The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: IEDs, Land Mines, and Booby Traps
At the end of December 1979, the Soviet Union sent thousands of troops into Afghanistan and immediately assumed complete military and political control of Kabul and large portions of the country. This event began a brutal, decade-long attempt by Moscow to subdue the Afghan civil war and maintain a friendly and socialist government on its border. It was a watershed event of the Cold War, marking the only time the Soviet Union invaded a country outside the Eastern Bloc—a strategic decision met by nearly worldwide condemnation. While the massive, lightning-fast military maneuvers and brazenness of Soviet political objectives constituted an “invasion” of Afghanistan, the word “intervention” more accurately describes these events as the culmination of growing Soviet domination going back to 1973.
Undoubtedly, leaders in the Kremlin had hoped that a rapid and complete military takeover would secure Afghanistan’s place as an exemplar of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which held that once a country became socialist Moscow would never permit it to return to the capitalist camp. The United States and its European allies, guided by their own doctrine of containment, sharply criticized the Soviet move into Afghanistan and devised numerous measures to compel Moscow to withdraw.
In the summer of 1973, Mohammed Daoud, the former Afghan Prime Minister, launched a successful coup against King Zahir. Although Daoud himself was more nationalist than socialist, his coup was dependent on pro-Soviet military and political factions. Since 1955 Moscow had provided military training and materiel to Afghanistan; by 1973, a third of active troops had trained on Soviet soil.
Additionally, Daoud enjoyed the support of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), founded in 1965 upon Marxist ideology and allegiance to Moscow. In 1967 the PDPA split into two factions: the Parchamists, led by Babrak Karmal (who supported Daoud), and the “Khalqis” led by Noor Taraki. For the next five years, Daoud attempted the impossible task of governing Afganistan’s Islamic tribal regions, while also struggling to reconcile the PDPA split. But the more radical Khalq faction never fully recognized Daoud’s leadership, while Karmal viewed the coup largely as a means to consolidate his own power. In response, Daoud hoped to mitigate both of these threats by steering Afghanistan away from Soviet influence and improving U.S. relations, while decreasing the influence of radical elements in the government and military.
Daoud’s middle course ended in disaster. On April 28, 1978, soldiers aligned with Taraki’s “Khalq” faction assaulted the presidential palace, where troops executed Daoud and his family. In the following days Taraki became the Prime Minister, and, in an attempt to end the PDPA’s divisions, Karmal became Deputy Prime Minister. In Washington, this Communist revolution was met with alarm. The Carter administration recognized that Taraki would undo Daoud’s attempt to steer Afghanistan away from Moscow, and it debated whether to cut ties with Afghanistan or recognize Taraki in the hopes that Soviet influence could be contained. Although the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski advocated the former course, Carter supported the Department of State’s advocacy of recognition. Shortly after the revolution, Washington recognized the new government and soon named Adolph Dubs its Ambassador to Afghanistan. Until his kidnapping and death at the hands of Afghan Shia dissidents in February 1979, Dubs strongly pursued good relations with the Taraki regime in the hopes that U.S. support would keep Soviet influence at bay.
Once again, the tumult of internal Afghan politics complicated both U.S. and Soviet jockeying. In the summer of 1979, Hafizullah Amin, a longtime ally of Taraki who became Deputy Prime Minister following the April Revolution, received word that Babrak Karmal (Daoud’s early supporter) was leading a Parcham plot to overthrow the Taraki regime. Amin took the opportunity to purge and execute many Parchamists and consolidate his own power. Complicating matters further, this internal strife damaged the Kabul Government’s major national program, namely, to bring the Communist revolution to the Islamic tribal areas beyond Kabul. By the winter of 1978, this program was met by armed revolt throughout the country. In response, Amin and Taraki traveled to Moscow to sign a friendship treaty which included a provision that would allow direct Soviet military assistance should the Islamic insurgency threaten the regime. This insurrection intensified over the next year and it became increasingly obvious to the Soviets that Taraki could not prevent all-out civil war and the prospect of a hostile Islamic government taking control. By mid-1979 Moscow was searching to replace Taraki and Amin, and dispatched combat troops to Bagram Air Base outside of Kabul.
This move prompted the Carter administration to begin supplying non-lethal aid to Afghan mujahedeen, or Islamic insurgents. In August, a high-ranking Soviet military delegation arrived in Kabul to assess the situation. U.S. officials interpreted this mission as one last Soviet attempt to shore up the Taraki regime, and also an opportunity to devise a military takeover. Regarding the latter, most analysts in Washington believed that such a move remained possible but unlikely.
But this calculus was bound to change. Amin sensed the Soviet mission was designed to strengthen Taraki at his expense. In response, forces loyal to Amin executed Taraki in October—a move that infuriated Moscow, which began amassing combat units along its border. At this juncture Washington was still unsure how to interpret the Soviet maneuvers: was the Soviet Union planning a full takeover or did it remain committed to preserving the April Revolution? Analysts remained skeptical that Moscow would occupy the country given the political and economic costs.
By the winter of 1979, faced with mutinies and an uncertain leadership, the Afghan Army was unable to provide basic security to the government against the onslaught of Islamic fighters nearing Kabul. By that point the Soviets were sending in motorized divisions and Special Forces. Washington demanded an explanation, which the Soviets ignored. Finally, on Christmas Eve, the invasion began. Soviet troops killed Amin and installed Babrak Karmal as the Soviet’s puppet head of government.
Although the Carter administration had closely watched this buildup from the outset, its reaction following the invasion revealed that, until the end, it clung to the hope that the Soviets would not invade, based on the unjustified assumption that Moscow would conclude that the costs of invasion were too high. In response, Carter wrote a sharply-worded letter to Brezhnev denouncing Soviet aggression, and during his State of the Union address he announced his own doctrine vowing to protect Middle Eastern oil supplies from encroaching Soviet power. The administration also enacted economic sanctions and trade embargoes against the Soviet Union, called for a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics, and stepped up its aid to the Afghan insurgents. In sum, these actions were Washington’s collective attempt to make the Soviets’ “adventure” in Afghanistan as painful and brief as possible. Instead, it took ten years of grinding insurgency before Moscow finally withdrew, at the cost of millions of lives and billions of dollars. In their wake, the Soviets left a shattered country in which the Taliban, an Islamic fundamentalist group, seized control, later providing Osama bin Laden with a training base from which to launch terrorist operations worldwide.
7
in the Soviet-Afghan War LTC (RETIRED) LESTER W. GRAU
The 1979-1989 Soviet war in Afghanistan lasted more than nine years, and mine warfare was a major component of it. Both the Soviets and their Afghan counterparts from the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan employed millions of anti-personnel land mines in pattern minefields. General Boris Gromov, who commanded the Soviet 40th Army during the withdrawal, stated that the 40th Army turned over 613 minefields (with records) to the Afghanistan army before it withdrew from the country.
The Soviets supplemented these fixed fields with scatterable mines employed from aircraft, helicopters, cannon, and multiple rocket launchers. The Mujahideen deployed a wide variety of anti-tank mines and anti-personnel mines that were supplied by the United States, China, NATO members, and Arab countries.
The Mujahideen also reused Soviet mines and manufactured their own blast mines (fougasse), which we now refer to as improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Soviet figures for mine injuries include IEDs and booby traps.
The Mujahideen did not have many Soviet 40th Army Losses to Mines — Personnel KIA and Vehicles Lost mines at the start of the war but soon obtained them. Soviet deaths to mines were initially quite high until the Soviets developed mine countermeasures which cut their losses. These countermeasures included issuing flak jackets, sandbagging and reinforcing vehicle floors, and riding on the tops of armored vehicles. Dissemination of these countermeasures was part of the in-country courses conducted by the 45th Separate Engineer Regiment.
After that, the number of deaths from mines fell, but the number wounded by mines rose. Vehicle losses peaked in 1984 and 1985 during the heaviest fighting in the war and fell off as the Soviets prepared to withdraw.
Of the 620,000 Soviet personnel who served in Afghanistan, at least 14,453 were killed or died from wounds, accidents, or disease. This is 2.33 percent of those who served. Another
4 53,753 (or 8.67 percent) were wounded or injured.
In the early part of the war, there were twice as many Soviet soldiers wounded by bullets than by shrapnel than by bullets. The proportion of multiple and combination wounds increased four times over the course of the war, while the number of serious and critical wounds increased two times. Land mines were the primary reason for this increase in serious and critical wounds. The number of wounded from land mines increased by 25-30 percent over the course of the war.5 Improved Soviet medical evacuation during the war allowed more of the critically wounded to survive.6 Throughout the course of the war, land mines caused 30-40 percent of the trauma cases treated by Soviet medical personnel.
Interest in training Russian soldiers to deal with mines, IEDs, and booby traps remains high. All of these systems were also used by the Chechens in their long war with the Russians. In August 2008, the following article appeared in the Russian Army Digest. It reflects Russian experience with IEDs in Afghanistan and Chechnya and reflects their efforts to train their soldiers to avoid becoming IED casualties. The IEDs in this article use simple triggering mechanisms of almost 40 years ago. They are all mechanical triggering devices with no remote mechanisms. This article also gives a great deal of credit to foreign (Arab) instructors, although during the war the Soviet press characterized the foreign instructors as Pakistani and American. The Arab instructors became a problem for the Russians during their war in Chechnya.
Dirty Tricks of the “Ghosts” E.I. Kaminsky
The “ghosts” [Mujahideen] learned about making explosive obstacles in specialist schools and training centers run by experienced foreign instructors. The methods and means of mining and their application are varied, cunning, and perfidious. Most often, the Arab “wolves” mined stretches of road, roadside buildings, and mountain paths; areas at risk also included water wells, oases, groves, and paths to them; abandoned buildings and caves suitable for accommodation or resting people. At the bottom of the list were major assets: weapons stores and valuable material; armaments, combat equipment, and various devices deliberately left on the terrain; and so on. The “ghosts” [Mujahideen] used a wide range of various booby traps.
All of these seriously impede the movement of forces, their maneuver and transfer, and the transport of cargo. Along with this is the experience of combat in the Republic of Afghanistan that shows how mine blasts occurred through carelessness and lack of caution. But there will be no surprise explosions if soldiers are observant and cautious; study enemy tactics, tell-tale indicators, and secret signs left behind during mining; and call in the sappers in a timely fashion.
For example, combined arms unit commanders and drivers must strictly observe march discipline. Without an order, drivers must not pass other vehicles, pull off the road onto the shoulder, or pull off the road into places that have not been checked by sappers.
In a “mine war,” all personnel, and not just the platoon- assigned lookouts, must keep an eye on the road. Remember that no matter how much the enemy camouflages a mine site, there are always traces — loose wrappers strewn on the road, wire bits, or metal contacts used in a roadside bomb’s switch — barely noticeable bumps on the road, “scraps” of explosive packing material, and so on.
If a driver spots any such thing, he must stop the vehicle, mark the suspicious site, report to the unit commander, and follow his orders. In his turn, the commander calls in sappers or uses his own assets to survey and demine (or bypass) the suspect section.
Sappers also continuously survey while on the move. Survey is one of the key methods of detecting mines and is based on sound knowledge of where they are likely to be set, telltale indicators, and secret signs used by the “ghosts.”
For example, more often than not the “ghosts” would lay individual anti-tank (or anti-vehicle) mines in places where the explosion would halt traffic for a long time and kill personnel — chiefly at steep hairpin turns in passes; places with road and bridge structures; road sections alongside steep inclines, ledges, and side-hill cuts; in narrow gorges and hollows; and on high embankments.
Let me cite an example of actual combat using this tactic. Working in scouting and obstacle-clearing groups, sappers located and deactivated several anti-tank mines on the approach to a steep mountain road turn. They checked several dozen more meters of the road — no mines. However, it was disquieting that all the mines that had been found were metal (meaning that they were easily located by mine detectors) and placed at a minimal depth.
They continued to search and just beyond the turn they found a powerful roadside bomb [IED] triggered by an electric push- button switch made of two plastic plates with metal contacts secured between them (Figure 1). This is the usual design of the switches that the “ghosts” used. The pressure of the moving tracked vehicle of the wheel or track of a passing vehicle on the switch’s upper plate brings the electric contacts together.
LESSONS FROM THE PAST
Another roadside bomb that we found was built in the same way, only this time both plates of the switch were wrapped in polyethylene, meaning that the electric circuit could close only after this improvised insulation had been destroyed, that is, after it had been run over several times. Apparently the “ghosts” were hoping that we would start moving once we found mines located before the turn but not search for those mines after the turn. They calculated that the passage of the first vehicles would convince us that this section of the route was “safe.” And then, after a while, there would be a powerful explosion.
With no detour. It is activated by an electric pressure-release switch. (It is cunning because the sappers who check the rubble are convinced that there are no mines in it since it is very hard to find an IED hidden deep beneath the roadbed. The blast must occur while the debris heap is being worked on, at the very last moment when the load that is keeping the electric switch deactivated is being removed: (1) explosive charge, (2) power source, (3) electric wire, (4) electric switch, (5) electric switch spring, (6) electric switch contacts, (7) rubble, (8) cliff, (9) wall of stone.
A bounding anti-personnel mine (like the American M2A4) is most often laid in a bush (tall grass) along a mountain path or in places that are convenient for rest (rest halts). It is triggered by pressure exerted directly on the fuse mechanism or by pulling one of the tripwires. The expulsion charge and fuse-delay mechanism detonate the explosive charge at a height of up to 1.8 meters: (1) mine casing, (2) explosive (fragmentation) element, (3) fuse, (4) pin, (5) tripwire, (6) stake.
Anti-personnel fragmentation directional mine laid in a tree. An ordinary mechanical fuse is used to activate it. The explosion produces an aimed swath of fragments that hit the target out to a distance of 180 meters: (1) M18A1 Claymore mine (USA), (2) fuse, (3) tripwire. The mine is mounted at a height of 1.2-1.6 meters.
But the “ghosts” did not manage to take us by surprise. They miscalculated because they underestimated our sappers’ skill. For our part, we drew certain conclusions for ourselves, in particular that steep bottleneck turns on mountain roads are mined not only on the approach to them but also on the way down.
There are other “ploys” as well. For example, some buildings and bridges close to or on the roadways that the “ghosts” themselves used were not demolished. Tunnels were most often mined in the middle or at the end in order to “draw” in [concentrate] as many vehicles as possible into the area.
On hard-surface roads, mines were usually laid on the shoulder or in the roadway, primarily where there were oil spots or potholes, where repairs were being carried out, as well as on detours.
On gravel and dirt roads, mines were located practically anywhere on the road surface, on the shoulder, or in ditches. But all the same, most often they were laid on well-traveled tracks. The favorite places for laying mines were mountain passes, steep hairpin curves, ledges, defiles, and so on. In a word, mines were laid where it was difficult to bypass them.
In order to make a blast more destructive and hamper search and deactivation, the “ghosts” often laid two to three mines in a single hole (a mine or roadside bomb with an extra explosive charge, fuse, or pressure-release switch). They usually booby-trapped these mines. Figures 2-7 show some versions of such “booby traps.”
The “ghosts” often covered anti-tank minefields (mine clusters) with anti-personnel mines. They clustered anti- personnel mines or laid individual mines in ditches or on the shoulder, on detours around destroyed road structures, in rubble, near to and in craters, in vehicle parking and maintenance areas, close to water sources, and so on. The “ghosts” most often laid anti-personnel blast mines on mountain paths, and tripwire-activated fragmentation mines on the adjacent slopes.
The obstacles’ locations are marked with signs of a sort — a broken branch or shrub, a notch on a tree, a barely noticeable pyramid of two to three stones on or close to the road, and so on. Areas where anti-personnel or mixed minefields and powerful roadside bombs have been laid were most frequently marked.
To gain the upper hand over an adversary, one must be well acquainted with his strengths and weaknesses and tactics. Sappers must have a sound knowledge of enemy explosive items, mining methods, and the marking system that the enemy uses. Only then, by combining their knowledge with strong mine neutralization skills, can they effectively figure out all sorts of “tricks” to prevent casualties and the destruction of materiel. It is the duty of commanders to teach sappers all of this.
IEDs are nothing new to the Afghanistan battlefield, and the Soviet experience still holds value today. This is a look back at the history of the IED before the introduction of the high-tech, remote fusing systems. The Mujahideen used some remote fusing during the Soviet-Afghan War, but they were primarily hard wired. High-tech counter-IED systems are valuable, but the trained soldier, who understands the enemy’s patterns, history, and techniques is still the most effective counter-IED system in the force.
The latest on IED’s has been written into the magazine for more click here