Southern Challenges and the Regionalization of the Transatlantic Security Partnership
Recent security developments in the European southern neighborhood seem not to have questioned the objectives and methods of the transatlantic security partnership. The overbearing legacies of the Iraq invasion, the 2011 Libyan intervention and the ongoing conflict in Syria, have framed — and will continue to frame — transatlantic discussions on out-of-area military operations. The geopolitical upheaval stemming from the “Arab Spring” has reshuffled the traditional understanding of the regional balance of power, while the political situations in Turkey, Israel, and Lebanon are also subjects of concern for transatlantic partners. Instability and insecurity in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have had direct effects on European and U.S. societies. The threat of Islamist terrorism has increasingly spread beyond the Mediterranean, and millions of migrants fleeing the dangers of the region have led to a still unresolved refugee crisis in Europe, with unclear political implications.
Facing this multiplicity of crises and issues, transatlantic powers have often failed to adopt a proactive approach, and the case-by-case reactions have shown various degrees of success. The United States and its European partners remain highly reluctant to directly intervene in the security crises in the MENA. Reliance on regional partners has not delivered desirable outcomes so far, and transatlantic partners are in need to redefine the scope of their strategy of outsourcing. The discussions at the next NATO Summit in 2017 should provide the basis for a necessary rethinking. If not, the future of crisis management in the region will be handled by powers like Russia, Iran and Turkey, along the model of the Syrian crisis, leaving the United States and Europe on the side-lines, as the countries seek to drive the conflict in ways that serve their interests and spheres of influence.
Constructive transatlantic cooperation can only emerge if transatlantic partners share a common understanding of the changing and complex security environment of the MENA. Despite objective efforts in the last two years in order to improve the exchange of information, further improvements remain necessary in order to design an efficient transatlantic strategy towards the Southern security challenges. Transatlantic partners and NATO have to continue joint efforts in order to address more specifically three key issues.
Firstly, they need to move beyond the so-called concept of the “Southern flank,” which is problematic in itself. Indeed, it may appear pertinent to distinguish, in theory, security challenges in the Mediterranean neighborhood from those in the Eastern neighborhood. But in fact, they both combine conventional and non-conventional challenges for Europe’s security and political integrity. Russia’s comprehensive use of its power (military force, cyber inference, destabilization of social and energy networks) is directly threatening the existence of European and NATO countries, while the spillover effects caused by failing states and terrorism in the Middle East and Africa — as in the case of the refugee crisis and foreign fighters — constitute an existential threat for political systems and national security. These threats should be addressed through a NATO–EU comprehensive approach, based on a pragmatic division of labor between both institutions
Indeed, the artificial distinction between the South and the East has only lead to further regional fragmentation within the transatlantic partnership since 2014. The challenges stemming from crises in the Southern neighborhood are a reminder of the security ecosystem in which transatlantic powers operate. Rather than opposing the two “flanks,” the transatlantic narrative should highlight the constant linkage between the different threats. It is in the interest of all transatlantic partners to reinforce the security of their neighbors, and not only focus on the security of the transatlantic territory. Although NATO no longer aims at a “360 vision,” all 28 allies are necessary to face both Eastern and Southern issues. It also requires a more proactive understanding of the neighbors’ needs and factors of instability. For instance, the migration crisis affecting Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon cannot be overlooked, as it already weakens these societies and could eventually create a new political turmoil with security implications for Europe.
Secondly, despite a more accurate perception of the threat, transatlantic partners have yet to overcome a form of strategic helplessness. The blockages are not security-related, but rather political (rise of populism, identity politics), and economic (budget constraints). Transatlantic partners are aware of their divergences and of the reality of the risks that are faced, but still need to engage in some necessary efforts, especially in terms of defense spending. The difficulty to translate the perceptible progress into policy-making also stems from the lessons-learned from past operations. Recent cooperation in the MENA region cannot provide credible models for partnerships with non-transatlantic powers. The conflict in Yemen has illustrated the failure of a division of labor with regional partners. The idea that transatlantic countries could command while regional actors operate on the field is an illusion. Similarly, a Libya-scenario seems unrealistic in the near future, and the election of Donald Trump may increase the resistance to any transatlantic intervention in the region. Trump has been very critical of the 2011 Libyan operation, and his anti-Islam rhetoric during the campaign will durably affect the regional perceptions of the United States.
Finally, transatlantic partners have to recalibrate their objectives and priorities rather than invent a new transatlantic project in the MENA. The raison d’être of the Alliance and the tools available to project power are known and unquestioned. The general sense of confusion and helplessness could lead to a dangerous overestimation of what is necessary to defend transatlantic interests. The transatlantic security partnership does not need to create a new theology, but needs to fix what does not work anymore in the operationalization process. Recalibrating the strategic ambitions in the Southern flank — that is, agreeing on a more realistic set of objectives — requires political leadership and willingness to collaborate, which may be more difficult in the current political environment in the United States and in Europe. It is however paramount to translate common perceptions and interests into a practical roadmap, with workable goals.
Getting rid of irrelevant historical analogies could be a first step in that direction. The success-stories of Central and Eastern European countries during the post-Cold War era are often still used as strategic guidelines in the very different geopolitical context of the MENA region. The examples of the integration of former communist countries into the European project are not relevant to define the strategy in the Southern flank, and set too ambitious objectives for transatlantic partners. Similarly, the Yugoslav wars and the reconstruction of Bosnian and Croatian societies do not necessarily provide helpful models for future initiatives in other strategic environments. Recalibrating NATO’s objectives means to accept the singularity and specificity of the crises faced in the MENA. Historical references, often misused, have fostered false expectations on the transformative power of transatlantic powers, and consequently created ill-designed objectives in European neighborhoods. The following pieces provide policy-relevant and complementary perspectives on the challenges faced by NATO in the region. The authors present different priorities for transatlantic partners, both in order to stop inefficient or counter-productive ongoing initiatives and mindsets, and to design new approaches. The final focus on the Libyan case presents an up-to-date analysis of the situation, and provides the keys to understand the obstacles preventing NATO allies from transforming the military victory into a strategic success.