BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL 11–15 November 1942—Enemy Air Attacks of 11–12 November and Cruiser Night Action of 12–13 November

BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL 11–5 November 1942 PART ONE—Enemy Air Attacks of 11–12 November and Cruiser Night Action of 12–13 November

PERHAPS the entire period between 7 August 1942, when the first Marines landed in thewith the shattering of the enemy’s supreme effort to overwhelm the island between 11 and 15 November. During the desperate sea and air battles of those 5 days, Japanese losses as estimated by CINCPAC were 2 battleships sunk and 2 damaged, 4 cruisers sunk and 6 damaged, 8 destroyers sunk and 4 damaged, and 12 transports sunk or destroyed. Our losses consisted of 1 battleship damaged, 2 cruisers sunk and 3 damaged, 7 destroyers sunk and 4 damaged, and 3 cargo vessels damaged, 2 of these negligibly.
Beginning the first day of the Solomons operation, the Japanese had offered vigorous opposition to the consolidation and extension of our positions on Guadalcanal. During the remainder of August, they made many air attacks and attempted several landings, all of which were successfully driven off 2 or mopped up.
With the coming of September they redoubled their efforts to bomb us off the island and to put reinforcements ashore. Small night landings by cruisers and destroyers—the so-called “Tokio Express”—became increasingly prevalent throughout the month and in early October. This method of reinforcement proved unsatisfactory, however, because few men and no heavy materiél could be carried. Consequently the enemy found it necessary to bring in large transports. Before this could be done, our air power on Guadalcanal had to be crippled, at least temporarily.
A surface force of cruisers and destroyers, which probably intended to put Henderson Field out of commission, was thrown back in the Battle of Cape Esperance on the night of 11–12 October.3 Japanese losses were heavy, but 2 nights later they came back and succeeded in shelling the field for an hour and 20 minutes. By the morning of the 15th only 1 of our bombers and 10 fighters were in a condition to take to the air, and they were unable to prevent a convoy of 6 transports from coming in. Our lone bomber sank one of these ships. Other SBD’s were flown in by noon, and with the help of Army B-17’s they set 4 beached transports afire and badly damaged the remaining one. But an enemy force estimated by General Vandegrift to number 16,000 men had already reached shore

Frequent shelling of Henderson Field continued, as well as daily air attacks. On 23, 24, and 25 October there were strong Japanese land assaults. At sea a major carrier engagement took place on the 26th— the Battle of Santa Cruz Islands.4 In this action a strong enemy carrier and battleship force which was covering transports and auxiliaries was intercepted about 350 miles northeast of Guadalcanal. Although we suffered the sinking of the Hornet and the damaging of the Enterprise, the enemy lost many of the planes comprising the air groups of four carriers, two of which were damaged.
Thereafter the Japanese intensified their efforts to interrupt our communications, achieving considerable success. But they in turn were forced to rely on the “Tokio Express” for reinforcements. An American Task Force of 24 submarines which had begun to operate in the Solomons made this makeshift even less satisfactory. During the first half of November the submarines inflicted the following damage on Japanese communications: sunk, 1 and probably 2 destroyers, 1 light minelayer, 1 oiler, 3 cargo vessels; damaged, 1 seaplane tender (Chiyoda class), 1 heavy cruiser, 1 light cruiser (Natori class), 1 destroyer, 3 or more cargo ships. During the same period surface craft probably destroyed 2 hostile submarines, while Guadalcanal planes probably sank 2 midget submarines.
The Navy and the Marines were cooperating to push the Japanese back on land. Beginning at 0030 on 30 October, the light cruiserAtlanta and four destroyers bombarded enemy positions back of Point Cruz for 8 hours. Next morning the Fifth Marines struck across the Matanikau River, supported by such ships as were available. On 3 November our troops had advanced beyond Point Cruz.
During the preceding night Japanese cruisers and destroyers landed 1,500 men and some artillery east of Koli Point. Our offensive to the west was checked to counter this new threat. But because of the heavy damage Japanese supply lines had been receiving at the hands of the Navy, the enemy failed to reinforce this new landing and was unable to launch a general attack from all sides as he had planned.
On 4 November the San Francisco, Helena, and Sterett bombarded the new force east of Koli Point, setting fires and destroying stores and ammunition. By the 11th only an estimated 700 Japanese remained alive. They escaped to the jungle, where they were exterminated during the ensuing month by the Second Marine Raider Battalion and by disease.

By November our air defenses on the island had been greatly improved. The development of landing facilities in the Lunga area was proceeding rapidly, and the striking power of Marine and Army aircraft was beginning to make itself felt. On 7 November, Guadalcanal planes attacked an enemy light cruiser and 10 destroyers. They scored 1 bomb and 2 torpedo hits on the cruiser, damaged 2 destroyers, and shot down 16 planes.
Under cover of darkness the Japanese continued doggedly to put ashore troops and supplies from cruisers and destroyers and by means of landing boats from neighboring islands. Our PT boats from Tulagi attacked repeatedly. On the night of 6–7 November they sank a destroyer. On other nights they damaged two more. Many landing craft were destroyed by planes and surface guns.
The Japanese were not succeeding in improving their position, and it became apparent that they had decided to strike another blow of major proportions. Enemy surface forces were concentrating in the Rabaul-Buin area. By 12 November these were estimated to include 2 carriers, 4 battleships, 5 heavy cruisers, about 30 destroyers, and the transports necessary for a decisive invasion attempt. Our

aircraft noted at least 60 ships in the Buin-Faisi-Tonolei anchorages, including 4 probable battleships, 6 cruisers, and 33 destroyers.
To ward off the impending attack, Vice Admiral William F. Halsey Jr., Commander South Pacific Force and South Pacific area, had no such imposing strength available. Only one carrier, the Enterprise, was on hand at Noumea, and she was damaged and would not be fully ready for action until 21 November.5 We were inferior in land-based aircraft as well.
Guadalcanal had received some reinforcements from Efate on 6 November. Seven more United States transports were scheduled to sail from other ports with supplies and reinforcements which were even more vitally important. If Admiral Halsey’s combatant forces could not protect them and simultaneously counter the new enemy offensive, we would be obliged to retire from the Solomons, thus jeopardizing the entire Allied position in the South Pacific.

Embarked on board the Noumea Group of Task Force TARE were the Army One Hundred Eighty- Second Reinforced Regiment (less Third Infantry Battalion); Battery “L,” Eleventh Marines (155- mm. howitzer); the Two Hundred Forty-Fifth Field Artillery Battalion (USA); the One Hundred First Medical Regiment; 1,300 officers and men of the Fourth Marine Replacement Battalion; Co. “A,” Fifty-Seventh Engineers (USA); 1 quartermaster company; 1 ordnance company; and 372 naval personnel as reinforcements for the Naval Local Defense Force, as well as considerable ammunition reserves.
The Espiritu Santo Group carried the First Marine Aviation Engineer Battalion, Marine replacements, ground personnel of Marine Air Wing ONE, aviation engineering and operating material, ammunition and food.
In all, about 6,000 men were to be put ashore on Guadalcanal. To protect the landing, Admiral Turner had a total of 3 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 2 light cruisers (antiaircraft), and 14 destroyers—20 combatant ships. He was also to employ this force to seek out and destroy such enemy surface forces as might be found in the Guadalcanal area.

Starting Tuesday, 10 November, planes stationed at Espiritu Santo, the Fijis, and Henderson Field were to scout north and west against surface craft and submarines, and to provide fighters, bombers, and antisubmarine patrol in the Guadalcanal area proper. On 11, 12, and 13 November, enemy air fields in range of Guadalcanal were to be bombed

The four transports of Task Force TARE’S Noumea group with the Portland, Juneau, Barton, Monssen, and O’Bannon sortied on Sunday, 8 November, at 1500.8 The Shaw left on the 9th, joining the rest of the group on the 10th. Admiral Scott’s section of the Espiritu Santo group sailed on Monday, 9 November, and passed north of San Cristobal Island to avoid a group of submarines and to escape discovery by the enemy’s long range air scouts based in the Buin region. However, these vessels were sighted by a large twin-float Japanese seaplane on Tuesday morning. The aircraft apparently was one of two or three of its type which the enemy had started basing on a tender in a location believed at the time to be the Swallow Islands. Its report was possibly responsible for the air attack on the transports at Guadalcanal the next day.
Admiral Callaghan’s section of Task Force TARE departed from Espiritu Santo on Tuesday, 10 November. At 1700, the Pensacola, Gwin, and Preston were detached by COMSOPAC as reinforcements for Task Force KING, which was still at Noumea, but which was preparing to sail to support Admiral Turner.9 The remainder of Admiral Callaghan’s vessels rendezvoused with the Noumea transport group near the eastern end of San Cristobal on Wednesday morning. To prevent air discovery by the Swallow Islands seaplanes, and because a submarine was reported sunk to the west of San Cristobal by

the fast minesweeper Southard (on her way to Aola Bay with troops), a new route south of the island was selected. For the rest of the day the transports and their four escorting destroyers operated about 20 miles in advance of our main fighting strength.
By the afternoon of Monday, 9 November, there was no longer any doubt that the Japanese had set in motion a vast amphibious offensive against Guadalcanal, probably with strong air support.10 Admiral Turner’s considered judgment, together with the reconnaissance reports already mentioned, led him to estimate that the enemy planned to employ 2 to 4 carriers, possibly 2 to 4 fast battleships, as well as cruisers and destroyers, to the northward of Guadalcanal. As protection for at least 1 division of troops in 8 to 12 transports, 2 heavy cruisers, 2 to 4 light cruisers, 12 to 16 destroyers, and several light minelayers would probably operate eastward from Buin. It was anticipated that land-based planes would start bombing Guadalcanal on Tuesday, and that the airfield would perhaps be bombarded by surface craft Wednesday night. A continuous and concentrated carrier air attack on Henderson Field would probably take place on Thursday, with further naval bombardment and landings, perhaps after midnight, on Thursday night, near Cape Esperance or Koli Point. As the narrative progresses, it will be seen that many of these hypotheses were accurate, although no Japanese carriers were directly involved.
Since the enemy invasion force was expected in the Guadalcanal area by Friday, 13 November, it was most important that our transports finish landing their reinforcements and supplies on Thursday and make good their escape. Divorced from responsibility for protecting the transports, the combatant units would be in a better position to carry the fight to the Japanese. If Task Force TARE, with its exceptional antiaircraft strength, managed to turn back the enemy’s initial onslaught, cost what it might, then our land-based aircraft on Guadalcanal, plus the planes of the Enterprise and the battleships of Task Force KING, might dash in and destroy or cripple the main Japanese surface forces.
According to the original plan, Admiral Scott’s cargo vessels from Espiritu Santo were due off Lunga Point, Guadalcanal, at 0530 on Wednesday, 11 November. Admirals Turner and Callaghan were to reach Indispensable Strait that night, after which the Noumea transports would pass through Lengo Channel, if favorable reports were received from minesweepers, and anchor at the unloading point Thursday morning. Admiral Callaghan was to precede the transport group and arrive at the east end of Sealark Channel about 2200. There he was to be joined by Admiral Scott’s fighting vessels, except for three destroyers detached as antiaircraft and antisubmarine protection for the three Espiritu Santo transports. During the night he was to pass through Sealark Channel to Savo Sound and strike any enemy forces he might find, with particular attention to possible transports in their rear. Retiring eastward to Indispensable Strait at daybreak, he was to take up a support position until about 1800, when he would return to cover the final unloading and departure. This was tentatively scheduled for 2200, unless it was found necessary to return the next day to complete the operation, or the expected attack failed to take place. If the Japanese bombarded Guadalcanal or Florida Island during Thursday night, or attempted to land troops, Admiral Callaghan was to be on hand to oppose them.

Later, this plan was changed slightly. On Thursday Admiral Callaghan was to return from Indispensable Strait, as soon as he made sure no enemy vessels were present, and cover the unloading, which was to proceed at top speed all day. If the enemy attacked, he was to form a circular screen at a distance of 1,000 yards from the nearest transports. As far as the landing proper was concerned, all troops were to be put ashore first, carrying 2 days’ rations, water, barracks bags, and one unit of fire, so that they would be ready for action in case the Japanese did succeed in making a landing. Those who were on the beach were to work continuously at unloading the boats. None of the Marines already present on Guadalcanal would be available, since they were dealing with the Japanese land forces.
Admiral Turner stated emphatically to all officers concerned that the safety of our position on the island depended entirely on the rapidity with which the ships were emptied.
FIRST PHASE—ENEMY AIR ATTACKS OF 11 AND 12 NOVEMBER
Wednesday, 11 November
0530 Admiral Scott arrives at Guadalcanal.
0905 Planes reported.
0935 Nine dive bombers sighted; all destroyed. Unloading resumed. 1127 Twenty-seven bombers attack shore installations.
1800 Admiral Scott retires to Indispensable Strait for night.
2200 His combatant forces join Admiral Callaghan.
2330 Admiral Callaghan arrives in Savo Sound for a search.
Admiral Scott reached Guadalcanal at 0530 on Wednesday, as expected, and began unloading supplies on Lunga Point. The sea was calm, with the wind about force two. Surface visibility was unlimited; cloud ceiling was 10,000, with formations low over the mountains on Guadalcanal. At 0905 Radio Guadalcanal reported that 10 bombers and 15 fighters were approaching from the northwest and should arrive at about 0930. At 0910 they were located on a bearing of 300° T., distance 80 miles. Seven minutes later the bearing was 280° T., distance 43. At 0920 Admiral Scott got under way and formed antiaircraft disposition as follows: The Betelgeuse, Libra, and Zeilinwere in column. The Atlanta was several hundred yards ahead of them. The Aaron Ward, Fletcher, Lardner, and McCalla were stationed on the flanks of the column at a distance of 1,500 yards from it. The formation was steaming on course 000° T., speed 15.
At 0930 “bandits” were reported approaching from 230° T., distance 20, and coming in fast. Five minutes later, 9 dive bombers of the Aichi 99 type emerged from the clouds over Henderson Field at about 10,000 feet. The planes were in a rough T formation and peeled off from the right side. Shortly before the first one started its dive, about 0938, the Atlanta and the other ships opened fire. There were bursts close to the leading plane, which sheered away and jettisoned its bombs. Several other aircraft were set afire and downed in the sea. Marine land-based fighters had begun to take a hand, and a single F4F-4 accounted for 4 of the 5 kills scored against the 15 Zero fighters which were protecting the bombers. The latter chose the transports as targets. The Zeilin received 3 near-hits and 1 hold was flooded. The Libra and Betelgeuse were slightly damaged by other near-hits. Personnel casualties were considerable. About half the bombers escaped destruction by antiaircraft fire but were downed by fighter planes during their withdrawal. Six of our planes and 4 pilots were lost, principally because of the inexperience of the personnel.
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Unloading operations were resumed. At 1127 a flight of 25 medium and heavy level bombers, protected by 5 Zeros, came in at 27,000 feet and began attacking ground installations on the island. The transports received no attention, but antiaircraft fire was opened. Most bursts were short, but 1 bomber was believed destroyed. The landplanes downed 6 aircraft for certain and probably 2 others. Henderson Field antiaircraft accounted for 1 additional bomber. One Grumman fighter was lost.
As dusk approached (about 1800), Admiral Scott retired to Indispensable Strait for the night. It was found necessary to send theZeilin back to Espiritu Santo with the Lardner as escort. The damaged ship proceeded under her own power at 10 knots and arrived safely on 14 November.
Meanwhile Admiral Turner’s and Admiral Callaghan’s combined force was approaching on schedule. On the morning of the 11th the Portland’s four seaplanes had been sent back to Espiritu Santo, because the Battle of Savo Island, when the Canberra, Astoria, Quincy, and Vincennes were lost, had demonstrated that during action the presence of cruiser planes on board is a serious fire hazard. The evening air search from Guadalcanal showed no enemy planes or ships in the vicinity, but this was not considered conclusive, so Admiral Callaghan proceeded at high speed in advance of the transports. After reinforcement by Admiral Scott’s combatant ships in Indispensable Strait, he entered Savo Sound at 2330 and made two thorough sweeps east and west of Savo Island. Nothing was found. The entire group remained in the sound and joined Admiral Turner and the transports when they appeared at dawn on Thursday.
Thursday, 12 November
0530 Transports arrive at Guadalcanal.
0718 Enemy shore battery opens up and is silenced.
1010 Friendly aircraft fired on.
1035 Enemy BB’s sighted, 335 miles
1045 Enemy DD’s, 195 miles.
1317 Guadalcanal reports enemy bombers and fighters which could arrive at 1330. 1405 Torpedo planes attack.
1419 Action terminated.
1450 “Two CV and two DD” sighted, 150 miles. Never confirmed.
1525 Transports anchor again.
Admiral Turner’s four transports anchored off Kukum Beach at 0530 on Thursday, and the Betelgeuse and Libra anchored 2 miles east of Lunga Point. Combatant vessels were disposed about the transports in two protective semicircles. The San Francisco, Portland, and Helena lay 3,000 yards away. The Atlanta, Juneau, 11 destroyers, and the fast minesweepers Hovey (Lt. Comdr. Edwin A. McDonald) and Southard (Lt. Comdr. John G. Tennent III),11 which had been sweeping Lengo Channel and the transport area, were stationed 6,000 yards away. The screen had orders to close to 1,000 yards if an air attack eventuated and the transports had to get underway. One submarine contact north of Lunga Point was reported that morning, but depth charge attacks produced no results.
At 0718 a Japanese 6-inch shore battery opened up on the Betelgeuse and Libra. Counter-battery work by our shore guns and shellfire from the Helena, Barton, and Shaw soon caused it to cease firing. Neither of

the cargo vessels was hit, and debarkation continued. Subsequently, the Buchanan and Cushing attacked enemy shore installations farther to the west. Many large fires and explosions were observed. When the range closed to about 1,500 yards, the destroyers used 1.1-inch and 20-mm. machine guns on a number of large Japanese landing boats which had been previously riddled by the fire of ships and aircraft, and further destruction was caused among them. The attack was facilitated by an unidentified but friendly

the Entire Battle Part I can be Found HERE