MERC COL. BOB MacKENZIE’S Final Fire Fight
Col Bob MacKenzie, Longtime SOF editor and contributor was killed in Sierra Lion Feb 1995.
He was ambushed and the rebels that killed him thought they gotten the King of Mercenaries in that fight. MacKenzie, Vietnam vet, fought in Rhodesia, South Africa, and in other hot spots for 20 years. Here is his final recorded firefight.
The firefight that led to his death was never recorded.
This story is the last front-line dispatch from Colonel Robert MacKenzie. Soldier, gentleman and patron of worthy military campaigns, Col. MacKenzie was KIA in Sierra Leone last February by “Revolutionary United Front” terrorists (see “Death ofa Warrior,” July ’95). Prior to accepting the position as trainer of a newly formed Sierra Leone commando unit, MacKenzie served with the HVO under Brigadier Zelko Glasnovic in Bosnia. This dispatch was prepared posthumously from his notes.
The situation at Bihac, the embattled town 100 miles to our north, bore heavily on the minds of all ranks in the First Guards Brigade of the HVO (the Bosnian Croat army in Bosnia). One in the Byzantine array of combatants and allegiances in this most Balkan of wars, the HVO is stationed in central Bosnia. They are allied with the predominantly Muslim Bosnian government army (BiH).
Setting aside historical differences, these allies ‘have conducted successful joint operations against the Bosnian Serb forces: It is expected that at some point the BiH and HVO will amalgamate into one army, and such a union would probably last as long as they have a common enemy in the Serbs.
On the other side, the Bosnian Serbs have proclaimed a Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which they would like to expand and consolidate. Until quite recently they have gotten much logistical and other support from Serbia. These Serbs in Bosnia, commonly called “Chetniks,” are strong in heavy weapons; the BiH is strong in infantry, and the’ HVO strongest in terms of leadership.
We were all concerned with the implications of the heavy fighting around Bihac, and whether we would be drawn into it. On 28 October our commander, Brigadier Zelko Glasnovic, answered that question with a warning order for an assault on the Serbs’ southern lines, which had been left vulnerable by their concentration of forces to the north.
First Guards’ barracks became the site of frantic activity as we shifted from “peacetime” training to preparation for combat operations. The infantry companies drew small arms, ammunition and grenades, filled magazines, inspected individual equipment and speculated on what for most would be their first experience in real combat. Our armor contingent loaded their T-55s and BMPs; artillery men checked their guns and our anti-tank company tested their Saggers, Faggots (known as Spiggots in the U.S. AImy) and other wireguided missiles.
Almost unbelievably, the brigade was ready on time and we deployed to our assembly areas. As commander of the brigade commander’s reconnaissance team, I was leading six other foreigners, all of whom had a great deal of military experience. In addition we had two English-speaking HVO soldiers as interpreters. We were all looking forward to seeing some action. The brigade also had a recon platoon comprised of local troops, but they were assigned to other tasks in the opening phases of the operation.
H-hour was supposed to be 0430 on 1 November. Several other HVO formations were also involved in the attack, and for various reasons H-hour was delayed several hours.
Meanwhile, in the freezing darkness,
First Guards Brigade moved to the start line with two battalions up and one in reserve. Our anti-tank detachments were moving with the infantry companies and our T-55s were in overwatch. Our artillery fire plan called for initial preparatory bombard ment to begin just prior to H-hour, with targets on call thereafter. Finally at 0730 our leading companies crossed the start line.
Amazingly, we caught the Serbs by surprise and resistance was light, with the Serbs fleeing in the face of our artillery and tank fire. Several pockets of resistance were neutralized by a combination of 120mm mortars, 107mm and 122mm rockets, and the 100mm guns on our T-55s. By 1430 enemy resistance was crumbling all along our front and three Serbian tanks on the right flank were spotted pulling out of their positions and speeding away from the front line. A Faggot wire-guided missile accounted for one of them. For the rest of the afternoon our infantry advanced through the thickly wooded hills, and just before evening the Serbian forces on our right broke and the reserve battalion was committed to exploit the breach. By nightfall all of our units were well past their initial objectives. Since neither side does much fighting at night, we stopped and dug in while the Serbs continued to withdraw.
On the second day of the operation my group, which had been at brigade HQ in reserve, was tasked with reconnaissance of a road on our right flank. The nine of us set out into thick fog shortly after first light. Moving slowly through the fog across a couple of kilometers of open ground, we paused often to listen for enemy activity and were relieved to enter the forest before the fog lifted. Proceeding cautiously through the woods parallel to the road, we reached the place where a Serbian tank had been hit by a missile the day before. A few pieces of metal, a good deal of blackened earth and the body of a Serbian tanker were all that remained -the tank had apparently been recovered during the night.
Continuing our reconnaissance up the road we started coming upon well-built Serbian log bunkers. Fortunately they were empty. When we were about 7 kilometers in front of our lines we were told to stop and wait for the infantry to catch up. By the time they reached us it was after lunch and since their instructions were to proceed no farther, we went forward another kilometer and found a small ridge from which we could watch Serbs abandoning their positions in front of us. We watched for the rest of the afternoon and then returned to HQ. Along the rest of the brigade front the advance was disappointingly slow in the face of light or no opposition other than a few land mines. D+2 saw us in reconnaissance again, this time moving through forested hills trying to get around the enemy’s flanks and into position where we could observe their HQ in a viIlage called Rilic. The rest of the battlefield echoed with the sounds of artillery fire as Serbian positions were sheIled. About 1100 my team got into position overlooking Rilic. HVO intelligence sources had told us that Rilic would be heavily defended by hundreds of troops with armor and artillery support, so we were surprised when our first glimpse indicated no activity.
Creeping through the woods into the outskirts of town, we confirmed that Rilic had in fact been evacuated. There was not a soldier to be seen, but there were mess tins, gas masks, overcoats and blankets strewn all over the place. Radioing the news back to HQ, we moved into a secure ruin and waited impatiently for the brigade to catch up, since nine men are a bit sparse to hold an entire town. The lead elements finally arrived at about 1330, and brigade HQ and the rest of the brigade followed, so that by nightfall we were firmly in possession.
Countering A CounteraHack
Morning came with rumors of a Serb counterattack. To preempt any such action the brigade commander ordered artillery fire on likely enemy assembly areas and no attack materialized. In fact that day the Serb resistance was completely shattered, and our tanks and troops rapidly advanced 11 kilometers to the town of Kupres, which the Chetnicks had hurriedly abandoned. When we arrived in Kupres we found that the predominantly Muslim Bosnian army was also pressing the Serbs, and we linked up with them on our right flank. At this stage our advance stalled, and we only managed another 2 kilometers before encountering serious resistance from entrenched enemy infantry and armor.
Another reason for the slowdown of our advance was the fact that both of our flanks were dominated by Serbheld mountains, and efforts to dislodge them were not going wel L HVO commanders decided to secure Kupres, a town formerly of some 8,000 Croatian residents, which had been fought over several times in the past and finally taken by the Serbs in 1992. The recapture of Kupres by the HVO was of considerable emotional importance, and many vows were sworn never to let it fall into enemy hands again.
Both sides then continued consolidating their positions and for the next several weeks trench systems reminiscent of World War I were dug, creating a no-man’s land varying from 1 to 4 kilometers in depth. Part of this area was comprised of a deserted town and buildings from which my team conducted numerous operations to harass the Serbs. Since no-man’s land consisted of open fields interspersed with ruined buildings, and the enemy had positions on high ground overlooking the entire area, we usually had to sneak out at 0300 under cover of darkness, occupy our positions, and remain there until nightfall allowed us to creep back to our own lines. Sometimes we were sniping with .50 caliber or .300 Winchester Magnum sniping rifles, other times we had a 90mm recoilless rifle and 60mm or 82mm mortars. From ranges of 6001,500 meters, we used these weapons to harass the Serbian bunkers and trench lines. On these operations I also had a radio link to brigade artillery and did some good fire control, scoring direct hits with 120mm mortars.
Our effectiveness was confirmed by Serbian radio traffic and their repeated, but fortunately futile, attempts to kill us.
On one such occasion, the brigade commander became aware of an impending attack by armor and infantry on the cluster of houses from which we were firing the recoilless rifle. He warned me on the radio that enemy action was imminent, but because the clump of buildings was surrounded by several hundred meters of flat, open ground, we couldn’t withdraw. Glasnovic ordered a couple of our own tanks into overwatch position and organized a salvo of 130mm artillery rounds onto the likely enemy approach route. We reduced our activities and waited until dark before sneaking away.
On another mission, we were in the same general area with an 82mm mortar to complement our sniping rifles when, in an obviously organized counter, Chetniks from widely disparate positions opened fire on us. In the space of a few minutes we took a dozen rounds of 82mm mortar fire -many of which were close enough to rain shrapnel on us; someone from a different part of the battlefield flew a wire-guided Sagger missile at us, and a T-84 tank popped out of cover, fired two quick rounds and disappeared again. After recovering from our initial alarm, and making note of the peculiar clattering noise a wireguided missile makes as it flies by, we resumed fire with our own mortar and sniping rifles. Of course, all of our missions in no-man’s land included gathering combat intelligence, and we were able to add some useful information to the commander’s maps.
As the weeks dragged on, neither side showed serious inclination to advance, and we varied the type and location of our missions so as not to set a pattern. Other brigade activities during the period mostly consisted of using our artillery against Chetnik rear areas. There was also some patrol activity on our part, probing their defenses. From the enemy’s side came some return artillery and tank fire, but no patrols. As Christmas approached, hostilities diminished while the snow fall increased. As of this writing it is uncertain whether anything else will happen during the winter months, especially since yet another cease-fire, leading no doubt to peace in our time, has been signed in Bosnia