early December 2001—in less than three months—the Taliban regime had been overthrown, a significant number of the al-Qa’ida leadership had been killed or captured, and a major terrorist safe haven had been eliminated. Through it all, the CIA’s integrated intelligence collection, communications, technology, logistics, and delegated leadership were invaluable to the campaign.
Most importantly for the Agency, the lessons learned in those early days of the war against al-Qa‘ida—and in the years since—have become part of the CIA’s fabric. We are more agile, adaptive, and collaborative. More than half of our workforce has been hired since 9/11, and integration—internally among our Directorates and externally with our Intelligence Community, military, and other partners—is considered a key component of any Agency success. These changes—developed in part from the war in Afghanistan and the war against al-Qa‘ida—will certainly pass the test of time and are already providing a strong base for our future.
The Final Chapter in the Hunt for Bin Ladin
Abbottabad, Pakistan—In the early morning hours of May 2, 2011, a US military raid on an al-Qa‘ida compound killed Usama Bin Ladin, America’s most wanted terrorist. The mission’s success was the culmination of many years of complex, thorough, and highly advanced intelligence operations and analyses led by the CIA with support from partners across the Intelligence Community.
Shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, the CIA began collecting information on key individuals connected to or providing support to Bin Ladin. Reporting made clear early on that he communicated via a network of couriers. It was years later, however, before more was known about one key courier than simply his kunya, or operational pseudonym. Analysts then worked several more years before identifying the area in Pakistan where the courier was believed to be located.
By late 2010, further intelligence enabled the identification of the courier’s compound in Abbottabad, a town in Pakistan’s Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province (formerly the Northwest Frontier Province), about 35 miles north of Islamabad. The compound and its main residence had extensive security features unusual for the area: high walls topped with barbed wire, double entry gates, opaque windows, no apparent internet or telephone connections, and all trash burned rather than collected. Moreover, the two registered owners did not appear to work or have an income that would allow them to afford such a large residence. This led the Intelligence Community to assess that the compound was probably being used to hide Bin Ladin, as well as the courier.
The operation on May 2nd, authorized by the President on April 29th, was a surgical raid by a small team of special operations forces designed to minimize collateral damage and to pose as little risk as possible to noncombatants on the compound or to Pakistani civilians in the neighborhood. In the aftermath, Bin Ladin was positively identified via several independent means.
The large quantity of materials collected from the compound required time for a thorough review. The CIA led a multi-agency task force to prioritize, catalogue, and analyze them for intelligence about al-Qa‘ida’s affiliates, plans and intentions, and current threats. The collected materials indicated that Bin Ladin remained an active leader in al-Qa‘ida, providing strategic, operational, and tactical instructions to the organization. Though separated from many al-Qa‘ida members in remote areas of the region, he was far from a figurehead. Bin Ladin remained in charge while in hiding.
Bin Ladin was al-Qa‘ida’s founder and only amir, or commander, in its history until his death. He was largely responsible for the organization’s mystique, its ability to raise money and attract new recruits, and its focus on the United States as a target for terrorist attacks. The death of Usama Bin Ladin marked a significant victory in the US-led campaign to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qa‘ida.
The daring raid that ensured that Bin Ladin will never kill again was a team effort, the product of increased integration within the Intelligence Community and of close collaboration with our military partners. The CIA was at the center of it all, driving the collection of vital information, assessing each piece of data, and analyzing all sources to produce the compelling intelligence case that led US forces to Abbottabad. The Agency’s contributions were the product of a decade of positive changes — improved collection, analysis, technology, and support.