Unidentified Warplanes Hit Al Watiya Air Base Libya: Libya’s Vows Revenge

VIDEO: Command General of the Armed Forces

Libya’s Defense Minister Salah Al Din Al Namroush said the airstrikes on al Watiya Air Base by foreign fighter jets supporting “war criminal Khalifa Haftar” were provoked attacks on the Libyan Army’s successes in retaking the base. He warned that Libya will retaliate for the reported air strikes by yet to be identified war planes, Middleeasteye reported.

Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA), backed by the Turkish military support, recaptured the base from forces loyal to eastern commander Khalifa Haftar. Turkey has designs to establish a permanent presence there. Libya news provided footage at the time:

BACKGROUND from the perspective of the United States:

Fighters in western Libya rallied with Turkish military support to blunt the Libyan National Army LNA’s advance, and Haftar’s forces withdrew from northwestern Libya in June 2020. DOD Congress

Fighting has continued in central Libya despite multilateral demands for a ceasefire. LNA forces and local partners control much of Libya’s territory and key oil production and export infrastructure, directly or through militia allies. The GNA and anti-LNA groups control Tripoli and the western coast. Southern Libya is marginalized and faces threats from criminals, rival ethnic militias, and terrorists.

Conflict dynamics shifted during the conflict as Russian- national Wagner Group contractors intervened on behalf of LNA forces, Turkey and the GNA concluded maritime and security cooperation agreements, Turkey deployed fighters and arms on behalf of the GNA, and outsiders shipped weapons to both sides. U.S. officials, Russia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates arm the LNA and aid its operations. Turkey provides overt military support to anti-LNA forces. Both sides have recruited Syrian militias to their ranks. State Department officials condemned “toxic foreign interference” in March 2020, and have called for “a sovereign Libya free of foreign intervention.”

Nongovernment conflict observers estimate that fighting between LNA forces, GNA supporters, and anti-LNA militias has killed more than 2,600 fighters, along with more than 450 civilians since April. Near Tripoli, conflict has displaced more than 200,000 people, and put more than 300,000 in frontline areas, some of which were mined by retreating LNA forces. More than 650,000 foreign migrants (largely from sub-Saharan Africa) also are in Libya and remain especially vulnerable.

In 2020, multilateral diplomatic initiatives have sought to achieve and sustain a ceasefire between Libyan combatants (Figure 2) as a precursor to renewed political reconciliation efforts. Russia and Turkey engineered a temporary truce in January, but did not achieve a ceasefire. Meeting in Berlin, Germany later in January, the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council along with other key foreign actors jointly committed to supporting a series of new arrangements aimed at durably ending the conflict. GNA and LNA figures attended, but did not formally commit to a ceasefire. The Security Council endorsed the Berlin commitments in Resolution 2510. The U.N. Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) then supported intra-Libyan security, political, and economic discussions, but COVID- 19 concerns and resumed fighting undermined progress.

Years of division and conflict have weakened the Libyan health care system’s ability to mitigate COVID-19-related risks. In April, Acting UNSMIL head Stephanie Williams said ongoing fighting was “reckless” and “inhumane,” saying it was “stretching the capacity of local authoritiesand the health infrastructure that is already decimated.”

U.S. and U.N. officials have condemned post-Berlin weapons shipments to Libya as violations of the U.N. arms embargo and called for a humanitarian ceasefire to allow the country to combat the spread of COVID-19, which, to date, appears to be limited. Following its retreat, the LNA proposed a ceasefire and reengaged in U.N.-sponsored talks. Russia, Turkey, and Egypt also have reengaged Libyan figures. Amid some continued fighting, humanitarian access is restricted. Oil production also remains disrupted, which threatens state finances.

Armed militia groups, local leaders, and coalitions of national figures with competing foreign patrons have remained the most powerful arbiters of public affairs. The U.N. Security Council praised Libya’s administration of elections for legislative bodies and a constitutional drafting assembly in 2012 and 2014, but declining rates of participation, threats to candidates and voters, and zero-sum political competition have marred the country’s democratic exercises. Insecurity deepened amid terrorist attacks on U.S. and other international targets in 2012, and coalitions of rival armed groups clashed in 2014, driven by overlapping ideological, personal, financial, and transnational rivalries. In the conflict’s aftermath, the country’s transitional institutions fragmented, and the LNA movement began a long fight against Islamist groups and critics in and around Benghazi.

In December 2015, some Libyan leaders endorsed a U.N.- brokered political agreement to create a Government of National Accord to oversee the completion of the transition. GNA Prime Minister-designate Fayez al Sarraj and members of a GNA Presidency Council tried to implement the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement but faced resistance from defiant militias, scorn from a rival interim government and leaders of Libya’s House of Representatives in the east, and hostility from Khalifa Haftar’s LNA/LAAF movement. This hostility erupted into conflict in 2019.

On the surface, the conflict in Libya pits two primary factions and their various foreign and local backers against each other in what appears to be a straightforward contest for control over the capital and the organs of state power. However, beneath the surface, complicated local interests, foreign agendas, personal grudges, identity-based concerns, profit motives, and ideological rivalries shape political and security developments. Leading Libyan coalitions suffer from internal divisions and political legitimacy deficits stemming from the extended, fractious nature of the transition period. Victory or surrender by either side could spur new fighting within their ranks. Outside powers have exploited these factors, frustrating mediation efforts.