1980 – Operation Eagle Claw: Crisis in Iran
Crisis in Iran: Operation EAGLE CLAW
Operations
In the mid-1970s, Islamic fundamentalists, urged on by the exiled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, grew more and more dissatisfied with the leadership, reforms, and government of Iran, under Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi. In August, 1978, approximately 44,000 Americans, including 700 military members, 250 defense department employees, and 8,000 defense- related contractor personnel lived in Iran.In early December, when antigovernment demonstrations in Iran began to threaten the well-being of U .S. military dependents in the country, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) directed the Military
Airlift Command(MAC) to fly out dependents wishing to leave Iran. Consequently, on December 8-9, the Twenty-First Air Force flew 2 C-5 and 9 C-141 special assignment airlift missions carrying 903 persons from Mehrabad Airport in Tehran, the capital of Iran, to bases in the United States and Ger- many .Throughout the remainder of the month, violence and disorder mounted, leading the U .S. Department of State to recommend that all American dependents leave the country. By the end of December, the JCS, at the request of the Secre- taryofState,directedMACtoprovidespace-availableseating onscheduledMACflightsfromIrantodependentsofAmeri- can citizens.In response, MAC increased the number ofregu- larly scheduled missions to Tehran to two a day . C-5s and C-141s flew these missions equipped with the maximum number of seats.The airlift continued throughout January 1979 amidst further demonstrations, strikes, and general turmoil.
The Shah fled the country on January 16 and Khomeini triumphantly returned on February 1. He appointed a government four days later and began to transform Iran into a theocratically ruled Islamic state. In addition to draconian domestic measures, he completely abandoned the Shah’s pro- Western orientation and adopted a foreign policy of absolute hostility toward the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In February, an estimated 1 million people demonstrated in Tehran, and at least 500 died in a clash between factions.
As a result of this turmoil, the U .S. Department of State ordered increased efforts to evacuate all American dependents and nonessential industrial and military personnel from Iran.
The JCS also directed the ARKS task force to remain at Sigonella, Italy, pending further guidance . The next morning, armed guerrillas stormed the U.S. Embassy compound in Tehran and seized 102 Americans hostage until Khomeini security forces, responding to U.S. requests for assistance, returned the embassy to U.S.control. The government of Turkey, however, stipulated that the aircraft arrive with no weapons or military equipment aboard, that the helicopters depart for Iran with the permission of the Iranian government, and that the helicopters be used to evacuate only U .S.personnel and their families. On February 17, the Iranian government reopened Mehrabad Airport, and MAC flew its final evacuation mission-a C-141 that airlifted sixty-nine passengers to Athens. Between February 17 and 26, 13 commercial Boeing 747 missions chartered by the state department airlifted 4,099 more passengers from Tehran -to cities in Europe and the continental United States. By March 1, the United States decided to airlift out of Tehran all but skeletal staffs at the embassy and at some corporate headquarters.
The tension continued to mount. Hardly a day passed without some manifestation of anti-American sentiment. News broadcasts, demonstrations, speeches in Parliament, and venomous pronunciations from the Ayatollah reflected this attitude. Khomeini blamed the United States and the “great Sa- tan, “U.S.President James E. Carter, for Iran’s troubles.
In May 1979, a crowd of 150,000 gathered at the U.S.Embassy chanting “death to Carter.” Despite this activity, President Carter, in an effort to maintain contact with Iran, did not recall American Foreign Service personnel. Meanwhile, the Shah, diagnosed with cancer, requested treatment in the United States . Acting against the advice of almost all of his advisors, President Carter allowed the Shah to enter the United States for surgery and radiation treatment at the New York-Cornel lMedical Center. November 4, 1979, the Iranians seized the American embassy and took fifty-three U .S. diplomatic personnel hostage . For the remainder of his presidency, Carter worked to free these citizens. The United States tried diplomatic initiatives, the seizure of Iranian assets, economic sanctions, and passive military air and naval deployments-all failed
From the first day of the crisis, the National Security Coun- cil discussed military options such as the seizure of Iranian oilfields, retaliatory bombing, mining of harbors, total block- ade, various covert operations, and a rescue attempt. President Carter eventually decided to go with the rescue attempt. This decision caught the JCS by surprise.The United States lacked bases and other resources in the area. Intelligence sources in Iran had disappeared after the revolution . Opera- tionally, the United States did not have a force to conduct the rescueorcontingencyplansforit.Afterfivemonthsofinten- sive preparation, a complicated operational rescue plan emerged.It involved eleven groups of men drawn from the U .S.Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Central Intelli- gence Agency (CIA). The President and his military advisors approvedtheplanandordereditsexecution.
The operation, known as EAGLE CLAW, called for 3 MC-130s to carry an assault force of 118 troops from the island of MC-130 flying low over a desert. 128 Masirah, off the coast of Oman, to Iran, landing 200 miles southeast of Tehran at a desolate, uninhabited location called
Desert One. Unfortunately, this site was very close to a highway .Accompanying the MC-130s would be three fuel-bearing EC-130s . After landing in the desert, they would wait for the eight RH-53Dhelicopters. They sent eight helicopters so that if anything went wrong with two, they would still have the minimum number .
The helicopters would then refuel from the EC-130s and load the assault force. The C-130s would return to Masirah while the RH-53s proceeded to the assault force’s hiding site. The helicopters would unload the troops, then proceed to a separate site fifteen miles to the north in the hills, where they would hide during daylight.
Meanwhile, two agents, who would have been placed in Iran several days before, would rendezvous with the assault force and lead the troopers five miles overland to a remote wadi sixty-five miles southeast of Tehran . There they would hide until dark .
The agents would then leave, obtain a pickup truck and a pas- senger van, return to the site, and transport six drivers and six translators to a warehouse in Tehran where six enclosed Mer- cedes trucks were stored.The drivers and translators would pick up the Mercedes trucks, return to the hiding site, pick up the assault force, and enter Tehran .
While the main assault force drove through Tehran to the embassy compound. The assault force, divided into three elements, would neutralize the outside guards, scale the embassy wall, enter the compound, neutralize the interior guards, locate and secure the hostages, and determine if helicopters could land within the embassy grounds . If no obstacles existed, one helicopter would land, pick up the hostages, and fly them to Manzariyeh, an airport approximately thirty-five miles south of Tehran.
The rest of the helicopters would then pick up the assault force. If obstacles existed and could not be removed, the assault force would blow a hole in the embassy wall, and lead the hostages to a nearby soccer stadium where the helicopters could ac- complish the airlift.While the assault force conducted the rescue operations in Tehran, a U.S.Army Ranger contingent would fly in, take ,and secure the airfield at Manzariyeh. They would hold the field
until the helicopters arrived from Tehran . Once everyone ar- rived at Manzariyeh, all of the hostages, drivers, translators,
MC-130 of the type used in the rescue attempt.
helicopter crews, agents, Special Forces personnel, and the assault force would be airlifted out of Iran on C-141 aircraft. The Rangers would then destroy any American equipment left
On Aprl 24, 1979, the first MC-130 launched from the island
of Masirah. It carried the ground and air commanders, a team tasked to block the highway, and one of the assault elements. The other five C-130s would follow one hour later.
As the first MC-130 crossed the Iranian coast, it dropped to 400 feet to avoid enemy radar.At approximately the halfway point, the air commander received word that the eight helicopters had launched from the Nimitz.After landing successfully at Desert One, team members unloaded the equipment. Before they could block the highway, a bus approached the landing zone. The blocking force fired on the bus, stopped it, and detained forty-five Iranians. Before this incident ended, an Iranian gasoline-tanker truck came down the road. When it did not stop, the troopers launched an M72 LAW (light antitankweapon), igniting the truck. Finally, when a small pickup truck approached, the driver evidently sensed the danger, turned around, and fled.The U .S. ground commander decided to continue the mission, and the first MC-130 took off to return to Masirah.
The second MC-130 landed shortly afterward.The burning tanker truck served to light the area, while the troopers un- loaded this aircraft.It then taxied onto the rough airstrip and took offforthe return flight to Masirah.In short order, one more MC-130 and the three EC-130s landed in the desert and took their positions with engines idling to wait for the helicopters.
At first, the helicopter mission bordered approximately two hours after take-off, one crew received cockpit indications of an impending rotor-blade failure. The crew landed, verified the malfunction, and abandoned their aircraft.A companion aircraft landed, picked up the crew, and continued the mission . Approximately one hour later, the pilots saw what appeared to be a fog bank several miles ahead .
They encountered a cyclonic dust storm . Intense winds buffeted the aircraft, and visibility dropped so that the pilots could not see the ground from as low as seventy-five feet, nor could they see the other aircraft. The pilots described the experience as flying in a darkened milk bowl.With no visual references, the pilots, wearing night vision goggles, flew on instruments, at low-level, in the dark, through the turbulent winds .
Several experienced vertigo but successfully kept their aircraft in the air.As the flight contin- ued, another helicopter experiencing navigation and flight- instrument problems, decided to abort and return to the Nimitz.This left six helicopters proceeding to Desert One . Dur- ing the long flight across the desert, a third helicopter experienced hydraulic problems, continued the mission, hoping the problem could be fixed on landing.
Meanwhile, at Desert One, the ground forces waited impa-
tiently.They needed to refuel the helicopters, board them, and fly to the hiding site before daylight, and time was running out.Finally, an hour to an hour and a half late, the helicopters on normal, but began arriving.
The ground commander realized that part of the mission would have to be flown in daylight; still he de- cided to continue . He ordered the assault force to board the helicopters. Simultaneously, the Americans began loading the detainedIraniansonboardtheMC-130forevacuationtothe Manzariyeh Airport . While the assault force boarded the RH-53s, the pilot of the helicopter with hydraulic problems conferred with the helicopter commander . They concluded that the aircraft could not be fixed at Desert One and would have to be abandoned . The commanders decided to refuel the helicopters so that they could return to the Nimitz and load the assault force on the C-130s to return them to Masirah Island.
The desert floor rocked from the roaring engines of four C-130 and five RH-53 aircraft, and dust and sand flew everywhere . While the burning tanker truck cast an eerie glow, the assault force began loading onto the C-130s for evacuation. The helicopters had moved near the EC-130s to refuel when suddenly disaster struck. Evi- dently, a rotary blade on one of the helicopters struck an EC-130 .
The resultant explosion destroyed both aircraft and endangered the other nearby aircraft.
Eight men died. The commanders decided to load everyone on the remaining C-130s and abandon the four functional helicopters. As quickly as possible, the troopers and helicopter crews boarded the Hercules, which took off for Masirah. The mission had tragically failed. Although President Carter continued to work to free the hostages, the Iranians held them captive until January 20, 1981 .
When the news broke, critics attacked everything from the plan to the maintenance of the helicopters, but the major factors contributing to the failure were the unexpected dust storm and the lack of backup helicopters. However, even in those areas, there were extenuating circumstances . The United States had no way to insert meteorologists into the
Iranian desert to predict or warn about dust storms .
The Nimitz could not carry any more helicopters in its hangar nor could any be carried on the deck for fear that Soviet satellites would detect them and the Iranians would be warned . Per- haps the most significant result of the Iranian operation was the eventual formation of the U.S. Special Operations Command and its USAF component, the Air Force Special Operations Command.
The military had learned that especially in operations of this type, where personnel were drawn from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, joint planning and joint training were crucial.
HERE IS THE ACCOUNT FROM THE AIR FORCE:
1980 – Operation Eagle Claw
In the mid-1970s, Islamic fundamentalists led by the exiled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini began to oppose the pro-American Iranian government under Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi. Approximately 44,000 U.S. citizens, including nearly 10,000 military, civilian, and contract personnel, lived in Iran during the summer of 1978, when protests against the Iranian government significantly increased.
As protests continued into the fall, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the U.S. Air Force’s Military Airlift Command (MAC) to evacuate all dependents who wished to leave. On December 8 and 9, 1978, 11 MAC C-141s and C-5 s evacuated 903 people to the United States and Germany. When conditions failed to improve, the USAF increased the number of MAC flights to evacuate U.S. dependents. The Shah abdicated on January 16, 1979, and the Ayatollah returned from exile on February 1, setting the stage for the establishment of an Islamic state. By February 10, 1979, a total of 34 C-5 and 87 C-141 flights had evacuated 5,732 people from Iran while the Joint Chiefs mobilized helicopters, C-130 aircraft, and a contingent of U.S. Marines in case the U.S. Embassy in Tehran needed evacuation.
On February 14, 1979, armed Iranians stormed the embassy and took 102 Americans hostage. After the Ayatollah’s forces intervened and returned control of the embassy to the United States, they allowed the USAF to fly one final C-141 evacuation mission. After that, the U.S. State Department chartered 13 commercial Boeing 747 airliners, which flew an additional 4,099 people out of the country. By March 1, 1979, the U.S. government decided to evacuate all of its citizens except for a minimal staff at the embassy and at several corporate headquarters.
Through the rest of the year tensions remained high and in the autumn the U.S. government allowed the exiled Shah to receive cancer treatment in the United States. That action angered many Iranians, and frustration boiled over on November 4, 1979, when Iranians again seized the embassy, along with the Iranian Foreign Ministry, and took 66 U.S. personnel hostage.
Thirteen hostages were later released, leaving 53 remaining in Iranian custody. For the remainder of his term, President James E. Carter, Jr., sought their release through a variety of means. None were successful and he soon turned to the U.S. military. After considering several options, President Carter decided to authorize a military rescue operation.
Because the U.S. military had no force ready to conduct such an operation in an area in which the United States had few bases or resources, the mission required five months of intensive planning by personnel from all service branches and the Central Intelligence Agency before receiving the President’s approval. Known as Operation Eagle Claw, it called for three USAF MC-130s to carry a 118-man assault force from Masirah Island near Oman in the Persian Gulf to a remote spot 200 miles southeast of Tehran, code-named Desert One. Accompanying the MC-130s were three USAF EC-130s which served as fuel transports. The MC-130s planned to rendezvous with eight RH-53D helicopters from the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz.
After refueling and loading the assault team, the helicopters would fly to a location 65 miles from Tehran, where the assault team would go into hiding.
The next night, the team, dependent upon trusted agents, drivers, and translators, would be picked up and driven the rest of the way to the embassy compound. After storming the embassy, the team and the freed hostages would rally at either the embassy compound or a nearby soccer stadium to be picked up by the helicopter force. The helicopters would then transport them to Manzariyeh, 35 miles to the south, by that time secured by a team of U.S. Army Rangers. Once at Manzariyeh USAF C-141 transports would fly the assault team and hostages out of Iran while the Rangers destroyed the remaining equipment (including the helicopters) and prepared for their own aerial departure. An extremely complex operation, Eagle Claw depended on everything going according to plan. Any deviation could cause the entire operation to unravel with possibly tragic consequences.
In the weeks before the mission, USAF combat controllers covertly deployed into Iran to prepare the landing site at Desert One. The mission began on April 24, 1980, when the first MC-130, carrying the mission commander and USAF combat controllers, arrived at the landing site. The combat controllers were tasked with establishing the airstrips and marshalling the aircraft once they had landed. Soon after the first MC-130 arrived, the plan began to fall apart. First, a passenger bus approached on a highway bisecting the landing zone. The advance party was forced to stop the vehicle and detain its 45 passengers. Soon, a fuel truck came down the highway. When it failed to stop, the Americans fired a light anti-tank weapon which set the tanker on fire and lit the surrounding area. Finally, a pickup truck approached but turned around and departed the area. The assault team commanders, however, decided to continue with the mission. Soon the other five MC-130s aircraft arrived at Desert One to wait for the helicopters. The RH-53 helicopters departed the Nimitz and were en route to Desert One. During the flight, two helicopters aborted because of flight instrument and mechanical problems while the pilot of a third helicopter decided to continue on to Desert One despite hydraulic problems. Soon the remaining six helicopters encountered an unexpected severe dust storm and proceeded individually to Desert One, arriving nearly an hour behind schedule.
Once at Desert One, the RH-53 with hydraulic problems could not be repaired, which left the team with one less helicopter than was required to carry the assault team and hostages. With just five helicopters available, the on-scene commander aborted the mission. The plan then shifted to getting the assault team back on the MC-130s while the helicopters refueled and returned to the Nimitz. At that point, tragedy struck.
One of the helicopter’s rotor blades inadvertently collided with a fuel-laden EC-130. Both aircraft exploded, killing five airmen on the EC-130 and three marines on the RH-53. The team commanders ordered the remaining helicopters abandoned and everyone to board the EC-130s, which soon departed for Masirah Island. With that, Operation Eagle Claw came to an end. President Carter was notified of the mission’s failure, and the wreckage at Desert One was broadcast to the world by the Iranian government. In the remaining months of his presidency President Carter continued to work toward the hostages’ release, although the government of Iran did not do so until the day of President Ronald W. Reagan’s inauguration on January 20, 1981.
A number of significant lessons were learned from Operation Eagle Claw, which led to the establishment of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and its USAF component, the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). The operation also highlighted the necessity of Joint planning and training.
Capt Gregory Ball, USAFR, Ph.D.
USAF participation in 23 contingency operations are summarized in this volume: including types of aircraft flown, and Air Force units involved.
For more information see:
“Crisis in Iran: Operation Eagle Claw” by Edward T. Russell, from the publication: Short of War: Major USAF Contingency Operations 1947-1997.
“Air Force Combat Controllers at Desert One“, by Forrest Marion, from Air Power History, Spring 2009.