Pat Tillman: From NFL star to Army Ranger:

The Pat Tillman Story from the Pat Tillman Foundation:

The day after the attacks of September 11, 2001, Pat told a reporter, “At times like this you stop and think about just how good we have it, what kind of system we live in, and the freedoms we are allowed. A lot of my family has gone and fought in wars and I really haven’t done a damn thing.”

Pat and his brother Kevin joined the U.S. Army that July, committing to a three-year term. They were assigned to the second battalion of the 75th Ranger Regiment in Fort Lewis, Washington. They served tours in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, and in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom in 2004. On the evening of April 22, 2004, Pat’s unit was ambushed as it traveled through the rugged, canyon terrain of eastern Afghanistan. His heroic efforts to provide cover for fellow soldiers as they escaped from the canyon led to his untimely and tragic death via fratricide.

MEMORANDUM FOR ACTING SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
SUBJECT: Review of Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army

On April 22, 2004, the 2nd Platoon, A Company, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment was conducting operations in the vicinity of Magarah, Afghanistan. Because of difficulties caused by an inoperable tactical vehicle, and the mission to achieve an established objective by nightfall, the platoon ground assault convoy, consisting of 41 Army Rangers, 4 Afghan Military Forces (AMF) soldiers, and 12 vehicles, was split into 2 groups. serial 1 or “( t h e Platoon Leader), CPL Tillman; and 4 AMF soldiers.? Serial 2, commanded by Sergeant First Class (SFC) (the Platoon Sergeant), consisted of 22 Rangers and two local Afghans traveling in 4 U.S. vehicles and a privately owned local vehicle (referred to as a “jinga” or “jingle” truck). The jinga truck, driven by a local Afghan, was towing a fifth (inoperable) U.S. vehicle.

After the split, Serial 1 traveled down the canyon road without incident arriving in the vicinity of the village of Manah. Serial 2, however, did not proceed along the separate planned route because SFC _ believed the risk of accidental injury or death to be too great given the terrain. Therefore, SFC _ ordered Serial 2 to travel down the same canyon road that Serial 1 had taken earlier.

While traveling down the canyon road, Serial 2 came under attack from enemy mortar or rocket propelled grenades and small arms fire originating from the top of the canyon walls. Upon ~ h i n d them, Serial 1 personnel, led by Staff Sergeant (SSG) (the squad leader), dismounted their vehicles and moved on foot through a small (6-building) village to an elevated spur overlooking the canyon road below and across from the southern ridgeline. CPL Tillman, Private First Class (PFC) and an AMF soldier positioned themselves on the forward slope ofthe spur visible from and exposed them from below. . lLT_and Specialist(SPC) (theRadio Operator), having been delayed by handling communications devices, were positioned at the base of a building in the village some distance below and to the rear of SSG and other Serial 1 personnel.

The first U.S. vehicle in Serial 2 was led by SSG (the squad leader), with a driver and five other occupants. As SSG and his crew moved down the canyon road, they fired their weapons in suppressive fire along the canyon walls. When S S G _ s vehicle exited the narrow portion of the canyon road below the spur where CPL Tillman and his team were located, occupants saw muzzle flashes coming from that position. S S G _ a n d his team directed their fire toward the muzzle flashes killing both CPL Tillman and the AMF soldier. As S S G _ s vehicle proceeded past the spur toward the vi~e vehicle occupants continued to fire on the building in the settlement hitting 1LT _ in the face and SPC _
in the knee and chest with small arms fire.

Our review concluded that CPL Tillman’s chain of command made critical errors in reporting CPL Tillman’s death and in assigning investigative jurisdiction in the days following his death, and bears ultimate responsibility for the inaccuracies, misunderstandings, and perceptions of concealment that led to our investigation. For example, CPL Tillman’s chain of command failed to timely report suspected death by friendly fire. Established Army policy required notification of death by friendly fire, which was suspected the day following the incident, up through the chain of command as well as to the Army Safety Center.
Guidance required that the Combatant Commander convene a legal investigation and authorized the cognizant Service to convene any safety investigation required by its regulations. The safety investigation required by Army regulations would have been conducted by a board oftrained, experienced investigators who would have collected, processed, and retained forensic evidence, and coordinated with criminal investigative authorities if warranted. Both legal and safety investigations would have been independent of CPL Tillman’s immediate chain of command and, therefore, not vulnerable to accusations that command Service members were shielded from culpability.
None of CPL Tillman’s superiors complied with these requirements. Instead, after clear evidence of fratricide emerged the day following the incident, CPL Tillman’s battalion commander (a lieutenant colonel three levels below the Combatant Commander), with the concurrence ofhis regimental commander, appointed a subordinate Army captain to investigate. That investigation, completed in about 2 weeks, determined CPL Tillman’s death was fratricide caused by leadership failures and tactical errors. Dissatisfied with the thoroughness of that investigation, CPL Tillman’s regimental commander (a colonel) ordered his own executive officer (a lieutenant colonel) to conduct a second investigation. That investigation, building on
the first, was completed in 9 days, confirmed death by friendly fire, and provided expanded findings on the contributing tactical errors. No independent investigator; that is, outside CPL Tillman’s immediate chain of command, was appointed by appropriate authority until 6 months after CPL Tillman’s death. A safety investigation was not initiated until nearly 6 months after the incident when most of the forensic evidence had been destroyed. Expertise available from the Army CID was not obtained until we initiated this review.
We concluded that the first two investigations, conducted by officers in CPL Tillman’s battalion and regiment under Army Regulation (AR) 15-6, “Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers,” were tainted by the failure to preserve evidence, a lack of thoroughness, the failure to pursue logical investigative leads, and conclusions that were open to challenge based on the evidence provided. More significantly, neither investigator visited the site to visually reenact the incident, secure physical evidence, take photographs, or obtain accurate measurements. In addition, the first investigating officer, with advice from his legal advisor, withheld information concerning suspected fratricide from medical examiners who raised questions based on anomalies they discovered during the autopsy. As a result, the first two investigations lacked credibility and contributed to perceptions that Army officials were purposefully withholding key information concerning CPL Tillman’s death. The full 85 Page Report HERE.

From NFL star to Army Ranger: Pat Tillman left professional football at the height of his career to serve in the Army following the events of 9/11. Blog.VA.com

With the start of the NFL season, we honor the service of a Veteran who played professional football.

Pat Tillman was born Nov. 6, 1976, in Fremont, California. He was the oldest of three, and was very close with his family and friends. At school, his football talent led the high school team to the division championship; it led him to a college scholarship at Arizona State University (ASU).

Tillman played football from 1994 to 1997 at ASU. In 1997, he led the Sun Devils to an undefeated season and a trip to the Rose Bowl. He was the team’s Player of the Year and the PAC-10 Defensive Player of the Year. And he was no different in the classroom, either. He graduated in 3.5 years and won the Clyde B. Smith Academic Award, the Sporting News Honda Scholar-Athlete of the Year Award, and the Sun Angel Student-Athlete of the Year Award.

In 1998, the NFL’s Arizona Cardinals drafted him to play professionally. In his rookie season, he played ten games, helping the team to its first playoff berth in 51 years. He posted 145 tackles in 2000. As if that wasn’t enough, he prepared for the 2001 training camp by competing in a 70.2-mile triathlon. Because of his loyalty to the Cardinals, he rejected an impressive multi million-dollar offer to play for the St. Louis Rams.

After the events of Sept. 11, 2001, Tillman completed the remainder of the 2001 season, then turned down a lucrative contract extension from the Cardinals to enlist in the Army.

He wanted to serve his country.

He told NBC News, “My great grandfather was at Pearl Harbor, and a lot of my family has gone and fought in wars, and I really haven’t done a damn thing as far as laying myself on the line like that.”

Because of his decision, Tillman received a lot of attention from the media. Few people are good enough to play professional sports. Fewer rise to the top.

After completing training, he entered the Army’s Ranger Indoctrination Program. Tillman deployed to Iraq during the invasion, as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom. He completed Ranger School in late 2003 and subsequently deployed to Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom.

Tillman was killed in action April 22, 2004, in Afghanistan. His battalion was involved in Operation Mountain Storm, part of the U.S. campaign against Al Qaeda and the former Taliban government along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. An Army spokesman stated that Pat was killed in the early evening during a firefight on a road about 25 miles southwest of a U.S. base at Khost.

Following his death, Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal approved Tillman’s nomination for a Silver Star. Senator John McCain delivered a eulogy during a televised memorial service on May 3, 2004.

After his death, Tillman was commemorated by the Sun Devils, the Cardinals and the NFL. Both the Sun Devils and the Cardinals retired his player number in his honor. In 2010, the NFL honored Tillman by adding him to the NFL Hall of Fame and working with the Pat Tillman Foundation to create a scholarship in his honor.

We honor his service.