Focus on the Arctic as Russia, China Dig In

Department of Defense Arctic Strategy  June 2019

DoD’s desired end-state for the Arctic is a secure and stable region where U.S. national interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is defended, and nations work cooperatively to address shared challenges.

The Joint Force must be able to deter, and if necessary, defeat great power aggression. DoD must prioritize efforts to address the central problem the NDS identifies – i.e., the Joint Force’s eroding competitive edge against China and Russia, and the NDS imperative to ensure favorable regional balances of power in the Indo-Pacific and Europe. Developing a more lethal, resilient, agile, and ready Joint Force will ensure that our military sustains its competitive advantages, not only for these key regions of strategic competition, but globally as well. Maintaining a credible deterrent for the Arctic region requires DoD to understand and shape the Arctic’s geo-strategic landscape for future operations and to respond effectively to contingencies in the Arctic region, both independently and in cooperation with others. DoD’s strategic approach seeks to do so by implementing three ways in support of the desired Arctic end-state (each described in detail in this document):

The Arctic means all U.S. and foreign territory north of the Arctic Circle and all U.S. territory north and west of the boundary formed by the Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers; all contiguous seas, including the Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian islands chain.

Assessment of Arctic Security Environment

The United States is an Arctic nation. The Arctic security environment has direct implications for U.S. national security interests. Geographically, the Arctic comprises the northern approaches of the United States and represents a potential vector both for attacks on the homeland and for U.S. power projection. Approaches to the Arctic Ocean to both the east and west of the United States form strategic corridors for maritime traffic. Arctic sea routes transit through the Bering Strait between the United States and Russia, while the Greenland, Iceland, United Kingdom – Norwegian (GIUK-N) gap is a strategic corridor for naval operations between the Arctic and the North Atlantic.

The Arctic region is comprised of the eight nations with sovereign territory in the Arctic,2including multiple U.S. allies and partners. The United States does not recognize any other claims to Arctic status by any State other than these eight nations. The United States maintains strong defense relationships with six of the seven other Arctic nations. Four are NATO Allies: Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark (including Greenland), Iceland, and Norway; and two are NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partners: Finland and Sweden. They are highly capable, with immense experience in high latitude operational environments.

Although the immediate prospect of conflict in the Arctic is low, these trends could adversely affect U.S. national security interests, promote instability, and ultimately degrade security in the region. Key dynamics include:

Changing Physical Environment: The Arctic’s physical environment continues to change, including through diminished sea ice coverage, declining snow cover, and melting ice sheets.3Temperatures across the Arctic region are increasing more than twice as fast as global average temperatures, accompanied by thawing permafrost and loss of sea ice and glacier mass. Diminishing Arctic sea ice is opening new shipping lanes and increasing access to natural resources during the summer months. If the warming trends continue at the current rate, Arctic- wide sea ice loss may result in nearly ice-free late summers by the 2040s. Thawing permafrost, compounded by storm surge and coastal erosion, adversely affects infrastructure, including DoD installations, and complicates the development of new and resilient DoD infrastructure.

Arctic nations refers to those countries that are members of the Arctic Council: Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark (including Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States.

Status of Arctic Sea Routes: Russia and Canada claim the right to regulate Arctic waters in excess of the authority permitted under international law. Russia requires foreign vessels to obtain permission, embark Russian ice pilots, and serve under escort of Russian icebreakers before entering the Northern Sea Route (NSR). Russia has also reportedly threatened to use force against vessels that fail to abide by Russian regulations. Canada considers the waters of the Northwest Passage to be internal waters, subject to the complete sovereignty of Canada.

Increasing Military Activity: Russia views itself as a polar great power and is the largest Arctic nation by landmass, population, and military presence above the Arctic Circle. Russia’s commercial investments in the Arctic region have been matched by continued defense investments and activities that strengthen both its territorial defense and its ability to control the NSR. Russia formed the Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command in December 2014 to coordinate its renewed emphasis on the Arctic. Since then, Russia has gradually strengthened its presence by creating new Arctic units, refurbishing old airfields and infrastructure in the Arctic, and establishing new military bases along its Arctic coastline. There is also a concerted effort to establish a network of air defense and coastal missile systems, early warning radars, rescue centers, and a variety of sensors. China’s operational presence in the Arctic is more limited. It includes China’s icebreaking vessels, the Xuelong and newly-constructed Xuelong 2, and civilian research efforts, which could support a strengthened, future Chinese military presence in the Arctic Ocean, potentially including deployment of submarines to the region.6

Attempts to Alter Arctic Governance through Economic Leverage: Despite having no territorial claims in the region, China is seeking a role in Arctic governance. As part of China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative, it has linked its economic activities in the Arctic to its broader strategic objectives, as articulated in its first Arctic policy white paper in January 2018. China’s stated interests in the Arctic are primarily focused on access to natural resources and the opportunities offered by the Arctic sea routes for Chinese shipping. China does not currently have a permanent Arctic military presence, but is increasing its presence through economic outreach, investments in Arctic states’ strategic sectors, and scientific activities. China maintains research stations in Iceland and Norway and has pursued energy development and infrastructure projects in Russia, such as the Yamal liquefied natural gas project. China also continues to seek opportunities to invest in dual-use infrastructure in the Arctic. Despite China’s claim of being a “Near Arctic State,” the United States does not recognize any such status.

U.S. National Security Interests in the Arctic

The United States has three broad, interlocking sets of national security interests related to the Arctic region. These interests are derived from DoD’s assessment of how U.S. national security interests, as defined in the 2017 National Security Strategy,7 apply to the Arctic region. They include:

1. 1)  The Arctic as the U.S. homeland: The United States is an Arctic nation with sovereign territory and maritime claims in the region. Its interests include defending U.S. sovereignty and the homeland, including through early warning and missile defense; protecting U.S. critical infrastructure; and achieving domain awareness to protect U.S. security interests in the region.
2. 2)  The Arctic as a shared region: The Arctic includes a domain of shared interests whose security and stability depend on Arctic nations constructively addressing shared challenges. Regional cooperation – built on a bedrock of internationally recognized principles like national sovereignty – is in the U.S. interest8 and contributes to a secure and stable Arctic. This is strengthened by the U.S.-led alliance and partnership network in the Arctic and by maintaining activities in the region in line with international norms.
3. 3)  The Arctic as a potential corridor for strategic competition: The Arctic is a potential avenue for expanded great power competition and aggression spanning between two key regions of ongoing competition identified in the NDS — the Indo-Pacific and Europe — and the U.S. homeland. U.S. interests include maintaining flexibility for global power projection, including by ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight; and limiting the ability of China and Russia to leverage the region as a corridor for competition that advances their strategic objectives through malign or coercive behavior.

   Protecting U.S. national security interests in the Arctic requires a holistic approach that

recognizes the relationship between these three sets of interests. As DoD examines both the United States’ and other nations’ interests and activities in the Arctic, DoD will prioritize risks and opportunities at the intersection of these three sets of interests. Additionally, DoD activities to protect U.S. national security interests in the Arctic will be in support of broader whole-of- government efforts.

Risks to U.S. National Security Interests

Trends in the Arctic security environment present specific risks across the three sets of U.S. national security interests:

Homeland: The Arctic is strategic terrain as a potential vector for an attack on the U.S. homeland. China and Russia pose discrete and different challenges in their respective theaters, but both are also pursuing activities and capabilities in the Arctic that may present risks to the homeland. In addition to the challenge posed by strategic competitors, coastal erosion and permafrost thaw pose risks to DoD Arctic installations. Increased economic activity in the Arctic raises the probability of a mass casualty incident in the Arctic where DoD assistance may be requested. Natural disasters or other contingencies, such as an oil spill, may severely affect Alaska, requiring DoD support to civil authorities. These events may also inhibit DoD’s ability to project power from the homeland.

Shared Region: In different ways, Russia and China are challenging the rules-based order in the Arctic. Russia regulates maritime operations in the NSR, contrary to international law, and has reportedly threatened to use force against vessels that fail to abide by Russian regulations.

Russia has generally followed international law and procedure in establishing the limits of its extended continental shelf. Russia could choose to unilaterally establish those limits if the procedures prove unfavorable and could utilize its military capabilities in an effort to deny access to disputed Arctic waters or resources. China is attempting to gain a role in the Arctic in ways that may undermine international rules and norms, and there is a risk that its predatory economic behavior globally may be repeated in the Arctic.

Potential Corridor for Strategic Competition: Developments in the Arctic have the potential to directly or indirectly constrain DoD’s ability to flow forces globally, and more broadly to affect U.S. strategic objectives related to competition with China and Russia in the Indo-Pacific and Europe. The Arctic remains vulnerable to “strategic spillover” from tensions, competition, or conflict arising in these other regions.

DoD’s Strategic Approach for the Arctic

DoD’s strategic approach for the Arctic is to protect U.S. national security interests and prudently address risks to those interests in ways that uphold the region’s rules-based order, without fueling strategic competition.

Deterrence in the Arctic: To ensure a credible deterrent for the Arctic, DoD must be able to quickly identify threats in the region, respond promptly and effectively to these threats, and shape the security environment to reduce or mitigate the prospects of these threats manifesting in the future.

Commander U.S. Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM) is designated as DoD’s Arctic Capability Advocate.

The Arctic environment presents specific operational challenges that limit communications, including the harsh climate, vast distances, and atmospheric phenomena. Even within the Arctic there is considerable variation between the North American Arctic, which has a harsher climate, and the milder, Gulf Stream-affected, European Arctic. The North American Arctic also lacks the relatively robust logistics infrastructure of the European Arctic. Operating effectively in the Arctic, therefore, requires DoD to make time-sensitive, risk-informed investments to understand and build awareness of the region.

Given this operating environment, there is a need for deployable communications and data networks capable of operating in the northern latitudes. This requires establishing robust and dynamic communications architecture with terrestrial, aerial, and space layers that are fully integrated and interoperable with mission partners. Both terrestrial and aerial communications equipment must be designed to function in the harsh Arctic weather conditions, which include rapid cycles of freezing and thawing and temperatures below minus 60 degrees Fahrenheit. Equipment testing must also be conducted in realistic Arctic conditions for sufficient periods of time. Adequate data coverage requires sufficiently ruggedized sensors to be deployed year- round for longitudinal data-set acquisition.

Supporting the Coast Guard’s Homeland Security Missions. The Coast Guard is the lead agency for homeland security in the Arctic. It has specific responsibilities for establishing and maintaining situational awareness across the region. The Coast Guard’s investments in ice- breaking ships through the Polar Security Cutter program support Arctic operations for a range of mission sets, including homeland security, defense, and search and rescue.9 DoD will continue to support this program, as it provides a key capability to ensure interoperability between Coast Guard and Navy vessels and to support U.S. presence in the Arctic region.

The Coast Guard is recapitalizing its polar icebreaker fleet through the Polar Security Cutter Program to address the need for six new polar security cutters.

Regular exercises and deployments in the Arctic. DoD will demonstrate and enhance the Joint Force’s ability to operate in the Arctic through regular exercises and deployments in the region, both independently and with allies and partners. Some exercises will be conducted within the NATO context; others will be bilateral or multilateral. Exercises with Arctic allies and partners enable our ability to deter aggression from strategic competitors, including anti-submarine warfare and cold weather and mountainous training. DoD is also an active participant in exercises hosted by other nations, including TRIDENT JUNCTURE, ARCTIC CHALLENGE, and COLD RESPONSE Exercises.

Exercises such as ARCTIC EDGE and BOLD QUEST will enhance the Joint Force’s familiarity with, and proficiency operating in, Arctic conditions and will improve joint, as well as Service, operations in the region. The Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex enables training and exercising opportunities in Arctic conditions and across domains.

Cold Weather Training. Operating in extreme cold weather conditions (exceeding minus 60 degrees Fahrenheit) requires specific tactics, techniques, and procedures. Toward this purpose, DoD will build on existing cold weather training for other operating environments. The Northern Warfare Training Center (NWTC) at Fort Wainwright, Alaska provides cold weather and mountain training, while Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska hosts the Arctic Survival Training School which is the Air Force’s oldest survival school.

DoD’s cooperation within NATO uniquely contributes to Arctic security and deters strategic competitors from using the Arctic as a corridor for expanded competition enabling their objectives in other regions.

Preserving Freedom of the Seas. Maintaining freedoms of navigation and overflight are critical to ensuring that the Arctic remains a free and open domain and that U.S. forces retain the global mobility guaranteed under international law. DoD will continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows. When necessary and appropriate, the United States will challenge excessive maritime claims in the Arctic to preserve the rules-based international order and the rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation and overflight, as well as for other, related high seas uses.

Annex A: Service Roles and Missions in the Arctic

Each Military Department plays a critical role in achieving objectives and approach outlined in this Arctic strategy.

Air Force

The Air Force operates the majority of DoD’s assets in the Arctic. The Air Force’s activities support international norms of access and navigation to ensure adequate protection of U.S. national security interests in the region.

Air and space assets are especially crucial for the Arctic region due to its vast distances and minimal land and maritime infrastructure. Air Force mission sets in the Arctic range from missile defense and power projection to space situational awareness and search and
rescue. Vital early warning decision space for homeland defense is provided by the Alaska Radar System and more than 50 radars that comprise the North Warning System across Canada. Assets at Clear, Alaska, and Thule, Greenland, are uniquely positioned for supporting space surveillance and satellite control networks, tracking tens of thousands of objects in orbit daily.

The Air Force maintains several large air bases supporting Arctic operations, including those at Elmendorf Air Force Base (AFB) and Eielson AFB in Alaska. Alaska offers key strategic locations for projecting airpower into the Indo-Pacific and Europe. These Alaskan bases support critical advanced generation fighter aircraft, including the F-35, and aerial refueling tankers from a strategic forward location offering global reach. The New York Air National Guard operates unique ski-equipped aircraft that provide access to some of the most remote locations on the Greenland ice sheet. The Alaska Air National Guard’s Rescue Coordination Center works closely with the Coast Guard to perform hundreds of search and rescue missions annually.

The Air Force contributes to essential training events focused on Arctic readiness, including operating Air Force’s oldest survival school at Eielson AFB, Alaska. Finally, the Air Force executes Exercise RED FLAG Alaska and contributes to the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex, DoD’s largest airspace, at 65,000 square miles, optimized for high-end training against strategic competitors.

In addition to these key, existing assets and posture, the Air Force continues to explore opportunities to modernize and enhance Arctic capabilities.

Navy

The Arctic region is uniquely relevant to the Navy’s ability to provide flexible deterrent options. The Arctic provides additional maneuver room for distributed nuclear and conventional force deterrent operations. The Navy’s 2nd Fleet has responsibility for ensuring the readiness of, and dynamically employing, maritime forces in the Atlantic and the Arctic, and the ability to fight across multiple domains, thereby deterring aggression. Commander, U.S. 2nd Fleet is dual- hatted as Commander of NATO’s Joint Force Command Norfolk.

The Navy will be ready to exercise, maintain, and exploit Sea Control in order to defend U.S. maritime access and interests in the Arctic. Naval forces provide maritime security in the maritime domain and the seaborne approaches to the United States, including the Arctic. Maritime security in the Arctic includes defending sea lines of communication and the homeland from seaborne attacks, maritime domain awareness, and supporting Coast Guard operations as required. The Navy builds interoperability with the Coast Guard through the National Fleet Plan and the associated National Fleet Board. Regular meetings of the Coast Guard-Navy National Fleet Board Arctic Working Group address cooperation and maritime security operations in the Arctic. The Navy also ensures access to the Arctic through routine deployments of submarines and aircraft to the region.

The Arctic enables sea-based power projection (e.g., precision fires from ships, submarines, carrier-based aircraft, and Marines Corps operations) from vectors outside of traditional operating areas. The Navy conducts the biennial ICEX submarine exercise north of Alaska’s North Slope. This is a multi-national submarine exercise that enhances readiness for sustained Arctic operations.

Through its sealift operations, the Navy provides timely movement, positioning, and sustainment of the Joint Force across the range of military operations, including the movement of personnel, material, and forces to and from or within the Arctic, by sea.

The Navy will provide support as required to Arctic search and rescue missions conducted and led by the Coast Guard, and as directed in support of international partners.

As part of its DSCA and Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief responsibilities, the Navy will remain ready to support Arctic operations, such as: pollution response and natural disaster recovery; integrated planning efforts with local, State, Federal, and native communities; and interoperability with the Coast Guard and international partners.

Marine Corps

The Marine Corps maintains capability to support Naval operations in “any clime and place,” including the Arctic. Depending on seaborne lift, the Service plans for a baseline of two Marine Expeditionary Brigades that can conduct offensive operations in extreme cold weather environments.

To develop and maintain this capability, the Marine Corps routinely deploys Marine Air- Ground Task Forces of varying sizes to conduct cold weather training. The units train at the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, and other venues, including Camp Ripley, Minnesota and Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. The Service also trains in Alaska, in Exercise ARCTIC EDGE, and in Norway, in exercises such as TRIDENT JUNCTURE, as well as through winter training rotations above the Arctic Circle. These training exercises feature interoperability training with NATO allies such as Norway and the United Kingdom. Additionally, the Marine

Corps conducts cold weather training in the Pacific, including in the Korea Marine Exercise Program, and in northern Japan, in winter exercises such as FOREST LIGHT. The Marine Corps has recently upgraded its Infantry Combat Clothing and Equipment (ICCE) cold weather inventory. The Service maintains sufficient cold weather ICCE for the entire active and reserve population and Extreme Cold Weather Clothing System (ECCWCS) ICCE (sufficient for temperatures to minus 25 degrees Fahrenheit) for 35,000 Marines. The resulting ability to outfit 39,000 Marines for extreme cold weather supports the Arctic-capable two MEB objective.

Army

On order, U.S. Army Alaska (USARAK) executes Joint Forces Land Component Commander functions in support of United States Army Pacific (USARPAC) operations and USNORTHCOM Homeland Defense and DSCA missions in Alaska. Army forces are postured to support mission sets through the USNORTHCOM-defined Alaska Joint Operations Area, as well as worldwide unified land operations in support of USARPAC.

Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Strategic Command mans and operates Ground-Based Interceptors at Fort Greely, Alaska, to defend the U.S. homeland from long-range ballistic missile attacks.

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Engineering (USACE) Research and Development Center, Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory (ERDC-CRREL) works to enhance Arctic domain awareness by examining the effects of a changing climate; and by monitoring Arctic effects on the operational environment, including sensor performance and signal propagation. The USACE ERDC-CRREL addresses effects on infrastructure and operations resulting from exposure to extreme environmental and dynamic climactic conditions. USACE ERDC-CRREL is pursuing technology to detect permafrost conditions, providing facilities to simulate Arctic conditions, as well as systems and materials evaluation and development.

The U.S. Army Cold Regions Test Center, located at Fort Greely, Alaska, plans and conducts developmental testing, with an emphasis on Soldier participation, in the snow, extreme cold, and sub-arctic natural environment. This provides acquisition and Army leadership with timely, accurate, and relevant information relating to system performance.

USARAK manages Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex training areas and airspace in and around Eielson Air Force Base and Fort Greely.

Special Operations Forces

Special Operations Forces (SOF) routinely participate in Arctic or near-Arctic region exercises (e.g., BOLD QUEST, NORTHERN GRIFFIN, TRIDENT JUNCTURE) to ensure interoperability with allies and partners.

The agile and expeditionary nature of SOF, combined with established allied and partner relations and interoperability, provides DoD a ready capability to compete below the level of armed conflict in the Arctic region, and across the spectrum of SOF core activities.

National Guard

The National Guard, through the Army or the Air Force, provides forces that may be made available to support DoD’s missions in the Arctic region.

The National Guard operates in both Federal and State capacities in the Arctic, contributing to a spectrum of DoD missions. In a Federal duty status, the National Guard provides ready forces available for mobilization as part of defense of the homeland or abroad, as well as for conducting DSCA missions. Drawing on forces located in Alaska and other regions, the National Guard augments Title 10 DoD forces, including in such missions as ballistic missile defense. The National Guard also contributes to DoD’s air mobility in the Arctic and leads the only U.S. LC-130 Wing capable of operating C-130s from ice locations in the Arctic.

In Title 32 and State duty status, the National Guard undertakes Disaster Response, Domain Awareness, Arctic Search and Rescue, Homeland Defense, and Environment Protection missions. The National Guard’s performance of these roles in Alaska builds operational proficiency in extreme climactic conditions and helps address some of the challenges posed by the changing physical environment. In addition, in Alaska the National Guard leads the Alaska Native Tribal liaison, supporting engagement with local indigenous communities.

In a State duty status, the National Guard has conducted international engagement with Arctic allies and partners, including planning and coordination activities related to disaster response and civil support. The National Guard Arctic Interests Council focuses and synchronizes interstate Arctic interests and expertise.

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