UPDATE: the Downing of MH17: Dutch Police Investigators
MH17 Witness Appeal November 2019
The Joint Investigation Team (JIT) releases a new witness appeal in the criminal investigation into the downing of flight MH17 on 17 July 2014. The JIT is looking for information on the individuals within the military and administrative hierarchy who enabled the shooting down of MH17 in Eastern Ukraine using a BUK TELAR. The JIT wants to get in touch with further witnesses who are able to testify about these command lines and the role that Russian government officials might have had. Today, the JIT releases further recorded conversations. Below we summarise these conversations and ask you specific questions.
On 19 June 2019, the Joint Investigation Team (JIT) announced that four defendants are to be prosecuted for their involvement in the downing of flight MH17 on 17 July 2014. The JIT further announced that the investigation continues and focuses on the crew of the BUK TELAR, and on individuals who were an important link in the decision-making process in the Russian Federation regarding the deployment of this BUK TELAR.
The JIT released intercepted phone calls. These showed that leaders of the armed group ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ (DPR) maintained contact with Russian government officials about Russian military support. These leaders included Alexander Borodai, self-proclaimed ‘prime minister’, and defendant Igor Girkin, self-proclaimed ‘defence minister’. They communicated with Sergey Aksyonov, the Russian-appointed leader in Crimea and Vladislav Surkov, a high ranking official of the Russian government.
Recent analysis of witness statements and other information revealed that Russian influence on the DPR went beyond military support and that the ties between Russian officials and DPR-leaders appear closer. The intensity of Russian influence is relevant to investigating further individuals involved in the downing of MH17. That is why today the JIT releases this new appeal for witnesses.
The JIT wants to know more about who gave orders to Borodai, defendant Girkin, other members of the DPR and the crew of the BUK TELAR in the summer of 2014. The JIT wants to get in touch with further witnesses who are able to testify about these command lines and the role that Russian government officials might have had. Today, the JIT releases further recorded conversations. Below we summarise these conversations and ask you specific questions.
Russian influence on the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’
In public interviews, DPR leaders stated that they were volunteers who were not directed by anyone. Defendant Igor Girkin said in an interview in 2017:
‘No one has appointed or sent me.’
At a press conference on 10 July 2014, Borodai said:
‘I would like to tell you that both Igor and I have been volunteers for a very long time. The volunteer movement is well developed in Russia.’
The JIT, however, has indications that they were in fact directed from within the Russian Federation. The JIT spoke with several witnesses who belonged to the DPR in the summer of 2014. These witnesses stated that the key figures of the armed group were directed from within the Russian Federation.
Their testimony is corroborated by telephone conversations, that were recorded at the time. For example by Borodai, one of those key figures. In his call with person (B) on 3 July 2014 at 17:30:15 hours, Borodai (A) seems to acknowledge that he was following Russian instructions:
A: Well, your plans are far-reaching. Mine are not. I’m carrying out orders and protecting the interests of one and only state, the Russian Federation. That’s the bottom line.
In another call, at the beginning of July 2014, a DPR-member tells a local commander that ‘men are coming with a mandate from Shoygu’. Sergey Shoygu is the Russian defence minister. According to the DPR-member, these men ‘will kick the local warlords out of the units’, and ‘people from Moscow’ will take over the command.
On 1 July 2014 at 22:08:05 hours a fighter with call sign Mongol (A) 380951267673 is called by an unknown person (B) 380509133442
B:As the Commandant of Makeyevka, I’d very much like to know that. I want to know what we’re moving towards.
A: We’re moving towards unity of command. What happens next is a bunch of men with a mandate from Shoygu will arrive and kick the local warlords the fuck out of the units –
B: Uh-huh.
A: …and then people from Moscow will take charge.(…)
B: (…) I need to know one thing: who shall I fucking report to when it happens?
A: You will report to the Minister of Defense. (…) Minister of Defense of the DPR.
(…) our Minister of Defense is Strelkov, and our Commander-in-Chief – like any other President or Prime Minister – is Borodai
Several former fighters have told the JIT that the Russian security service FSB and the military intelligence service GRU were involved in the daily management of the DPR. One of the witnesses stated that DPR leaders regularly went to Moscow to consult with their contacts at the FSB and GRU.
Intercepted phone calls also seem to show the involvement of Russian security services, working side by side in directing the DPR. For example, on 18 July 2014, two DPR-members are discussing that they are both receiving their orders from Moscow; one from the FSB and the other from the GRU.
On 18 July 2014 at 18:52:57 hours, a fighter with call sign Mongol (A) 380951267673calls another fighter with call sign Sherif (B) 380958851694.
(…)
B: It’s a week we’ve directly…. [inaudible] to Moscow and we get the orders. (…)
A: We get the orders from Moscow as well. It’s the same with us.
B: But it’s FSB in your case? Right?
A: Yes.
B: And it’s GRU in our case. That’s the only difference.
A: I know about it perfectly well
In August 2014, not long after MH17 was shot down, defendant Girkin announced his departure and told Borodai he ‘was returning to the Staff’. Apparently, he returned to an organisation he had worked for before.
On 13 August 2014 at 00:28:31 hours, defendant Girkin (C) 380637087501 is called by Borodai (B) 79265318514.
(…)
B: Hello?! Where are you?
C: Well, I’m returning to the Staff.
B: Are you returning to the Staff?
C: Yes, I am. The whole concept is changing there. I mean, we are not rich cattle industry owners anymore, but poor street … what’s it … beggars.
B: (…) So, what are we doing? Are we going to the Staff?
C: Yes-yes-yes! Go back to the Staff. (…) Bye!
B: Ok then! That’s it! Ok! We are going to the Staff! Uh-huh …
C: Uh-huh … Yes.
B: [Speaking to the side] As usual we are going …
In August 2014, defendant Girkin and Borodai both left Eastern Ukraine for Moscow. In an interview in 2017, Girkin explained:
“I was ordered to transfer command to Zakharchenko. […Q: And why do you think that he was chosen?] Well, I don’t know, he and Borodai went to meet with Surkov. And apparently he was chosen, that is for the formal head of command. And why and how this happened… Surkov’s choices are always shit.”
Apparently, Girkin was ordered to transfer command to Zakharchenko on Surkov’s direction.
Further sources, including interviews and press conferences, show that Zakharchenko did in fact take over command of the DPR.
QUESTIONS
The JIT wants to know:
- Who gave orders to Girkin and Borodai in the summer of 2014? What was the role of members of the ‘Staff’ in this?
- Who gave Girkin the order to transfer his command to Zakharchenko?
Means of communication
In addition to regular telephones, DPR-members used secure means of communication. A number of these seem to be provided by the Russian Federation and, moreover, used by Russian top officials in their contact with the fighters.
The JIT has found indications that the security service FSB provided telephones that cannot be wiretapped. In a conversation of 3 July 2014, defendant Dubinskiy mentions which fighters have special phones and where they got those from:
On 3 July 2014 at 20:01:11 hours Dubinskiy (A) 380631213401 calls Semenov 380639602502.
A: (…) how are you about those special communication telephones, you know, that we have? Those that go through the Internet, do you know? Secure. (…)Those are special phones, you cannot buy them. They are gotten through Moscow. Through FSB. (…) Look here, I’m reading the list of our men who … look, .. who have … Strelkov, Boroday, Gubarev, Agap, Chapay … well, Kramatorsk commandant’s office, Konstantynivka … er … my telephone, lzvarine, Mozgovoy … well, then Snizhne, Zakhar, .. whatsit … Oplot, you see, yeah? (…) Then … whatsit … Kalmius, Gubarev, Gubarev’s in Rostov, yeah? .. Druzhkivka commandant’s office, Aksyonov, Purgin, er … Botsman, Bes, Kalmius. Those are the ones who … now… who have those direct phones. So, you dial 3 figures…
The individuals who, according to Dubinskiy, had such a secure device all held important positions in the DPR. Among them are defendant Girkin, who is referred to by his call sign Strelkov, DPR-leader Borodai. Aksyonov, the Crimea leader appointed by Russia, is also included in the group of individuals mentioned by Dubinskiy.
In addition, key figures in the DPR regularly called with a ‘batch’ of telephone numbers in which the first set of nine digits is the same and only the last two digits differ. For further security, they seemed to be using a scrambler.
Alexander Borodai, the ‘prime minister’ of the DPR, had a telephone number from that batch (79265318514) and in the period from June 2014 to mid-August 2014 called almost daily with three other numbers from the same batch: 79265318528, 79265318520 and 79265318563. Topics of those calls will be discussed below.
QUESTION
The JIT wants to know:
- Who were the users of the telephone numbers of the batch starting with 792653185?
Areas of influence – Administration
In our witness appeal of 19 June 2019, a conversation of 11 July 2014 was publishedbetween Borodai and the user of the first number from this batch, Vladislav Surkov, a high ranking government official of the Russian Federation. In the conversation, Borodai says that he urgently needs military support from Moscow. Other conversations indicate that Surkov’s involvement did not end there.
On 3 July 2014 Surkov (B) and Borodai (A) had the following conversation. Surkov says that there will be reinforcements from Russia:
(…)
B: Some certain Antyufeyev will be setting off for your place. I told you about him.(…) In fact he was planning to depart over there on Saturday… or even on Sunday.(…) On Saturday they are already departing for the South to be combat-ready. Well, Sasha, there is one thing there- I’ll tell you about it right away – as they are claiming for the GB. But I said that Khodakovsky headed the GB.
A: No objections. I think that Khodakovsky, by the way, will vacate his office happily. (…)
B: No. Look, Sash! Make decisions … make decisions yourself. If he vacates[…], then let him vacate[…]. If he doesn’t want to vacate[…]for some reasons, let them found one more special service. It will not result in anything bad.
Surkov encourages Borodai to arrange for Vladimir Antyufeyev to get a high administrative post in the DPR. A week later, on 10 July 2014, Antyufeyev gives a press conference, together with Borodai and defendant Girkin. Antyufeyev tells the pressthat he arrived from Russia that same day and that the sectors State Security, Home Affairs and Justice of the DPR will come under his responsibility.
Another telephone conversation from Borodai also points to Russian influence on appointments in the DPR. These correspond to the content of an e-mail with an attachment addressed to Surkov, which was found in open sources. In that e-mail a list of candidates for the DPR government is attached.
Not all candidates on that list were appointed, as the following telephone conversation demonstrates. An assistant of Borodai (B) calls Pushilin (A), who will join the ‘government’. This apparently requires the approval of Moscow. On 15 May 2014 at 13:25:25 hours, Pushilin (A) 380507117096 is called by (B) 380639835490:
B: (…) Much to our regret we can’t include Purgin in the Security Council. We will apologize to him.
A: Uh-huh.
B: Moscow approved the closed list. Purgin is not included in it. (…)You … you are included in it. It depends on a position, you know. The Vice-Premier is simply not included in the Security Council. Sorry, guys. (…) When does the session start?
A: In half an hour.
B: (…) Don’t start without us. Alright? Don’t start without us. We will come to you soon. (…) Unfortunately, we don’t take Purgin. (…)
A: Well, I got that. I will… I will explain that to him. And after that you will add …because he will kinda get offended.
B: Of course, of course. It’s just that Moscow didn’t approve him.
Intercepted phone calls further show Surkov acting as a trouble-shooter for the DPR leaders. For instance in this conversation of defendant Leonid Kharchenko of 14 March 2015. Kharchenko speaks of an impending arrest of fellow defendant Sergey (“Nikolayevich”) Dubinskiy. Dubinskiy is in trouble because he is thought to have entered the country illegally.
On 14 March 2015 at 10:45:44 hours Kharchenko (A) 380660827518 calls a certain Andrey (B) 79154650595
A: (…) Listen, Andrey, can you get the information regarding the situation with Nikolayevich.
B: (…) Well, they said through Strelkov, right? … he dealt with the issue … at least tried to …(…) Yesterday I talked to the Administration …
A: Uh-huh.
B: of the President … Said that [ … ] was dealt with through Surkov. Surkov gave a command to Smirnov … and Smirnov … well, not a command … Surkov asked Smirnov and he gave … err … the approval. (…) As far as I know it’s all good.
A: (…)… here we are actually having the game now that he came in illegally and they want to arrest him. We need to get the information regarding this urgently.
According to this Andrey, Surkov corrected the misunderstanding about Dubinskiy. The man who arranged it for him, was Smirnov, the deputy chief of the FSB.
QUESTIONS
The JIT wants to know:
- Was the appointment of DPR leadership controlled by Russian officials? Who exercised this control?
- Did Surkov have any involvement in the appointments or running of the DPR ‘administration’?
- Who decided on the appointment of Antyufeyev?
Areas of influence – Finances
Various sources, including witness statements, indicate that the self-proclaimed DPR government was financed by Russian beneficiaries. According to a high ranking DPR-member, nearly the entire DPR budget was paid by Russian funds.
This is also demonstrated by the following recorded telephone conversation. On 12 July 2014, Borodai (A) discusses his money problems with the user of one of the three mentioned numbers from the batch: *8520 (B). Borodai says that his money is running out. A person named ‘Kolya’ had promised ‘180,000’. That money is waiting in Moscow, but they still need confirmation for payment.
A: (…) So… yeah, the biggest problem I have now is…err…I am running out of money. I mean, that, so to speak, one hundred and fifty, that I took with me, it is practically over.. Because fifty – to Zakhar, one million grivnyas – to Igor, plus all the other expenses, okay? (…)
B: Well, for that the economic doctrine has been introduced…so that it would be possible to […] locally.
A: Yes. Local money will be actually got in about two weeks. You see?
B: (…) you need to somehow get the money transferred.
A: Yeah, I need to somehow […] that money. There is Kolya, who promised one hundred and eighty thousand…err…I asked him to arrange that one hundred and eighty thousand through Lenya, but he said that he needed a confirmation, the money had to be in Moscow…in general, he is a [inaudible] fastidious person, is obscuring the situation.
B: Well, you summon him yourself, remind him about what he told you in my presence..(…) and say:” Dear friend, (…) you give us one hundred and eighty there, and you yourself know who…will give it back to you in Moscow”. (…) So …in addition, his …err…so to speak, former employer confirmed that to me…that is why I simply will not call him again for that one hundred and eighty thousand. I will simply come and give that money to him. Will say: “Here you are. It is for that.” (…) You know, that we agreed on one hundred and eighty. Take it. You need to try to arrange the rest. If there is still no flow, then we will arrange more through the same channel. And tell Nikolay: “ (…) Now I need one hundred and eighty, and later I will need this and that sum.” (…)
A: Agree the sum that you need with me and I will give it…so to speak, (…) Okay. Agreed.
QUESTIONS
The JIT would like to know:
- Who is the person (‘Kolya’) who had promised Borodai financial support?
- Who had to confirm this payment?
- Which further individuals in the Russian Federation were involved in providing financial support to the DPR?
- FOR THE ENTIRE REPORT HERE