WACO, botched ATF sting, four agents 70 cult members dead

Introduction

Remembering WACO, the ATF

In May 1992, ATF began an extensive investigation of David Koresh (a.k.a. David Wayne Howell) and the Branch Davidians, a cult group residing on a large and rural property near Waco, Texas. ATF’s investigation centered on Koresh and the Davidians being involved in the illegal manufacture and possession of machineguns and the illegal manufacture and possession of destructive devices, including bombs and grenades. ATF’s investigation showed that the group acquired:

• 136 firearms, including assault rifles and handguns
• 700+ magazines for those firearms
• 200,000+ rounds of ammunition
• 110 upper and lower receivers for AR15/M16 rifles
• Grenade-launcher attachments for AR15/M16 rifles
• 400+ empty M31 rifle grenades, along with black powder and other explosive chemicals

The investigation included: interviews with former cult members; inspection and interview of a federal firearms dealer; review of documentation showing the purchase of large quantities of AR-15 rifles, ammunition and inert grenades (which can be converted to live grenades); and records from interstate shippers. An ATF undercover agent became an associate member of the Davidians, although with limited access to their compound. Sufficient evidence was gathered to allow for the issuance of federal arrest and search warrants in February 1993, to arrest Koresh and search the compound.

ATF special agents from the Dallas, Houston and New Orleans Field Divisions were assigned to execute federal warrants at the Branch Davidian compound on February 28, ,The Davidians were alerted to the impending raid by a local postman, who was also a cult member. The heavily armed, cult members were waiting in ambush as the agents unloaded from their vehicles. Koresh was outside on the porch, as the agents approached telling him they had a search warrant and instructing him to “get down,” he retreated inside the house. Gunfire burst through the door, as the agents approached, one agent was wounded.

As a result of the 2 1/2 hour long gunfight, four ATF agents were killed; 20 ATF agents wounded from gunshots or shrapnel and eight agents suffered other injuries. A cease-fire followed and Koresh released 24 members (mostly children, but none of his own) from the compound. A 51-day stand-off ended when the Davidian Compound erupted in fire(s) set by cult members, as law enforcement attempted to force them out by introducing tear gas into the building on April 19. The fire destroyed the compound and more than 70 residents were killed, many from gunshot wounds apparently inflicted by fellow cult members. Nine cult members escaped the fire and were arrested, while eight of those members were later convicted in federal court on various firearms and/or other charges; and all were sentenced to various lengths of imprisonment.

A subsequent investigation by the Departments of Treasury and Justice regarding the actions of law enforcement agents during the siege determined that some tactics and decisions were poorly executed; and certain actions by ATF were criticized. However, the September 1993 U.S. Department of Treasury Administrative Review concluded: “…the agency is made up of dedicated, committed and experienced professionals, who have regularly demonstrated sound judgment and remarkable courage in enforcing the law. ATF has a history of success in conducting complex investigations and executing dangerous and challenging law enforcement missions. That fine tradition, together with the line agents’ commitment to the truth and their courage and determination has enabled ATF to provide our country with a safer and more secure nation under law.”

Fallen Agents

Special Agent Conway LeBleu

Special Agent Todd McKeehan

Special Agent Robert Williams

Special Agent Steven Willis 

From the Congressional investigation 1996

On February 28, 1993, a force of 76 ATF agents stormed the Davidian residence to serve the arrest and search warrants. Prior to the commencement of the raid, however, the Davidians had learned of the ATF’s plans. As the agents arrived at the Davidians’ residence, the Davidians engaged the ATF agents in a gun battle which continued for al- most 90 minutes. Four ATF agents were killed in the battle and more than 20 agents wounded. At least two Davidians were killed by ATF agents and several others, including Koresh, were wounded.

After a cease-fire was arranged, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) dispatched members of its Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) to Waco to take control of the situation at the request of the ATF. At 6 a.m. the next morning, the FBI formally took control of the situation and commenced a 51 day standoff with the Davidians. During this time, FBI officials engaged in daily negotiations with the Davidians in an effort to end the standoff peaceably. Between February 18 and March 23, 35 per- sons, including 21 children, left the residence and surrendered to the FBI. From March 23 to April 18, however, none of the remaining Branch Davidians left the residence.
In addition to the continual negotiations with the Davidians, FBI officials took other steps to in- duce the Davidians to surrender.

These tactics included tightening the perimeter around the Davidian residence, cutting off electricity to the residence, and at one point, shining bright lights at the residence and playing loud music and irritating sounds over loudspeakers. During the course of the standoff, FBI negotiators consulted with several experts routinely retained by the FBI. In some cases, the advice of these experts was fol- lowed while in other cases it was not. Many other

these individuals offered credible assistance, the FBI chose to ignore the offers of assistance from all of these persons.

During the week of April 12, senior Justice Department officials began considering a plan developed by the FBI to end the standoff. Attorney General Janet Reno, other senior Justice Department officials, and FBI officials held several meetings concerning the plan.

The FBI also requested the input of Department of Defense employees and military personnel concerning the plan to end the standoff. During these deliberations Associate At- torney General Webster Hubbell personally dis- cussed the status of the negotiations with the FBI’s chief day-to-day negotiator in Waco. The pro- posed plan centered around the use of a chemical riot control agent which would be injected through the walls of the Davidian residence in order to induce the residents to leave the structure. It pro- vided for the methodical insertion of the riot con- trol agent into different parts of the building over a 48 hour period. The plan also contained a contingency provision to be used if the Davidians fired on the FBI agents who were implementing the plan. In that event, the FBI proposed to insert the riot control agent into all portions of the residence simultaneously. As a result of these deliberations, the Attorney General approved the implementa- tion of the plan for April 19, 1993.

At approximately 6 a.m. on April 19, the FBI’s chief negotiator, Byron Sage, telephoned the Davidians and informed them that the FBI was in-

serting the riot control agent into the residence. Sage also began broadcasting a prepared state- ment over loudspeakers that the FBI was ‘‘placing tear gas in the building’’ and that all residents should leave. As the announcement was being made, FBI agents using unarmed military vehicles with booms mounted on them began to insert the riot control agent into the compound by ramming holes into the sides of the structure and then using devices mounted on the booms to spray the riot control agent into the holes in the walls. Almost immediately the Davidians began to fire on the ve- hicles being used by the FBI.

At 6:07 a.m., the commander of the Hostage Rescue Team ordered that the contingency provision of the operations plan be implemented and that the riot control agent be inserted in all portions of the residence at once. During 6 hours of insertion of the riot control agent no residents exited the compound.
At approximately 12:07 p.m., a fire was observed in one portion of the residence. Within 2 minutes, two other fires developed. Within a period of 8 minutes, the three fires had engulfed the entire structure, ultimately destroying it completely.
During the fire, sounds of gunfire from within the structure were heard. Some of these sounds were live rounds exploding in the flames inside the compound. However, other sounds were methodical and evenly-spaced, indicating the deliberate firing of weapons. Nine persons escaped from the struc- ture during the course of the fire but more than 70 other residents remained inside. All of these per- sons died. Of this number, autopsies indicated that 19 died from gunshots at close range. Most of the other residents who remained inside the structure died as a result of smoke inhalation from the fire or from burns from the fire.
B. FINDINGS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEES AUGUST 2, 1996.

As a result of its investigation, the subcommittees make the following findings:
The Branch Davidians

1. But for the criminal conduct and aberrational behavior of David Koresh and other Branch Davidians, the tragedies that occurred in Waco would not have occurred. The ultimate responsibil- ity for the deaths of the Davidians and the four Federal law enforcement agents lies with Koresh.
2. While not dispositive, the evidence presented to the subcommittees indicates that some of the Davidians intentionally set the fires inside the Davidian residence.
3. The Davidians could have escaped the residence for a significant period of time after the start of the fire. Most of the Davidians either did not attempt to escape from the residence or were prevented from escaping by other Davidians.
4. The gunshot wounds which were the cause of death of 19 of the Davidians on April 19 were either self-inflicted, inflicted by other Davidians, or the result of the remote possibility of accidental discharge from rounds exploding in the fire.
   
5. Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen and Deputy Secretary Roger Altman acted highly irresponsibly and were derelict in their duties in failing to even meet with the Director of the ATF in the month or so they were in office prior to the February 28 raid on the Davidians residence, in failing to request any briefing on ATF operations during this time, and in wholly failing to involve themselves with the activities of the ATF.

For the full report here